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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-5195

MICHAEL JONES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF APPEALS

[February - , 1983)

delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 24-301(d) of the District of Columbia Code 1 provides that a person tried for a crime and acquitted solely by
reason of insanity may, after a 50-day evaluation period, be
committed to a mental institution indefinitely unless he
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no
longer mentally ill and dangerous. We granted certiorari to
determine whether the Due Process clause of the Fifth
Amendment permits indefinite commitments under such cirJUSTICE BRENNAN

' "(1) If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground
that he was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a
hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or subsection (e) of this section.
"(2)(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection
shall have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to
determine whether he is entitled to release from custody. At the conclusion of the criminal action referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection,
the court shall provide such person with representation by counsel ....
"(B) ... Within 10 days from the date the hearing was begun, the court
shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law
with respect thereto. The person confined shall have the burden of proof.
If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate." D.C.
Code § 24-301(d) (1981).
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JONES v. UNITED STATES

454 U. S. 1141 (1982).

I
Of central importance to this case is the system Congress
established in 1970 when it amended§ 24-301 ("§ 301") as part
of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, § 207, 84 Stat. 473, 601-603. Section 301
addresses the general topics of the insanity defense and mental competency to be tried. In its 1970 amendments, Congress left in place a requirement that defendants plead insanity affirmatively, and it added a sentence to subsection (j)
stating, "No person accused of an offense shall be acquitted
on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is
affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence." 2 It also substantially revised subsection (d), which
specifies what happens to a person who, like petitioner, is acquitted solely by reason of insanity ("insanity acquittee"). 3

--;

'See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 73 (1970).
Note that a person acquitted by reason of insanity cannot be committed
automatically after his acquittal or forced to bear the burden of proof in
order to obtain release at a § 30l(d)(2) hearing unless he raised the defense
himself. § 301(d)(l); see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 u: S. 705 (1962). Petitioner has never claimed that the Government, not he, raised the question
of insanity in this case.
3
Before 1970, § 301 had required automatic commitment of all insanity
acquittees to a psychiatric hospital. In Bolton v. Harris, 130 U. S. App.
D. C. 1, 395 F. 2d 642 (1968), however, the United States Court of Appeals-which then exercised appellate jurisdiction over District of Columbia Code offenses-had held that insanity acquittees had to be given a judicial hearing with procedures substantially similar to those in civil
commitment proceedings before they could be held beyond a reasonable period necessary to evaluate their present mental condition. The current
version of § 301(d) represents a partial codification of the Bolton holding
insofar as it requires a judicial hearing, but it mandates procedures markedly different from those which apply at civil commitment hearings. See
H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 74; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1303, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., 233 (1970) (conference report); n. 7, infra.
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Subsection (d)(l) now provides that an insanity acquittee
shall be committed automatically to a hospital for the mentally ill until he qualifies for release under one of the other
provisions of the statute. Subsection (d)(2), however, requires that such a person be given a hearing within 50 days of
his confinement to determine whether he is eligible for release. The court ordering the initial commitment must ensure that the insanity acquittee is represented by counsel.
At the 50-day hearing, "[t]he person confined shall have the
burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person confined is entitled to his release
from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court
shall enter such order as may appear appropriate." See
n. 1, supra. Both the insanity acquittee and the Government have a right to appeal : the court's decision.
§ 301(d)(3). 4
'
Judicial interpretations have filled certain important lacunae in the statutory scheme just described. Section 301, for
instance, nowhere states the substantive standard for acquittal by reason of insanity. At the time of the proceedings at
issue in this case, the District of Columbia courts employed
the so-called "Durham rule," acquitting by reason of insanity
if the criminal act with which a defendant was charged was "a
'If an insanity acquittee does not win release at the 50-day hearing, or if
he waives the hearing altogether, any subsequent efforts to obtain release-conditional or unconditional-are governed by subsections (e) or
(k). Subsection (e) provides that when the superintendent of the mental
hospital in which an insanity acquittee is confined certifies to the court that
he has regained his sanity, will not be dangerous to himself or others in the
reasonable future, and is entitled to release, the court may release him if
the Government does not object. If the government does object, the court
must hold a hearing. Under subsection (k), an insanity acquittee still in
custody may initiate proceedings to obtain his release at six-month intervals, and the statute dictates that he bear the burden of proof "on all issues." In addition, an insanity acquittee may apply for habeas corpus if he
has exhausted his other remedies under the statute. See §§ 301(g),
301(k)(7).

81-5195-OPINION
JONES v. UNITED STATES

4

product of a mental disease or defect." 5 Nor does § 301
state specifically what showing would entitle an insanity
acquittee to release at a 50-day hearing under subsection (d),
but the Court of Appeals in this case held that the insanity
acquittee must show that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous to himself or others. 6 What the court below called
"[t]he twofold proof requirement of mental illness and dangerousness," see 432 A. 2d 364, 372 (1981) (en bane), also applies in civil commitment proceedings in the District of Columbia, with the important difference that there the
Government must bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. 7
At the time of petitioner's first hearing, the District of Columbia Superior Court still used the standard for determining insanity that had been
used by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit from 1954 to 1972. See Durham v. United States, 94 U. S. App.
D. C. 228, 214 F. 2d 862 (1954); United States v. Brawner, 153 U. S. App.
D. C. 1, 471 F. 2d 969 (1972). Shortly after petitioner's hearing, however,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, like the United States Court of
Appeals before it, abandoned the Durham test in favor of one like that proposed by the American Law Institute. See B ethea v. United States, 365
A. 2d 64J 79 (DC 1976).
• United States v. Jones, 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en
bane). The court held that the same showing was required for release at a
§ 301(d)(2) hearing as would justify subsequent release under§ 301(e) if the
superintendent of the hospital to which an insanity acquittee had been committed certified the acquittee's eligibility for release to the court. Although § 301(e) is phrased in the conjunctive-i. e., it appears that an insanity acquittee would have to be both no longer mentally ill and no longer
dangerous to obtain release-the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
clearly interprets the standard as justifying release if either condition is
met. Ibid.
7
See D.C. Code § 21-545(b) (1981). That section does not expressly require clear and convincing proof, but the requirement has been read into it
after Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), held that due process required clear and convincing proof. See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC
1979). There are other differences between procedures for civil committees and § 301 release procedures. Candidates for civil commitment may
demand a jury for their commitment hearing. D.C. Code § 21-545(a)
5

:J
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II
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested as he apparently tried to shoplift a jacket from a department store in
the District of Columbia. He was arraigned the next day in
the District of Columbia Superior Court on a single charge of
attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by no
more than one year's incarceration. 8 At the arraignment,
the court (on its own motion) requested the Forensic Psychiatry office at the District of Columbia General Hospital to perform a preliminary examination of petitioner's competency to
stand trial. 9 The examining psychiatrist reported two days
later that, in his opinion, petitioner was competent to stand
trial, but that he should be committed to a psychiatric hospital for treatment, because he showed signs of a mental disorder, including auditory hallucinations. 10 The court then ordered petitioner committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital ("St.
Elizabeth's"), a public hospital for the mentally ill, for a more
extended evaluation of his competency. 11
(1981). After the initial commitment, a civil committee may obtain his release at any time, without judicial review, if the chief of service of the hospital where he is committed determines that he "is no longer mentally ill to
the extent that he is likely to injure himself or other persons if not hospitalized." D.C. Code § 21-546(a) (1981); compare § 301(e). See also id.,
§ 21-548. Like insanity acquittees, civil committees may request judicial
hearings every six months to determine whether they may be released,
even if the hospital has not recommended release. Compare§§ 21-546(a),
21-547 with § 301(k).
8
See D.C. Code §§ 22-103, 22-2202 (1981).
• See App. 1, Record 46. Section 301(a) provides that the court may
order such an examination if it appears to the court "that, from the court's
own observations or from prima facie evidence submitted to it ... [the defendant] is of unsound mind or mentally incompetent so as to be unable to
understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense .... "
10
See Record 47.
11
Until early February 1976, however, petitioner remained in the District of Columbia Correctional Center awaiting an opening in the evalua-
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Petitioner spent four weeks at St. Elizabeth's. A psychologist at St. Elizabeth's submitted a report to the court,
stating the opinion of the St. Elizabeth's staff that petitioner
was competent to stand trial. However, the staff also expressed the opinion that if petitioner had in fact committed
the offense it was "the product of his mental disease," which
the staff diagnosed as "Schizophrenia, paranoid type." 12
Sometime shortly after the court and the parties received
this report, petitioner pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity.
Trial was held on petitioner's attempted petit larceny
charge on March 12, 1976. There is no record of the trial except for the Superior Court docket entry. It indicates that
the Government and petitioner's counsel stipulated to a statement of facts, that the Government presented testimony by
the same psychologist who had prepared the St. Elizabeth's
report, and that the court found petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered him committed to St. Elizabeth's
pursuant to § 301(d)(l). See App. 3.
On May 25-somewhat more than 50 days later-petitioner
received his 50-day hearing pursuant to § 301(d)(2)(A). The
Government announced at the outset of the hearing that it
was prepared to go forward with the testimony of Dr. Gertrude Cooper, another staff psychologist at St. Elizabeth's.
The Government noted, however, that the burden was on petitioner to prove that he should be released at this hearing. 13
In brief testimony, Dr. Cooper stated that she had interviewed petitioner once and seen him around the Ward an unspecified number of times, and she repeated the general opinion of the staff 14 as well as some second-hand observations by
tion ward at St. Elizabeth's. See id., at 48-51.
12
See id., at 51. The report also disclosed that petitioner was being
given 400 milligrams of Thorazine (a psychotropic drug) daily, and that, in
the opinion of the staff, petitioner did not require hospitalization pending
trial.
13
See May 25 Transcript 3-4.
14
In response to the Government's request to describe petitioner's con-
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the occupational therapists. 10 Dr. Cooper also testified that
the staff at St. Elizabeth's continued to diagnose petitioner as
suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type, and that "because his illness is still quite active, he is still a danger to himself and to others." She concluded, ''We would like to keep
Petitioner's
him still at the hospital and work with him." 16
cross examination was even briefer-it established that Dr.
Cooper was unsure whether petitioner had committed larceny or assault, but that "based on what [she] recall[ed] of
the record, he is likely to repeat the same conduct either
way." 11
duct on the Ward, Dr. Cooper testified: "Well, pretty much all of us have
agreed that he is [a] very self-a-facing [sic] individual and no one really gets
to !mow him ve:ry well. He does not create any problems. He doesn't get
into any difficulty but he also does not lead to active social life. He is not a
very active participant in the informal activities on the Ward. The patients play cards, play pool, do things like that. He keeps to himself more.
"I might add, this is sort of a heavy dose of medication and we are hoping
that as his illness becomes less active that we can reduce that." Id., at
8-9. Dr. Cooper also testified that petitioner was being given 900 milligrams of Thorazine a day at that time. Id., at 8. (Shortly before the
hearing, however, she submitted a report which indicated that petitioner
was receiving 1000 milligrams of Thorazine daily, plus a tranquilizer.
Record 54.)
1
• Dr. Cooper reported information she had received from the Occupational Therapy Department: "They found that Mr. Jones is quiet; that he
responds to other people both patients and staff. He does not initiate contact. That he tends to be by himself. That he carries out projects in an
acceptable fashion. That while some of the time he may accept their technical direction and other times he seems to ignore it. For example, having
finished a piece of copper work ... he was advised then to apply a coat of
laquer. This he chose to ignore and would not do it which caused the therapy assistant some anxiety.
"In shbrt he is not always responsive in a positive way to what goes on
but there are some positive features. He does want to recover. He does
ask for suggestions as to what he might do and we feel he is positively motivated." May 25 Transcript 7.
0
_ : ] ' ld., at 9.
11
Id., at 10-11. Counsel also asked whether petitioner would do better
in a less restrictive wing of St. Elizabeth's, but the Government success-
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At the close of the hearing, the court declared, "[T]he defendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of his mental illness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to himself and others." 18 Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeth's, although
the court issued no formal order of commitment and the
docket showed only that the case had been continued for six
months.
The fact that the docket did not reflect that a hearing had
been held caused some confusion, and, in October 1976, new
counsel appeared for petitioner and demanded a § 301(d)(2)
release hearing. After some procedural maneuvering, a second Superior Court hearing was held on February 22, 1977,
at which petitioner demanded to be released or recommitted
under customary civil commitment standards. Having studied the May 25 transcript and having heard argument on the
constitutionality of petitioner's continued confinement, the
court reaffirmed the findings at the earlier hearing, and it
specifically denied petitioner's request that the Government
be required to bear the burden of proof at a new hearing if it
wished to keep him in St. Elizabeth's. 19
Petitioner appealed this ruling to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Superior Court; then it granted rehearing and reversed. 20 Finally, the court heard the case en bane and affirmed the Superior Court ruling. It held:
fully objected to that line of questioning.
18
Id., at 13.
19
Record 29--30. Petitioner based his claim for relief on Waite v. Jacobs, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 281, 287, 475 F. 2d 392, 398 (1973), and United
States v. Brown, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 402, 408, 478 F. 2d 606, 612 (1973),
in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had suggested that when an individual acquitted by reason of insanity had been in
detention for a considerable period of time, not longer than the sentence he
would have served had he been convicted, his continued detention should
be governed by civil commitment standards. See Record 66.
00
396 A. 2d 183 (1978); 411 A. 2d 624 (1980) (on rehearing).
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"[T]he acquittee's mental illness is initially established by [affirmative proof. Dangerousness is no less validly established by proof that the defendant committed the criminal
act, a finding necessarily underlying any acquittal by reason
of insanity....

"[T]he presumption that a mental condition continues is a
reasonable one and it is also reasonable to require the person
who raised the presumption to refute it by affirmative proof."
_ 432 A. 2d, at 373--374.

l

[

III
Government to commit him indefinitely without ever proving
-j~ ..t Jue
1roc.e !.S
by clear and convincing evidence that he meets the commitdoes. nc-f rer..-. i-J the. ment requirements in § 301(d)-i. e., that he is presently
mentally ill and would be a danger to himself or others if released. His case rests primarily on three unanimous decisions handed down by this Court during the past decade:
Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), and Jackson v. Indiana,
rr:,'""\406 u. s. 715 (1972). 21
\!.;)Addington and O'Connor dealt with "civil commitment":
state-imposed psychiatric hospitalization premised on an individual's mental illness but not necessarily on the fact that he
has committed a criminal offense, the most familiar type of
O'Connor held that a meninvoluntary commitment. 22
tally ill individual had a "right to liberty," which the State
could not abridge by confining him to a mental institution,

Pe.fit,'0>1(•

c...rjue~

None of this Court's opinions has interpreted the Due Process clause
with respect to the involuntary commitment of insanity acquittees. The
one case in which it has dealt with the rights of insanity acquittees, Lynch
v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962), involved statute~· interpretation of an
earlier version of§ 301, see nn. 2--3, supra, rather than the Constitution.
22
See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190, 1193 (1974).

/

/
. .:.

''"<\

__,

\

\

21

_,,,,.-d'--
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even for the purpose of treating his illness, unless in addition
to being mentally ill he were likely to harm himself or others
if released. 422 U.S., at 573-576; see id., at 589 (BURGER,
C. J., concurring). Then, in Addington, the Court carefully evaluated the standard of proof in civil commitments according to the due process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976), holding finally that "due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence," 441
U. S., at 427, specifically "clear and convincing evidence,"
id., at 433. The level of certainty involved in "clear and convincing evidence" was necessary to preserve fundamental
fairness to candidates for civil commitment in light of their
strong interest against involuntary confinement and psychiatric treatment, see id., at.427; cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U. S. 745, 766-770 (1982); yet to require more as a constitutional matter would unduly impair governmental efforts to
protect both mentally ill individuals and society at large, 441
c.-:,. U. S., at 427-431.
\..2!.)Jackson v. Indiana considered the commitment of persons
charged with a crime but found incompetent to stand trial.
It held that "due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." 406 U. S., at
738. Consequently, the State was not permitted to hold the
defendant more than the reasonable period of time necessary
to determine whether he was competent or likely to attain
competence in the foreseeable future, unless it instituted the
t'°r.:\customary procedures for civil commitment. Ibid.
\J.!/Petitioner's contention is that, once he has been confined for
longer than the maximum sentence he could have received
for attempted petit larceny, the Government has no greater
interest in keeping him hospitalized involuntarily than it has
in civil commitment cases. Like the involuntary committees
in Jackson, therefore, he argues that the Government may

1

l
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not continue his involuntary commitment unless it at least accords him the minimum due process protection recognized in
Addington: that the Government must bear the burden of
proving his committability by clear and convincing evidence.
Recognizing that the current version of§ 301(d) represents a
congressional judgment that the Government should not have
to carry the burden of proof in initiating or continuing his
commitment, see H. R. Rep. No. 91-1303, supra, n. 2, at
233, petitioner concedes what cannot harm him-that the
Government has legitimate reasons to commit insanity
aquittees for some period of time without carrying the burden of proof prescribed in Addington. But he argues that
confinement without clear and convincing evidence to justify
it can extend only for a reasonable period of time, and at most
only as long as he could have been incarcerated had he been
convicted on his criminal charges rather than acquitted by
reason of insanity.
@rhe issue, therefore, is not whether the Due Process clause
forbids treating insanity acquittees differently from other
civil commitment candidates. Petitioner concedes that they
should be treated differently for some purposes. The dispute before us, rather, concerns whether the differences between insanity acquittees and other civil commitment candidates justify treating them differently on a permanent basis, ,
as § 301(d) provides, by relieving the Government of ever
meeting the Addington burden. 23
23

In the courts below, petitioner argued that he had a right to a jury on
equal protection grounds as well as the due process rights defined in
Addington, arguing that because he is similarly situated to candidates for
civil commitment the Government must commit him under the civil commitment provisions in the District of Columbia Code, see note 7 supra, but
he has not pressed his jury claim before this Court. Accordingly, we do
not reach petitioner's equal protection theory, and we express no opinion
whether either due process or equal protection give him a right to a jury
determination of his present mental illness and dangerousness.
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Involuntary confinement and psychiatric treatment, if unnecessary, represent a massive intrusion on individual autonomy; yet the governmental interests in commitment are often
strong, lying at the core of the State's traditional parens patriae and police powers. No set of procedures and standards
can guarantee error-free commitment decisions, but when
both governmental and individual interests are at their strongest, we can try to reduce the consequences and likelihood of
error. Therefore, following the approach of Addington and
Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, we address the petitioner's interests in avoiding unjustified commitment, the Government's interests in continuing petitioner's commitment without meeting the requirements of Addington, and the
possibility that alternativ¢s will protect individual interests
more without compromising the Government's legitimate
objectives.
'
A

Every person presumptively has an interest in not being
hospitalized and subjected to psychiatric treatment involuntarily. "The Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation
of liberty that requires due process protections." Addington
v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425; see Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S.
584, 600-601 (1979). Mental illness without more "does not
disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts
of an institution." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at
575. Even prison inmates who may be mentally ill have an
interest in remaining in the general population rather than
being placed in a mental hospital:
"None of our decisions holds that conviction for a crime
entitles a State not only to confine the convicted person
but also to determine that he has a mental illness and to
subject him involuntarily to institutional care in a mental
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hospital. . .
A criminal conviction and sentence of
imprisonment extinguish an individual's right to freedom
from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they
do not authorize the State to classify him as mentally ill
and to subject him to involuntary treatment without affording him additional due process protections." Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 493--494 (1980). 24
Petitioner's interest in avoiding involuntary commitment is
no weaker than that of a person threatened with civil commitment. The Government argues that, by raising the insanity
defense, petitioner labelled himself as mentally ill-at least
as of the date of his attempt to steal the jacket-and thus he
lacks an interest in avoiding the social stigma that may attach
to mental illness. Avoiding stigma, however, is only one of
the reasons why an individual might object to involuntary
commitment. 25 Several of this Court's cases have recognized
We do not suggest, of course, that the Government must meet the
standards of Addington and O'Connor in seeking to commit individuals for
treatment while they are legitimately in custody. See Vitek v. Jones,
supa at 494--496, cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 617--629 (wards of the
state).
2;'5 In Addington and Vitek the Court recognized an interest in not being
stigmatized by society at large on account of being labelled "mentally·ill," .
see 441 U. S., at 426; 445 U. S., at 492. Yet other aspects of involuntary
commitment affect the individual in a far more immediate way: "Persons
incarcerated in mental hospitals are not only deprived of their physical liberty, they are also deprived of friends, family, and community. Institutionalized mental patients must live in unnatural surroundings under the
continuous and detailed control of strangers. They are subject to intrusive treatment which, especially if unwarranted, may violate their right to
bodily integrity. Such treatment modalities may include forced administration of psychotropic medication, aversive conditioning, convulsive therapy, and even psychosurgery." Parham v. J.R., supra, at 626 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
Once the individual is hospitalized involuntarily, he may to a significant
extent lose the right enjoyed by others to refuse medical treatment. See
Youngberg v. Romeo, - - U.S.--, - - (1982) (involuntary commit21

81--5195--OPINION
14

JONES v. UNITED STATES

that persons who have already been labelled as mentally ill
nonetheless retain an interest in avoiding involuntary hospitalization and treatment. E. g., O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U. S., at 575; Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966).
Even those who admit they are mentally ill may, if competent, select an appropriate course of treatment unless some
legitimate governmental interest justifies depriving them of
that freedom.
Therefore, treating insanity acquittees
differently from other civil commitment candidates cannot be
justified by reference to the interests of the insanity
acquittees themselves. 26
tee's due process right to freedom from unreasonable restraint limited to a
guarantee that professional judgment has been exercised). It is possible
(although this Court has never approved the practice) that he will be subjected to restraint or medication for reasons that have more to do with the
needs of the institution than with his individualized treatment needs. See
Mills v. Rogers, - - U.S.--, - - (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d
836, 845 (CA3 1981) (en bane). This treatment may affect his very personality and his ability to think or to function in the outside world. Once the
Government has established that he is not capable of caring for himself,
sound policy may limit his ability to seek judicial relief from day-to-day professional treatment decisions, see Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, at--;
Parham v. J.R., supra, at 618, but we cannot presume that he lacks a
strong interest in having that initial determination made carefully or in
preserving the maximum degree of personal autonomy. See also Burt, Of
Mad Dogs and Scientists: The Perils of the "Criminal-Insane", 123 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 258, 261-273 (1974).
26
There can be no question that an individual's interest in avoiding unjustified commitment gives him an interest in who bears the burden of
proof at a commitment hearing. "To experienced lawyers it is commonplace that the outcome of a lawsuit-and hence the vindication of legal
rights-<lepends more often on how the factfinder appraises the facts than
on a disputed construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of precedents. Thus the procedures by which the facts of the case are determined
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule
of law to be applied. And the more important the rights at stake, the
more important must be the procedural safeguards surrounding those
rights." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 520--521 (1958); see Addington
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B
The Government claims that § 301's special procedures for
insanity acquittees serve two legitimate objectives. The
first is simply greater accuracy in the commitment process.
The Government argues that the most important function of
the Addington standard is to protect those who exhibit odd
behavior-but who are not mentally ill or dangerous-from
the inherent uncertainty of diagnoses and clinical predictions
of dangerousness. 27 As a class, the argument continues, insanity acquittees are more likely to be presently mentally ill
and dangerous than other candidates for civil commitment, so
there is no need for Addington's protections (with the risk
they entail that dangerous persons will be released because
the Government cannot meet its burden).
Second, the Government notes that the procedures and
standards for committing insanity acquittees are inextricably
linked to those that apply to the insanity defense itself. 28

·- ;

l

n.

v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 423. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510,
524 (1979).
27
See Brief for the United States, 37: "[I]n the case of the insanity
acquittee, there is a greatly diminished hazard of improvident commitment
resting solely upon 'abnormal behavior which might be perceived by some
as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact
within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable.' [Addington v. · \·
Texas, 441 U.S., at 426-427.)" See also H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra,
-ft. 2, at 74; Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S., at 715 (dictum).
28
In contexts other than civil commitment, the State may have legitimate reasons to commit mentally ill individuals besides the likelihood that
they will be dangerous to themselves or others ifreleased. Jackson v. Indiana aclrnowledged that the State's interest in determining whether the
accused would be able to stand trial in the foreseeable future justified commitment for a "reasonable period of time.'' 406 U. S., at 738; McNeil v.
Director, Pautuxent Institution, 407 U. S. 245, 249--250 (1972)(accepting
the legitimacy of short-term confinement of convicted criminal for a psychiatric evaluation). Yet the Court has rejected the argument that criminal
charges alone justified indefinite commitment if the State could not make
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The Government argues that Congress made an appropriate,
compassionate decision to allow mentally ill defendants to escape punishment by proving their insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, thus making assertion of the insanity
defense considerably easier than the Constitution requires,
see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 799 (1952). According
to the Government, however, the necessary complement of
that choice was placing the burden on insanity acquittees to
disprove continued mental illness and dangerousness at the
subsequent commitment stage. This system arguably discourages spurious "not guilty by reason of insanity" pleas. 29
Furthermore, the Government maintains, a system in which
it was easy for an accused to avoid criminal punishment on
the basis of mental illness and yet hard to isolate that person
and ~nsure that he receives psychiatric treatment would
eventually prove unacceptable to the public. 30
the showing required for regular civil commitment. See Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U. S., at 729-730. Several other decisions assume that
the State may, without proving dangerousness, commit for treatment a
person already legitimately in custody. See, e. g., Vitek v. Jones, 445
U. S. 480 (1980); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 510 (1972); cf.
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, 111 (1966). See also Parham v. J.R.,
supra, 442 U. S., at 619 (where State stands in loco parentis it may act in
best interests of a minor child).,
29
Brief for the United States, 39, n. 30.
30
See id., at 37-39; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, n. 2, at 74; cf. Note,
Rules for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and Release of Persons
Acquitted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N. Y. U. L. Rev.
281, 299-303 (1982).
The Government eschews reliance on a third rationale for treating insanity acquittees differently: that they may be punished for having committed
a criminal act by confining them to a mental intstitution. The dissenting
opinion below argued that this was Congress's true purpose in enacting the
current version of§ 301(d). See 432 A. 2d, at 378-381 (Ferren, J., dissenting). It is questionable whether confinement to a mental institution and
subjection to "psychopharmacological management" (which is now the
dominant form of institutiJi2al mental treatment), see American Psychi- .J....
atric Association, Statement on the Insanity Defense 15 (1982 (hereinafter )

"

,.
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Neither of these rationales justifies a permanent adjustment in the standard and burden of proof required for an involuntary commitment. 31 Addington considered the strong
public interest in committing those who are mentally ill and
dangerous, but held that those interests were adequately
served by a system in which the Government had to prove
the predicates for commitment by clear and convincing evidence. A significant departure from that benchmark is acceptable only if it is reasonably related to objectives not
present in Addington, and then only if there are no alternatives that accomodate the additional public interests with less
danger to individual interest. 32 In this case, the GovernAPA Statement)1, would pass constitutional muster as appropriate punishment for a crime. Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349,
366-367 (1910) (describing cadena temporal) with n. 25, supra. In any
event, it would be difficult to justify confining insanity acquittees for
longer than those found guilty of the same cri~es without proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of some additional fact. Cf. infra, at 21-22.
31
The Government's two justifications for § 301(d)'s departures from the
Addington standards are somewhat inconsistent. If the Government
were required to disprove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt once the defense had been raised, see Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469 (1895),
acquittal by reason of insanity would not necessarily be an accurate indicator of present mental illness.and dangerousness, so (under the first theory) presumably the Government could not rely on the insanity acquittal at
the subsequent commitment stage. But (on the Government's second theory) such a lenient standard for avoiding punishment would demand commitment standards that made it very difficult for insanity acquittees to
avoid involuntary commitment. In a jurisdiction that required the defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, see Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790 (1952), the opposite would be true: an insanity acquittal would be
highly accurate, but there would be no need to favor the Government at
the commitment stage in order to deter spurious insanity pleas or to "balance" the insanity acquittal/commitment system.
32
The Court has often inquired whether alternative procedures more
protective of individual interests were reasonably likely to accomplish the
State's legitimate objectives. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S.
319, 335 (1976), at 235; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 657--658 (1972);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542--543 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S.

~
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ment's arguments might at most support depriving insanity
acquittees of the due process protections in Addington for a
limited period of time, but they cannot support relieving the
Government of its Addington burden permanently. 33
C
The determination at a prior proceeding that petitioner
committed a criminal act, which was the product of a mental
disease or defect, certainly has relevance to the question
whether he should be committed, but it is not enough to justify the permanent shift in the burden of proof that § 301(d)
establishes. There is a substantial body of research suggesting that a consistent pattern of past violent behavior is a good
indication of the likelihood of future violence in the near
term, 34 and the same may well be true of criminal, non-violent
254, 267 (1970). Addington's assessment of the comparative merits of various standards of proof demonstrates the role of alternatives in our due
process analysis of involuntary commitment. See 441 U. S., at 425--433.
The Court has also rejected indefinite commitments where the State's purposes would be fully served by commitments of limited duration, with an
opportunity to renew the commitment at the end of its definite term. See
Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U. S., at 738; McNeil v. Director,
Paut/xent Institution, 407 U. S., at 249; cf. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S.,
at 510-511.
33
Thus, we need not consider the legitimacy of the interests asserted by
the Government, or to what extent they might justify departing from the
standards in Addington. The judgment below must be reversed if, assuming for the purposes of argument that the Government's interests are legitimate, they could not justify depriving petitioner of his Addington protections at the second hearing.
MJ. Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 71, 80-81
(NIMH 1980) (hereinafter Monahan); see, e. g., Cocozza, Melick &
Steadman, Trends in Violent Crime Among Ex-Mental Patients, 16 Criminology 317 (1978); Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, The Insanity Plea in
New York State, 51 N. Y. St. B. J. 186, 221-222 (1979). Note, however,
that Cocozza et al.'s study showed that ex-mental patients with a single
prior arrest were slightly less likely than members of the general population to be arrested again for a violent crime. The frequency of prior violent behavior is an important criterion in statistical predictions of future
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behavior like the attempted larceny in this case. Such considerations are inevitably taken into account at a commitment
hearing, if not by legislative adjustment of the commitment
standards, then through individualized assessments by mental health professionals whose understanding of the case at
hand is informed by research.
This Court's decisions suggest that the mere fact of past
criminal behavior has never justified permanent departure
from the minimum due process standards associated with
civil commitment. In Addington the petitioner did not dispute that he had engaged in a wide variety of assaultive conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges had
the State chosen to prosecute. See 441 U. S., at 420-421.
Similarly, the petitioner in Jackson v. Indiana had been
charged with two robberies, and this Court required the
State to follow its civil commitment procedures if it wished to
commit him for more than a limited period of time.
Bax:strom v. Herold involved a set of involuntarily committed
patients all of whom had been convicted of various offenses,
and yet the Court determined that they could not be treated
differently than other civil commitment candidates after their
convictions expired. The principal difference between this
case and Baxstrom is petitioner's admission that his attempted larceny was "the product" of his mental illnessi but
the evidence that criminal behavior by the mentally ill is'
likely to repeat itself, see note 34 supra, does not distinguish
between behaviors that were the product of mental illness
and those that were not. 35
There are many ways to take into account petitioner's past
conduct and mental condition without permanently excusing
violence. See 10,' Mom1:lr11:n, ,Htpt a, 11:t 108.
35
The connection between a person's mental condition and specific criminal acts required to find that person "not guilty by reason of insanity" is
more a social judgment than a sound basis for clinical prediction. It is
doubtful that persons acquitted by reason of insanity display a rate of future "dangerous" activity higher than civil committees with arrest records.

81--5195-0PINION
20

JONES v. UNITED STATES

the Government from meeting its Addington burden. The
most obvious are simply allowing the finder of fact to consider them in reaching a commitment decision, or requiring
mental health professionals who testify at a § 301(d)(2) hearing to address them. A "not guilty by reason of insanity"
verdict might conceivably justify shifting the burden of proof
as § 301(d) does for a limited period of time. See United
States v. Brown, 155 U. S. App. D.C. 402, 408, 478 F. 2d
606, 612 (1973); AP A Statement 15 (the future dangerousness
of insanity acquittees "may be assumed, at least for a reasonable period of time'') (emphasis added). But at the end of
that period the Government would be required to justify further commitment under the standards of Addington. These
methods would vindicate the Government's interest in accurate commitment decisions without depriving an insanity
acquittee permanently of the due process protections in
Addington. 36
""Apart from the availability of superior alternatives, there are several
arguments why a "not guilty by reason of insanity'' verdict might not deserve the weight it is given by § 301. First, the passage of time erodes the
predictive value of past behavior. Even if an insanity acquittee remains
mentally ill, the likelihood that he will repeat the same act, if he has not
repeated it since, diminishes with time. Monahan 52, 72; Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 Archives of General
Psychiatry 397, 401-406 (1972). See also Quinsey, The baserate problem
and the prediction of dangerousness: a reappraisal, 8 J. L. & Psychiatry
329 (1980). Second, the verdict entails no determination whether the insanity acquittee's mental illness is chronic or merely temporary. Although in many cases a mental illness may continue in a more or less constant state over a long period of time, there are doubtless conditions that
might satisfy the "mental disease" element of the insanity defense that do
not. Third, although various jurisdictions may consider even non-violent
crimes such as attempted petit larceny "dangerous," see Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 609, and n. 21
(1981), there is surely room for doubt whether a single attempt to shoplift
and a string of brutal murders should be accorded the same effect in a commitment procedure. Seen. 34, supra. Finally, the "not guilty by reason
of insanity" determination is backward-looking, focusing only on one mo-
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As to the Government's second rationale, the § 301 system
as it now stands is not designed to deter spurious insanity defenses. An insanity acquittee who is really "sane"-i. e., his
defense was completely spurious-should have no trouble
proving his right to release by a preponderance of the evidence at a § 301(d)(2) hearing or a subsequent release hearing. The supposed deterrent effect of the shift in the burden
of proof affects only that marginal group of insanity
acquittees who-because of the uncertainties inherent in psychiatric predictions of dangerousness-are not likely to disprove their mental illness and dangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence, but whom the Government is not likely
to prove mentally ill and dangerous by clear and convincing
evidence. 37 The Government has no legitimate interest in
preventing members of this group from trying to convince a
jury that they shbuld not be held accountable for their
crimes. If Congress were to make asserting a false insanity
defense a crime, punishable by incarceration, 38 the Government in the past, while the commitment decision must be addressed to the
present and the foreseeable future. In sum, the "fit" between the verdict
at a criminal trial and the question to be answered at a commitment hearing is less than perfect, and it weakens the argument that improved accuracy justifies a permanent departure from the Addington standards.
37
Addington recognized, "The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations." 441
U. S., at 430. Commentators and researchers have long acknowledged
that, even for persons with a history of violence, psychiatric prediction of
dangerousness is inaccurate roughly two-thirds of the time, with mental
health professionals usually erring on the side of predicting that an individual will be dangerous. See Monahan 44-61; Diamond, The Psychiatric
Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439, 447 (1974); Note, 57
N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 29~299. Predictions of dangerousness may often
reflect institutional biases or agreement with the consequences of the predictio~. g., retaining a patient for treatment, see supra, at-,.-. See
also AP A Statement, 13-14. For this very reason, the burden and standard of proof are critical.
38
But see n. 31, supra.

7-
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ment would not be able to prove this group guilty of the new
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Even on the assumption
that they were "really" not insane, but that the evidence on
the issue of insanity was evenly balanced, at most the Government has an interest in confining them for the length of
time specified by statute as the punishment for the crime
they committed.
The same holds true for the suggestion that more stringent
release standards are required to make the insanity defense
politically acceptable. Those whose abuses of the defense
are likely to produce the greatest public indignation can still
be expected to prove their sanity and win release. Those
who would be affected by a shift in the burden of proof fall
into the region of legitimate dispute, even among experts,
and the public's interest in isolating them on accoun~ of their
criminal actions does not extend beyond the sentence they
could have received. After that point, the Government has
the same interest in confining them for involuntary psychiatric treatment that it has for civil commitment candidates,
and it should be expected to justify that commitment under
the Addington standards.
In sum, permanent departure from the due process standards in Addington is not reasonably related to any of the Government's purported interests in treating insanity acquittees
differently from candidates for civil commitment. Even if ·
we accepted the Government's rationales at face value, they
would at most support deferring-for some definite period of
time-the Government's obligation to justify petitioner's involuntary commitment by clear and convincing evidence,
rather than eliminating that obligation altogether. Furthermore, shifting the burden of proof only for a limited period of
time provides insanity acquittees with significant protection
from continued involuntary confinement if they are not mentally ill or dangerous. Therefore, due process requires that
at some point the Government justify an insanity acquittee's
continued commitment by clear and convincing evidence.

81-519&-0PINION
JONES v. UNITED STATES

23

V
Our determination that the Government may not be excused permanently from meeting the Addington burden
raises a problem common to this Court's due process decisions. To hold that the balance of governmental and individual interests does not support applying§ 301(d)'s allocation of
proof in all cases is not to promulgate a comprehensive set of
rules defining when the Government may hold an insanity
acquittee against his will without meeting the Addington
burden. Congress remains the institution best suited to balance public and individual interests and to design a set of procedures that accomodates each. At the margin, any such
system will require that lines be drawn, and the role of the
courts is limited to evaluating legislative solutions in light of
particular cases. Cf. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. - (1982) (invalidating one-year statute of limitatations for support suits by illegitimate children); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U. S., at 738-739.
Accordingly, in this case we need not decide at what precise point after an insanity acquittal the Government must
meet its Addington burden to justify further confinement, or
even whether the interests it asserts are constitutionally sufficient to justify any but the most limited commitment, see
Jackson v. Indiana, supra, without clear and convincing
proof of whatever standards govern the commitment. 39 It is
enough to note that-accepting for the purposes of argument
the interests asserted by the Government in this case-none
of the justifications put forward for requiring petitioner to
bear the burden of disproving his mental illness and danger39
Even if differences between insanity acquittees and other candidates
for civil commitment justified legislative departure from the twin substantive standards of mental illness and dangerousness in O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 573--574, Addington would still require that the
Government establish the new predicates for commitment by clear and
convincing evidence.
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ousness support committing him under that standard for
longer than the time he would have served had he been convicted and sentenced for attempted larceny.
The maximum possible sentence for attempted larceny in
the District of Columbia, without regard to any statutory reductions, is one year. By the time of his February 22, 1977,
hearing, petitioner had been in custody for 17 months, either
in St. Elizabeth's or in the District of Columbia Correctional
Center. Therefore, he should have received the benefit of
the Addington standards at that time. The judgment of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed.

So ordered.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 24-301 of the District of Columbia Code provides .- __ ~
J
L~
that a person tried for a crime and acquitted solely by reason " ~ J ' - d , v l , ~ --C.V
of insanity may, after a 50-day evaluation period, be committed to a mental institution indefinitely unless he proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is not mentally ill or
dangerous. We granted certiorari to determine whether the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the equal
protection guarantee it embodies, permit indefinite commitments under such circumstances. 454 U. S. 1141 (1982).

I
Of central importance to this case is the system Congress
established in 1970 when it amended§ 24-301 ("§ 301") as part
of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, § 207, 84 Stat. 473, 601-603. Section 301
addresses the general topics of the insanity defense and mental competency to be tried. In its 1970 amendments, Congress left in place a requirement that defendants plead insanity affirmatively, and it added a provision stating, "No
person accused of an offense shall be acquitted on the ground
that he was insane at the time of its commission unless his
insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is affirmatively
established by a preponderance of the evidence. " 1 It also
'See §301(j ); H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1970).
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substantially revised § 301(d), which specifies what happens
to a person who, like petitioner, is acquitted solely by reason
of insanity ("insanity acquittee"). 2
Subsection (d)(l) now provides that an insanity acquittee
shall be committed automatically to a hospital for the mentally ill until he qualifies for release under one of the other
provisions of the statute. Subsection (d)(2), however, requires that such a person be given a hearing within 50 days of
his confinement to determine whether he is eligible for release. The court ordering the initial commitment must ensure that the insanity acquittee is represented by counsel.
At the 50-day hearing, "[t]he person confined shall have the
burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person confined is entitled to his release
from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court
shall enter such order as may appear appropriate." 3 Both
Note that a person acquitted by reason of insanity cannot be committed
automatically after his acquittal or forced to bear the burden of proof in
order to obtain release at a § 301(d)(2) hearing unless he raised the defense
himself. § 301(d)(l); see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962). Petitioner has never claimed that the Government, not he, raised the question
of insanity in this case.
2
Before 1970, § 301 had required automatic commitment of all insanity
acquittees to a psychiatric hospital. In Bolton v. Harris, 130 U. S. App.
D.C. 1, 395 F. 2d 642 (1968), however, the United States Court of Appeals-which then exercised appellate jurisdiction over District of Columbia Code offenses-had held that insanity acquittees had to be given a judicial hearing with procedures substantially similar to those in civil
commitment proceedings before they could be held beyond a reasonable period necessary to evaluate their present mental condition. The current
version of § 301(d) represents a partial codification of the Bolton holding
insofar as it requires a judicial hearing, but it mandates procedures markedly different from those which apply at civil commitment hearings. See
H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 74; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1303, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 233 (1970) (conference report); n. 6, infra.
3
The relevant subsections of § 301(d) provide as follows:
"(1) If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense
raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he
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the insanity acquittee and the Government have a right to appeal the court's decision. § 301(d)(3).
If an insanity acquittee does not win release at the 50-day
hearing, or if he waives the hearing altogether, any subsequent efforts to obtain release-conditional or unconditional-are governed by subsections (e) or (k). Subsection
(e) provides that when the superintendent of the mental hospital in which an insanity acquittee is confined certifies to the
court that he has regained his sanity, will not be dangerous to
himself or others in the reasonable future, and is entitled to
release, the court may release him if the Government does
not object. If the Government does object, the court must
hold a hearing. Under subsection (k), an insanity acquittee
still in custody may initiate proceedings to obtain his release
at six-month intervals, and the statute dictates that he bear
the burden of proof "on all issues." In addition, an insanity
acquittee may apply for habeas corpus if he has exhausted his
other remedies under the statute. See §§ 301(g), 301(k)(7).
Judicial interpretations have filled certain important lacunae in the statutory scheme just described. Section 301, for
instance, nowhere states the substantive standard for acquittal by reason of insanity. At the time of the proceedings at
was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant
to this subsection or subsection (e) of this section.
"(2)(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection
shall have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to
determine whether he is entitled to release from custody. At the conclusion of the criminal action referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection,
the court shall provide such person with representation by counsel ....
"(B) ... Within 10 days from the date the hearing was begun, the court
shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law
with respect thereto. The person confined shall have the burden of proof.
If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate." D.C.
Code § 24-301(d) (1981).
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issue in this case, the District of Columbia courts employed
the so-called "Durham rule," acquitting by reason of insanity
if the criminal act with which a defendant was charged was "a
product of a mental disease or defect." 4 Nor does § 301
state specifically what showing would entitle an insanity
acquittee to release at a 50-day hearing under subsection (d),
but the Court of Appeals in this case held that the insanity
acquittee must show that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous to himself or others. 5 What the court below called
"[t]he twofold proof requirement of mental illness and dangerousness," see 432 A. 2d 364, 372 (1981) (en bane), also applies in civil commitment proceedings in the District of Columbia, with the important differences that there candidates
for commitment may demand a jury for the ·commitment
hearing and the Government must bear the burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence. 6
• At the time of petitioner's first hearing, the District of Columbia Superior Court still used the standard for determining insanity that had been
used by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit from 1954 to 1972. See Durham v. United States, 94 U. S. App.
D.C. 228, 214 F. 2d 862 (1954); United States v. Brawner, 153 U. S. App.
D.C. 1, 471 F. 2d 969 (1972). Shortly after petitioner's hearing, however,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, like the United States Court of
Appeals before it, abandoned the Durham test in favor of one like that proposed by the American Law Institute. See Bethea v. United States, 365
A. 2d 64, 79 (DC 1976).
• United States v. Jones, 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en
bane). The court held that the same showing was required for release at a
§ 301(d)(2) hearing as would justify subsequent release under § 301(e) if the
superintendent of the hospital to which an insanity acquittee had been committed certified to the court the acquittee's eligibility for release. Although § 301(e) is phrased in the conjunctive-i. e., it appears that an insanity acquittee would have to be both no longer mentally ill and no longer
dangerous to obtain release-the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
clearly interprets the standard as justifying release if either condition is
met. Ibid.
6
See D. C. Code § 21-545(a)-(b) (1981). That section does not expressly
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II
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested as he apparently tried to shoplift a jacket from a department store in
the District of Columbia. He was arraigned the next day in
the District of Columbia Superior Court on a single charge of
attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by no
more than one year's incarceration. 7 At the arraignment,
the court (on its own motion) requested the Forensic Psychiatry office at the District of Columbia General Hospital to perform a preliminary examination of petitioner's competency to
stand trial. 8 The examining psychiatrist reported two days
later that, in his opinion, petitioner was competent to stand
trial, but that he should be committed to a psychiatric hospital for treatment, because he showed signs of a mental disorder, including auditory hallucinations. 9 The court then orrequire clear and convincing proof, but the requirement has been read into
it after Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), held that due process
required clear and convincing proof. See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233
(DC 1979). There are other differences between procedures for civil committees and § 301 release procedures. After the initial commitment, a civil
committee may obtain his release at any time, without judicial review, if
the chief of service of the hospital where he is committed determines that
he "is no longer mentally ill to the extent that he is likely to injure himself
or other persons if not hospitalized." D.C. Code § 21-546(a) (1981); compare § 301(e). See also id. § 21-548. Like insanity acquittees, civil committees may request judicial hearings every six months to determine
whether they may be released, even if the hospital has not recommended
release. Compare §§ 21-546(a), 21-547 with § 301(k).
7
See D. C. Code §§ 22-103, 22-2202 (1981).
8
See App. 1, Record 46. Section 301(a) provides that the court may
order such an examination if it appears to the court "that, from the court's
own observations or from prima facie evidence submitted to it ... [the defendant] is of unsound mind or mentally incompetent so as to be unable to
understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own
defense .... "
• See Record 47.
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dered petitioner committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital ("St.
Elizabeths"), a public hospital for the mentally ill, for a more
extended evaluation of his competency. 10
Petitioner spent four weeks at St. Elizabeths. A psychologist at St. Elizabeths submitted a report to the court,
stating the opinion of the St. Elizabeths staff that petitioner
was competent to stand trial. However, the staff also expressed the opinion that if petitioner had in fact committed
the offense it was "the product of his mental disease," which
the staff diagnosed as "Schizophrenia, paranoid type." 11
Sometime shortly after the court and the parties received
this report, petitioner pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity.
Trial was held on petitioner's attempted petit larceny
charge on March 12, 1976. There is no record of the trial except for the Superior Court docket entry. It indicates that
the Government and petitioner's counsel stipulated to a statement of facts, that the Government presented testimony by
the same psychologist who had prepared the St. Elizabeths
report, and that the court found petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered him committed to St. Elizabeths
pursuant to § 301(d)(l). See App. 3.
On May 25-somewhat more than 50 days later-petitioner
received his 50-day hearing pursuant to § 30l(d)(2)(A). The
Government announced at the outset of the hearing that it
was prepared to go forward with the testimony of Dr. Gertrude Cooper, another staff psychologist at St. Elizabeths.
10

Until early February 1976, however, petitioner remained in the District of Columbia Correctional Center awaiting an opening in the evaluation ward at St. Elizabeths. See id., at 48-51.
"See id., at 51.. The report also disclosed that petitioner was being
given 400 milligrams of Thorazine (a psychotropic drug) daily, and that, in
the opinion of the staff, petitioner did not require hospitalization pending
trial.

--·

--

----
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The Government noted, however, that the burden was on petitioner to prove that he should be released at this hearing. 12
In brief testimony, Dr. Cooper stated that she had interviewed petitioner once and seen him around the Ward an unspecified number of times, and she repeated the general opinion of the staff 13 as well as some second-hand observations by
occupational therapists at St. Elizabeths. 14 Dr. Cooper also
testified that the staff at St. Elizabeths continued to diagnose
12

See May 25 Transcript 3-4.
In response to the Government's request to describe petitioner's conduct on the Ward, Dr. Cooper testified:
"Well, pretty much all of us have agreed that he is [a] very self-a-facing
[sic] individual and no one really gets to know him very well. He does not
create any problems. He doesn't get into any difficulty but he also does
not lead to active social life. He is not a very active participant in the informal activities on the Ward. The patients play cards, play pool, do
things like that. He keeps to himself more.
"I might add, this is sort of a heavy dose of medication and we are hoping
that as his illness becomes less active that we can reduce that." Id., at
8-9.
Dr. Cooper also testified that petitioner was being given 900 milligrams
of Thorazine a day at that time. Id., at 8. (Shortly before the hearing,
however, she submitted a report which indicated that petitioner was receiving 1000 milligrams of Thorazine daily, plus a tranquilizer. Record
18

54.)

Dr. Cooper reported information she had received from the Occupational Therapy Department:
"They found that Mr. Jones is quiet; that he responds to other people
both patients and staff. He does not initiate contact. That he tends to be
by himself. That he carries out projects in an acceptable fashion. That
while some of the time he may accept their technical direction and other
times he seems to ignore it. For example, having finished a piece of copper work ... he was advised then to apply a coat of laquer. This he chose
to ignore and would not do it which caused the therapy assistant some
anxiety.
"In short he is not always responsive in a positive way to what goes on
but there are some positive features. He does want to recover. He does
ask for suggestions as to what he might do and we feel he is positively motivated." May 25 Transcript 7.
1
'
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petitioner as suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type,
and that "because his illness is still quite active, he is still a
danger to himself and to others." She concluded, "We would
like to keep him still at the hospital and work with him." 16
Petitioner's cross examination was even briefer-it established that Dr. Cooper was unsure whether petitioner had
committed larceny or assault, but that "based on what [she]
recall[ed] of the record, he is likely to repeat the same conduct either way." 16
At the close of the hearing, the court declared, "[T]he defendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of his mental illness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to himself and others." 17 Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeths, although
the court issued no formal order of commitment and the
docket showed only that the case had been continued for six
months.
The fact that the docket did not reflect that a hearing had
been held caused some confusion, and, in October 1976, new
counsel appeared for petitioner and demanded a § 301(d)(2)
release hearing. After some procedural maneuvering, a second Superior Court hearing was held on February 22, 1977,
at which petitioner demanded to be released or recommitted
under customary civil commitment standards. Having studied the May 25 transcript and having heard argument on the
constitutionality of petitioner's continued confinement, the
court reaffirmed the findings at the earlier hearing, and it
specifically denied petitioner's request that he receive a jury
hearing and that the Government be required to bear the
burden of proof if it wished to keep him in St. Elizabeths. 18
16

Id ., at 9.
Id. , at 10-11. Counsel also ·asked whether petitioner would do better
in a less restrictive wing of St. Elizabeths, but the Government successfully objected to that line of questioning.
11
Id., at 13.
18
Record 29-30. Petitioner based his claim for relief on Waite v. J acobs, 154 U. S. App. D.C. 281 , 287, 475 F . 2d 392, 398 (1973) , and United
16
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Petitioner appealed this ruling to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Superior Court; then it granted rehearing and reversed. 19 Finally, the court heard the case en bane and affirmed the Superior Court ruling, rejecting the due process and· equal
protection arguments that petitioner now presses in this
Court. 432 A. 2d 364, 372-374.

III
Petitioner's due process argument rests primarily on three
recent unanimous decisions of this Court: Addington v.
Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U. S. 563 (1975), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715
(1972). 20
Jackson considered the commitment of persons charged
with crimes but found incompetent to stand trial on account
of their mental condition. It held that "due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed." 406 U. S., at 738. Consequently, the State
was not permitted to hold the defendant for longer than the
reasonable period necessary to evaluate his competence or
the likelihood that he would regain competence in the foreseeable future, unless it was willing to give him the full hearStates v. Brown, 155 U. S. App. D.C. 402, 408, 478 F. 2d 606, 612 (1973), in
which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had suggested that when an individual acquitted by reason of insanity had been in
detention for a considerable period of time, not longer than the sentence he
would have served had he been convicted, his continued detention should
be governed by civil commitment standards. See Record 66.
19
396 A. 2d 183 (1978); 411 A. 2d 624 (1980) (on rehearing).
20
None of this Court's opinions has interpreted the Due Process Clause,
or the Equal Protection Clause, with respect to the involuntary commitment of insanity acquittees. The one case which addresses the rights of
insanity acquittees, Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962), involved interpretation of an earlier version of§ 301, see nn. 1-2, supra, rather than
the Constitution.
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ing it provided for indefinite civil commitments. Ibid.
Addington and O'Connor dealt directly with civil commitments. O'Connor held that a mentally ill individual has a
"right to liberty" that a State cannot abridge by confining
him to a mental institution, even for the purpose of treating
his illness, unless in addition to being mentally ill he is likely
to harm himself or others if released. 422 U. S., at 573-576;
see id., at 589 (BURGER, C. J., concurring). Then, in
Addington, the Court carefully evaluated the standard of
proof in civil commitment proceedings. Applying the due
process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335
(1976), the Court held that "due process requires the state to
justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere
preponderance of the evidence," 441 U. S., at 427, specifically "clear and convincing evidence," id., at 433. A preponderance standard was not sufficient to preserve fundamental
fairness to candidates for civil commitment in light of their
strong interest in avoiding involuntary confinement and psychiatric treatment. See id., at 427; cf. Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U. S. 745, 766-770 (1982). Yet to require more than
clear and convincing evidence as a constitutional matter
would unduly impair governmental efforts to protect both the
mentally ill and society at large. 441 U. S., at 427-431.
Addington and O'Connor balance the Government's interest in isolating and treating those who may be mentally ill
and dangerous, the difficulty of proving or disproving mental
illness and dangerousness in court, and the massive intrusion
on individual liberty inherent in involuntary psychiatric hospitalization. Petitioner contends that the Government has
no greater interest in keeping him hospitalized involuntarily
than it has in the ordinary civil commitment cases governed
by Addington and O'Connor, at least once he has been confined for longer than the maximum sentence he could have received for attempted petit larceny. Therefore, he argues
that he cannot be confined indefinitely unless the Government accords him the minimum due process protections re-
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quired for civil commitment. Petitioner concedes arguendo
that the Government may have legitimate reasons to commit
insanity acquittees for some definite period without carrying
the burden of proof prescribed in Addington, but he contends
that such confinement can extend only as long as he could
have been incarcerated had he been convicted on his criminal
charges rather than acquitted by reason of insanity.
The issue, therefore, is not whether due process forbids
treating insanity acquittees differently from other candidates
for commitment. Petitioner is willing to concede that they
may be treated differently for some purposes, and for a limited period. The dispute before us, rather, concerns the
question whether the differences between insanity acquittees
and other candidates for civil commitment justify confining
insanity acquittees indefinitely, as § 301 provides, without
the Government ever having to meet the procedural requirements of Addington. 21
A
The most obvious difference between insanity acquittees
and other candidates for civil commitment is that, at least in
the District of Columbia, an acquittal by reason of insanity
21
A number of our decisions have countenanced involuntary commitment
without the full protections of Addington and O'Connor, but these have involved persons already legitimately in custody and strictly limited periods
of psychiatric institutionalization. E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S.
715, 738 (1975) (acknowledging that the State's interest in determining
whether an accused would become competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future justified commitment "for a reasonable period of time"); McNeil
v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U. S. 245, 249--250 (1972) (accepting
the legitimacy of short-term commitment of a convicted criminal for psychiatric evaluation); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 510 (1972) (commitment of convicted sex offender, limited to duration of sentence); Baxstrom
v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, 111 (1966) (commitment of prison inmates who
are determined to be mentally ill during their prison term). See also
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 617-629 (1979) (wards of the state). But
cf. Note, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 425 (1979) (burden and standard of proof in
short-term civil commitment).
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implies a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant in fact committed the criminal act with which he
was charged. See Bethea v. United States, 365 A. 2d 64,
9~95 (D.C. 1976); § 301(c). For that reason-disregarding
for purposes of argument the problems that punishing someone acquitted by reason of insanity might entail 22-the Government conceivably has an interest in confining insanity
acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts. 23
Such confinement, however, could not extend beyond the
period Congress has established as a sentence for commission
of the crime charged. We addressed similar circumstances
in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972), in which the
State argued that special commitment orders under a sex offender statute could be justified "merely as an alternative to
penal sentencing," id., at 510. We stated:
22
According to ~he traditional view, the insanity defense is premised on
the notion that society has no interest in punishing insanity acquittees, because they are neither blameworthy nor the appropriate objects of deterrence. See A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 15 (1967). In addition,
insanity and mens rea stand in a close relationship, which this Court has
never fully plumbed. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 536-537 (1968)
(opinion of MARSHALL, J.); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 800 (1952); cf.
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975). Some have also suggested that
a statute providing for acquittal by reason of insanity may create a reasonable expectation, protected by the Due Process Clause, that insanity
acquittees will not be punished. See Note, 57 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 281, 285
(1982).
In any event, it is questionable that confinement to a mental hospitalalong with subjection to "psychopharmacological management," often the
focus of institutional mental care, see American Psychiatric Ass'n, Statement on the Insanity Defense 15 (1982) (hereinafter AP A Statement)would pass constitutional muster as appropriate punishment for a crime.
Compare Weems v. United States , 217 U. S. 349, 366-367 (1910) (describing sentence of cadena temporal) with n. 34, infra.
zi The Government denies that the purpose of§ 301(d) is to punish insanity acquittees for their crimes, and it eschews reliance on this interest.
Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion below argues that Congress enacted
the current version of § 301(d) with the intent of punishing insanity
acquittees. See 432 A. 2d, at 37!?r-381 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
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"That argument arguably has force with respect to an
initial commitment ... which is imposed in lieu of sentence, and is limited in duration to the maximum permissible sentence. The argument can carry little weight,
however, with respect to the subsequent renewal proceedings, which result in five-year commitment orders
based on new findings of fact, and are in no way limited
by the nature of the defendant's crime or the maximum
sentence authorized for that crime." Id., at 510-511. 24
Once Congress has defined a crime and the punishment for
that crime, additional punishment can only be justified by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of additional facts, within
the limits of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and and upon notice to defendants that they are subject to such additional
punishment. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605, 610
(1967); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 361-364 (1970).
B

The Government claims that § 301's departures from the
Addington standards are justified because insanity
acquittees, as a class, are more likely to be presently mentally ill and dangerous than other candidates for civil commitment. According to the Government, the most important
function of the Addington standards is to protect those who
exhibit odd or eccentric behavior-but who are not necessarily mentally ill or dangerous-from the inherent uncertainty
of psychiatric diagnoses and predictions of dangerousness.
Insanity acquittees, the argument continues, have both engaged in criminal behavior and admitted their mental illness
24

Note that in Humphrey v. Cady the petitioner had in fact received a
judicial hearing on his present mental illness and dangerousness, at which
the State bore the burden of proof, before he was recommitted at the end
of his sentence. See 405 U.S., at 507. Nevertheless, once his sentence
had expired the State's interest in punishment could not justify according
him fewer procedural protections than those given to civil commitment
candidates.
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as of the time of their criminal conduct. The Government
concludes on that basis that Addington's protections, which
entail a certain risk that dangerous persons may avoid commitment because the Government cannot meet its burden,
are unnecessarily inaccurate as applied to insanity
acquittees.
A "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict is not irrelevant to the determination of an individual's present mental
illness and dangerousness. A substantial body of research
suggests that a consistent pattern of past violent behavior is
a good-although far from perfect-indicator of the nearterm likelihood of future violence, 25 and one might well infer
that a consistent pattern of criminal, non-violent behavior,
such as petitioner's attempt to shoplift, might be a good statistical predictor of similar non-violent behavior in the future.
Nevertheless, our precedents in other commitment contexts are inconsistent with the argument that the mere fact
of past criminal behavior justifies indefinite confinement
without the benefits of the minimum due process standards
associated with civil commitment. In Addington itself, the
petitioner did not dispute that he had engaged in a wide vari20
J. Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 71, 80-81
(NIMH 1980) (hereinafter Monahan); see, e. g., Cocozza, Melick &
Steadman, Trends in Violent Crime Among Ex-Mental Patients, 16 Criminology 317 (1978); Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, The Insanity Plea in
New York State, 51 N.Y. St. B. J. 186, 221-222 (1979). But commentators and researchers have long acknowledged that, even for persons with
a history of violence, psychiatric prediction of dangerousness is inaccurate
roughly two-thirds of the time. See Monahan 44-61; Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439, 447 (1974);
Note, 57 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 298-299. Mental health professionals usually
err on the side of predicting that an individual will be dangerous, often because of institutional biases or agreement with the consequences of the prediction--e. g., retaining a patient for treatment, see supra, at 7. See also
AP A Statement, 13-14. As Addington recognizes, "[T]he subtleties and
nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach
in most situations." 441 U. S., at 430.
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ety of assaultive conduct that could have been the basis for
criminal charges had the State chosen to prosecute. See 441
U. S., at 420-421. Similarly, the petitioner in Jackson v.
Indiana had been charged with two robberies, yet we required the State to follow its civil commitment procedures if
it wished to commit him for more than a strictly limited period. 406 U. S., at 729-730.
In the closest precedent, Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S.
107 (1966), the petitioner had been convicted of assault and
sentenced to a term in prison, during which he was certified
as insane by a prison physician. At the expiration of his
criminal sentence, he was committed involuntarily to confinement in a state mental hospital under procedures substantially less protective than those used for civil commitment.
Id., at 108-110. The Court held that, once he had served his
sentence, Baxstrom could not be treated differently from
other candidates for civil commitment. Id., at 112-113.
The principal difference between this case and Baxstrom is
petitioner's admission, as part of his insanity plea, that his
crime was "the product" of his mental illness, but the connection between mental condition and specific criminal acts required to find an individual "not guilty by reason of insanity"
is more a social judgment than a sound basis for clinical
prediction. 26
Other considerations counsel against allowing the Government to predicate indefinite confinement without Addington
protections on a simple insanity acquittal. First, even if an
insanity acquittee remains mentally ill, so long as he has not
repeated the same act since his offense, the passage of time
The available evidence that criminal behavior by the mentally ill is
likely to repeat itself does not distinguish between behaviors that were the
product of mental illness and those that were not. See sources cited in
note 25, supra. It is doubtful that persons acquitted by reason of insanity
display a rate of future "dangerous" activity higher than civil committees
with similar arrest records.
26
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erodes the likelihood that he will repeat it. 'l:1 Second, the
"not guilty by reason of insanity" determination is backwardlooking, focusing only on one moment in the past. The commitment decision, on the other hand, must address the
present and the foreseeable future. Indeed, a claim of "temporary insanity" falls squarely within the traditional scope of
the insanity defense. Certainly some conditions satisfying
the "mental disease" element of the insanity defense do not
persist for an extended period. Third, § 301 fails to reflect
the commonsense truth that some crimes are more indicative
of dangerousness than others. Various jurisdictions may
consider non-violent misdemeanors "dangerous," but there is
room for doubt whether a single attempt to shoplift and a
string of brutal murders are equally accurate and equally
permanent predictors of dangerousness. 28 Finally, we cannot ignore the adverse effect extended institutionalization
may have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no
longer mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives
him of the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical judgments and because the treatment he receives may
make it difficult for him to show he has recovered. 29
27

Monahan 52, 72; Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill
Criminals, 27 Archives of General Psychiatry 397, 401-406 (1972). See
also Quinsey, The Baserate Problem and the Prediction of Dangerousness:
A Reappraisal, 8 J. L. & Psychiatry 329 (1980).
28
See Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 609, and n. 21 (1981). The frequency
of prior violent behavior is an important element in predictions of future
violence. See Monahan 107. Cocozza et al.'s study, see n. 25, supra,
showed that ex-mental patients with a single prior arrest were slightly less
likely than members of the general population to be arrested for a violent
crime.
29
The current emphasis on using anti psychotic drugs to eliminate the
characteristic signs and symptoms of mental illness, especially schizophrenia, may render mental patients docile and unlikely to engage in violent or
bizarre behaviors while they are institutionalized, but it does not "cure"
them or allow them to demonstrate that they would remain non-violent if
they were not drugged, and it may even create false symptoms of illness in
some cases. See APA Statement lfr-16; Note, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1720,
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There are many ways to take into account criminal behavior and past mental condition without depriving insanity
acquittees of the Addington protections. 3° Certain aspects
of§ 301(d)'s commitment procedures, apart from its allocation
of the burden of proof, reflect these considerations-first in- ·
sofar as the statute requires that all insanity acquittees be
committed automatically, with a release hearing only after a
50-day observation period, and second insofar as the testimony of mental health professionals at the hearings is informed by their own experience with and current research on
dangerous, mentally ill patients. The fact of an insanity acquittal and the evidence on insanity adduced at trial are certainly admissible at a commitment or release hearing. In addition, a "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict might
conceivably justify confinement for a limited period following
the insanity acquittal without requiring the Government to
meet its Addington burden. 31 But at the end of that period
the Government would be required to justify further i::ommitment under the standards of Addington.
C
The Government also argues that the procedures and
standards for committing insanity acquittees are inextricably
1724-1727 (1982).
30
In considering the requirements of due process, we have often inquired
whether alternative procedures more protective of individual interests at
reasonable cost were likely to accomplish the state's legitimate objectives.
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 657-658 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542-543
(1971).
31
See United States v. Brown, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 402, 408, 478 F. 2d
606, 612 (1973); APA Statement 15 (the future dangerousness of insanity
acquittees "may be assumed, at least for a reasonable period of time") (emphasis added). We have consistently rejected indefinite commitments
where the state's purposes would be served fully by commitments of limited duration, renewable only with full due process protections. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S., at 249; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U. S., at 249; cf. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S., at 510-511.
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linked to those that apply to the insanity defense itself. It
maintains that Congress decided, compassionately, to allow
mentally ill defendants to escape punishment by proving
their insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, thus making assertion of the insanity defense considerably easier than
necessary under Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 799 (1952).
According to the Government, however, the necessary complement of that choice was requiring those acquitted by reason of insanity to disprove their continued mental illness and
dangerousness at the subsequent commitment stage. This
system arguably discourages spurious insanity pleas. Furthermore, the Government argues, a system in which it was
easy for an accused to avoid criminal punishment on the basis
of mental illness, yet hard to isolate that person and ensure
that he receives psychiatric treatment, would eventually
prove unacceptable to the public. 32
Insofar as withdrawing Addington protections deters insanity pleas, it will affect. only those defendants who think
they may be able to prove their past insanity but not their
Cf. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. , at 715; Note, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev.,
at 299-303. The Government's arguments with regard to accuracy, see
part B, supra, and political acceptability are somewhat inconsistent. If
the Government were required to disprove insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt once the defense had been raised, see Davis v. United States, 160
U. S. 469 (1895), acquittal by reason of insanity would not necessarily be an
accurate indication of more than the existence of a reasonable doubt as to
sanity, so (to preserve accuracy) the Government could not rely on the insanity acquittal to prove mental illness and dangerousness at a subsequent
commitment hearing. Nevertheless, in terms of political acceptability,
such a lenient standard for avoiding punishment would demand commitment standards that made it difficult for insanity acquittees to avoid commitment. In a jurisdiction that required defendants to prove their insanity beyond a reasonable doubt at their criminal trial, see Leland v. Oregon,
supra, the opposite would be true: an insanity acquittal would be highly
accurate, but there would be no need to favor the Government at the commitment stage in order to deter spurious pleas or to "balance" the
acquittal/commitment system.
32
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present recovery or non-dangerousness, but as to whom the
Government could not prove present mental illness and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. 33 Such defendants come within a zone of uncertainty created by the inherent limitations of contemporary knowledge, see n. ~ , 2~
supra, in which reasonable experts and factfinders may often
disagree in good faith. As long as such persons raise their
defense in good faith, society has no legitimate interest in
preventing them from trying to convince a jury that they are
not guilty by reason of insanity.
Even if a small number of defendants who raise the insanity defense do so in bad faith, yet without the expectation
that they could prove they were not committable once the
trial was over, the individualized inquiry contemplated by
Addington and O'Connor precludes severely disadvantaging
every person acquitted by reason of insanity in order to deter
a small subgroup of those who consider raising the defense.
Jndeed, accepting a similar "deterrence" argument would
force us to overrule Jackson, which contemplates that a person charged with a crime may escape both trial and morethan-brief confinement if he is incompetent to stand trial but
cannot be civilly committed. See 406 U. S., at 729. Moreover, assuming deterring false pleas by defendants who are
"really" not insane justify confinement after an insanity acj J 'l i/,'f, ·"
quittal, that rationale cannot justify confinement for any
longer than if they were "really" convicted.
The same holds true for the theory that § 301 reflects a social judgment that persons who commit crimes while mentally ill should not go free without treatment. Insofar as it
"'Those who plead insanity in bad faith, yet nonetheless get acquitted by
reason of insanity, are likely to produce the greatest public indignation.
But a hypothetical insanity acquittee in this group should have little trouble proving that he is not mentally ill, even under the commitment standards of § 301(d). Therefore, commitment standards favoring the Government cannot deter truly spurious insanity pleas.
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supports depriving insanity acquittees of due process protections, it cannot do so for an unlimited time, without regard to
the seriousness of their conduct. And in any event, the Government may not subject them to a greater risk of unjustified
confinement and medical treatment because of their criminal
acts for longer than it can take away the liberty of those who
are convicted and punished for the same acts. After that
point, the Government has no more interest in confining
them for involuntary psychiatric treatment than it has for
civil commitment candidates, and it should be expected to
justify further confinement under the Addington standards.

D
Finally, the Government argues that the interest of insanity acquittees in avoiding commitment is weaker than that of
other candidates for civil commitment. On this theory, one
who raises the insanity defense identifies himself as mentally
ill-at least as of the date of the criminal conduct chargedand thus loses any interest in avoiding the social stigma that
may attach to mental illness. We reject the suggestion that
this justifies confining insanity acquittees indefinitely without the protections in Addington.
In Addington and Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980), we
recognized that individuals have an interest in not being stigmatized by society at large on account of being labelled mentally ill. 441 U. S., at 426; 445 U. S., at 492. Avoiding
stigma, however, is only one of the reasons why an individual
might object to involuntary commitment; other aspects of involuntary commitment affect him in a far more immediate
way. 34 We have repeatedly acknowledged that persons who
"Persons incarcerated in mental hospitals are not only deprived of
friends, family, and community. Institutionalized mental patients must
live in unnatural surroundings under the continuous and detailed control of
strangers. They are subject to intrusive treatment which, especially if
unwarranted, may violate their right to bodily integrity. Such treatment
34
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have already been labelled as mentally ill nonetheless retain
an interest in avoiding involuntary commitment, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575; Baxstrom v.
Herold, supra, as do those, such as prisoners, who have no
interest in avoiding confinement per se, see Vitek v. Jones,
445 U. S., at 493--494. 35 Every person has a strong interest
in not being involuntarily hospitalized and subjected to psyIf different due process standards for
chiatric treatment.
insanity acquittees can be justified at all, it must be on the
basis of different governmental interests, or different terms
and conditions of commitment, not diminished individual
interests.
E
In sum, indefinite commitment without the due process
protections adopted in Addington and O'Connor is not reasonably related to any of the Government's purported interests in confining insanity acquittees for psychiatric treatment. The rationales upon which the Government seeks to
justify § 301's departures from Addington at most support
modalities may include forced administration of psychotropic medication,
aversive conditioning, convulsive therapy, and even psychosurgery."
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S., at 626 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
A person who has been hospitalized involuntarily may to a significant extent lose the right enjoyed by others to withhold consent to medical treatment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, - - U.S.--, - - (1982) (involuntary committee's due process right to freedom from unreasonable restraint
limited to a guarantee that professional judgment has been exercised).
Although this Court has never approved the the practice, it is possible that
he will be subjected to medication for reasons that have more to do with
the needs of the institution than with individualized therapy. See Mills
v. Rogers, - - U. S. - - , - - (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 836, 845
(CA3 1981) (en bane); n. 29, supra. We cannot presume that he lacks a
strong interest in having the decisions to commit him and to keep him institutionalized made carefully, and in a manner that preserves the maximum
degree of personal autonomy.
35
But see n. 21, supra.
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deferring Addington's due process protections-its requirement that the Government carry the burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence-for a limited period of time, in no
event exceeding the term for which an insanity acquittee
could have been incarcerated had he been convicted of the
crime with which he was charged. 36
IV
Petitioner also challenges his continued commitment on
equal protection grounds, arguing that once the period for
which he could have been incarcerated for attempted petit
larceny had passed he should have received, in addition to the
elements of due process required by Addington and O'Connor, the statutory procedural protections accorded civil commitment candidates in the District of Columbia. These include, primarily, the right to a jury trial at the time of the
initial commitment decision and substantially more advantageous release procedures. See supra, at 3-4 and n. 6. The
question for equal protection purposes, then, is similar to the
due process question discussed above: may the Government
36
Of course, to hold that the interests asserted by the Government in this
case cannot support holding insanity acquittees in confinement past the
maximum term of the sentence they could have received, unless the Government can prove their mental illness and dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence, is not to promulgate a comprehensive set of rules governing the treatment of insanity acquittees. Nor is it to hold that the interests asserted by the Government in this case do in fact justify commitment up to the date on which a sentence would have expired; because that
date has passed we need not reach the question in this case. Congress and
the state legislatures are fully capable of balancing public and individual
interests and of designing a set of procedures that accommodates each.
At the margin, any such system will require that lines be drawn, and the
role of the courts is to evaluate whether legislative solutions, in light of
particular cases, meet the requirements of due process. Cf. Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U. S. - - (1982) (invalidating one-year statute of limitations on support suits by illegitimate children); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U. S., at 738-739.
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confine insanity acquittees indefinitely without providing
them the same protections given civil commitment
candidates?
Many of the cases discussed above furnish guidance as to
the requirements of equal protection in the commitment context. In Baxstrom v. Herold, we held that a prisoner who
had been administratively determined to be insane during his
prison term could not be committed to further involuntary institutionalization at the conclusion of his sentence unless the
State used its customary civil commitment procedures, including jury review and a determination of dangerousness.
383 U. S., at 110; see supra, at 15. To similar effect is Humphrey v. Cady, which questioned the validity of jury-less
commitments under Wisconsin's Sex Crimes Act if they extended beyond the duration of the maximum sentences sex
offenders could receive for the offenses they had committed.
405 U. S., at 510-511. Jackson v. Indiana held that even a
person charged with a crime, but found incompetent to stand
trial on account of his mental condition, could not be committed indefinitely without the State's customary civil commitment procedures. 406 U. S., at 729-730.
Petitioner's case is not distinguishable. Like the petitioners in Baxstrom and Humphrey, he has been confined for
longer than the term for which he could have been incarcerated as punishment for his criminal act, and, like the petitioners in Baxstrom and Jackson, he has never been given a commitment hearing that satisfied the due process requirements
for indefinite commitment. For the reasons discussed in
part III, supra, the Government's interests in confining him
without the due process protections of Addington cannot justify more than a definite commitment, extending at most as
long as the maximum term of confinement he could have received as a sentence. The same reasoning applies to his
right to equal protection. The Government's interests in
punishing those who have committed crimes or in ensuring
the accuracy of the commitment process provide no basis for
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distinguishing between insanity acquittees and civil committees after the term of the possible sentence has elapsed.
And the Government's interest in "balancing" insanity acquittals and subsequent commitments cannot justify the indefinite commitment scheme of § 301. Having been confined
under an indefinite commitment order for longer than the
maximum sentence he could have received, petitioner's current commitment is invalid, and he may not now be treated
differently than civil committees.
In the context of this case, that means that petitioner must
now receive a commitment hearing equivalent to that provided other candidates for civil commitment in the District of
Columbia, because the legitimate term of his prior commitment under § 301(d) has expired. If he is in fact recommitted at that hearing, his rights to release must also be equivalent to those of civil committees. 37
V

The maximum sentence for attempted petit larceny in the
District of Columbia is one year. 38 Beyond that period, petitioner should not have been kept in involuntary confinement
unless he had been committed under the standards of
Addington and O'Connor, and he should have been given the
same rights as civil committees or candidates for civil commitment. By the time of his February 22, 1977, hearing, peWe do not reach the question whether, had petitioner been given an
initial commitment hearing consistent with the requirements of due process for indefinite commitment, equal protection would now demand that he
be given a new commitment hearing under civil standards, or merely that
he be given the same rights to release as civil committees. Nor do we
reach the question whether the Government may confine petitioner, ifhe is
recommitted, to a facility other than one used to treat involuntary civil
committees.
38
Petitioner has not contended that statutory sentence reductions or
other sentencing factors should limit the maximum sentence he could have
received for purposes of the analysis in this case.
37
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titioner had been in custody for 17 months, either in St. Elizabeths or in the District of Columbia Correctional Center.
Therefore, at that time he should have received the benefit of
the Addington due process standards, as well as the further
statutory protections given candidates for civil commitment.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is
reversed.
So ordered.

r.
'

RIDER B

In this case petitioner was committed to St.
Elizabeths upon being acquitted of attempted larcenv by
reason of insanity.

At two subsequent hearings the

District of Columbia Superior Court found that he remained
mentally ill and dangerous.

The correctness of those

findings is not before us, as petitioner did not challenge
them on appeal. 1 Nor are we asked to decide whether the
A
District's procedures for release from confinement are
constitutional. 2

Nor, indeed, does petitioner challenge

directly his automatic commitment following his insanity
acquittal.

Rather, his argument is that an insanity

acquittal provides an inadequate basis for an indefinite
commitment.

Specifically, he contends that he must be

--

2.

released because he has been committed for a period longer
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum sentence.
We do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is
invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical maximum
prison sentence has anv relevance to the length of his
commitment.

RIDER A

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released
because he has been hospitalized for a period longer than
he might have served in prison had he been convicted .
. f ~ - ~

I

~ ! ; 0,

~--.....,,..-

In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may

~f

/

~

be acquitted by reason of insanity tHl1eso his insanity

is "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the
evidence." D.C. Code §24-301 (j)

(1981) • 1

If he

1 section 24-30l(j) provides:
" ( j) Insanity shall not be a defense in any er iminal
Footnote continued on next page.

2.

successfully invokes the insanity defense, he is committed
to a mental hospital.

§24-30l(d) (1). 2

Within 50 days of

commitment the acquittee is entitled to a hearing to
determine his eligibility for release, at which he has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

proceeding in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia or in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney
in such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his
plea of not guilty or within fifteen days thereafter or at
such later time as the court may for good cause permit,
files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting
attorney written notice of his intention to rely on such
defense.
No person accused of an offense shall be
acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of
its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who
raises the issue,
is affirmatively established by a
preponderance of the evidence."
2 section 24-30l(d) (1) provides:
"(d) (1)
If any person tried upon an indictment or
information for an offense raises the defense of insanity
and is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane
at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a
hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is
eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or
subsection (e)."
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible
only if the defendant himself raised the insanity defense.
See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).

3.

he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous.
30l(d) (2) . 3

§24-

If he fails to meet this burden at the 50-day

hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently may be
released, with court approval, upon certification of his
recovery by the hospital chief of service.

§24-30l(e) . 4

3 section 24-30l(d) (2) provides in relevant part:
(2) (A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his
confinement to determine whether he is entitled to release
from custody . . • •
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall
cause notice of the hearing to be served upon the person,
his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney and hold the
hearing.
Within ten days from the date the hearing was
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto.
The person confined shall have the burden of
proof.
If the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person confined is entitled to his
release from custody, either conditional or unconditional,
the
court
shall
enter
such
order
as
may
appear
11
appropriate.
The statute does not specify the standard for determining
release, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held in this case that, as in release proceedings under
§24-301 (e) and §21-545 (b) , the confined person must show
that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer
dangerous to himself or others. See 432 A.2d 364, 372 and
n. 16 (1981) (en bane).
/\
11

Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages.

4.

Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial
hearing every six months at which he may establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to

4 section 24-30l(e) provides in relevant part:
11
( e)
Where any per son has been con£ ined in a hospital
for the mentally ill pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section, and the superintendent of such hospital certifies
(1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that,
in the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not
in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or
others, and ( 3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the
person is entitled to unconditional release from the
hospital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of
the court in which the person was tried, and a copy
thereof served on the United States Attorney or the
Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever
office prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be
sufficient
to
authorize
the
court
to
order
the
unconditional release of the person so confined from
further hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days
from the time said certificate was filed and served as
above; but the court in its discretion may, or upon the
objection of the United States or the District of Columbia
shall, after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence
as to the mental condition of the person so confined may
be submitted, including the testimony of one or more
psychiatrists from said hospital.
The court shall weigh
the evidence and, if the court finds that such person has
recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future
be dangerous to himself or others, the court shall order
such
person
unconditionally
released
from
further
con£ inement in said hospital.
If the court does not so
find, the court shall order such person returned to said
hospital. . .• 11

..

5.

release.

§24-30l(k) . 5

Independent of its commitment of insanity acquittees,
the District of Columbia also has adopted a civilcommitment procedure, under which an individual may be
committed upon clear and convincing proof by the
Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure

5 section 24-30l(k) provides in relevant part:
(k) (1) A person in custody or conditionally released
from custody, pursuant to the provisions of this section,
claiming the right to be released from custody, the right
to any change in the conditions of his release, or other
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having
jurisdiction to order his release, to release him from
custody, to change the conditions of his release, or to
grant other relief. •..
(3) .•. On all issues raised by his motion, the person
shall have the burden of proof.
If the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person is entitled
to his release
from custody,
either conditional or
unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release,
or other relief, the court shall enter such order as may
appear appropriate . . . .
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd
or successive motion for relief under this section more
often than once every 6 months.
A court for good cause
shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more
often than once every 6 months."
11

6.

himself or others.

§21-545(b) . 6

He may be released at

any time upon certification of recovery by the hospital
chief of service.

§§21-546, 21-548.

Alternatively, the

patient is entitled after the first 90 days, and
7

subsequently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer
mentally ill or dangerous.

§21-546, 21-547: see Dixon v.

Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 598 (CADC 1970).

II

6 section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part:
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally
ill and, because of that illness, likely to injure himself
or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty, the
court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate
period, or order any other alternative course of treatment
which the court believes will be in the best interests of
the person or of the public."
See In re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into
the statute the due process requirement of "clear and
convincing" proof) .

7.

On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for
attempting to steal a jacket from a department store.

The

next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia
Superior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one
year.

D.C. Code §§22-103, 22-2202 (1981).

The court

)t!l- ·~ ~ ~ ~ ~
ordered petitioner committed to St. Elizabeths for a

1

determination of his competency to stana trial. 7

d-l ,

On March

2, 1976, a hospital psychologist submitted a report to the
court stating that petitioner was competent to stand
trial, that petitioner suffered from "Schizophrenia,

7 section 24-301 (a) authorizes the court to "order
the accused committed to the District of Columbia General
Hospital or other mental hospital designated by the court,
for such reasonable period as the court may determine for
examination and observation and for care and treatment if
such is necessary by the psychiatric staff of said
hospital."

~-

8.

~~~ ~ ~

~ ~1-u.:k;/. 4 ~
-?
t--1" ~ P - 1 ~ ~~ !' Lt/_.._

/4~

ul.w-

~~~~.If/Ip~~~~~

-------- --------____:~

and that petitioner's alleged offense was

"the product of his mental disease."

Record 51.

The

court ruled that petitioner was competent to stand trial.

7

Petitioner and the Government then stipulated that
petitioner had committed the attempted larceny bv reason
of insanity.

On March 12, 1976, the Superior Court found

petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity and committed
him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to §24-30l(d) (1).
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing
required by §24-30l(d) (2) (A).

A psychologist from St.

Elizabeths testified on behalf of the Government that, in
the opinion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer
from paranoid schizophrenia and that "because his illness
is still quite active, he is still a danger to himself and
to others."

Record 9.

Petitioner's counsel conducted a

9.

brief cross-examination, and presented no evidence. 8

The

court then found that "the defendant-patient is mentally
ill and as a result of his mental illness, at this time,
he constitutes a danger to himself and others."
13.

Id., at

Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeths.
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some

procedural confusion, a release hearing pursuant to §2430l(k) (2) was held on February 22, 1977.

Petitioner

demanded release or recommitment pursuant to the civil

commitment standards/in §21-545(b), including a jury trial

~

and proof by clear and convincing evidence of ~etitioRer 1s illness and dangerousness.

The Superior Court denied

8 Petitioner's counsel
seemed concerned primarily
about obtaining a trans fer for petitioner to a less
restrictive wing of the hospital. See Record 10-11.

10.

petitioner's request for a civil commitment hearing,
reaffirmed its findings at the May 25 hearing, and
continued petitioner's commitment to St. Elizabeths.

d-1-D

Petitioner bro~~l,-1; --a-n appeal -H'l the District of

"'
Columbia Court of Appeals.

A panel of the court affirmed

the Superior Court, 396 A.2d 183 (1978), but then granted
rehearing and reversed, 411 A.2d 624 (1980).

Finally, the

court heard the case en bane and affirmed the judgment of
the Superior Court.

432 A.2d 364 (1981).

The Court of

Appeals rejected the argument "that the length of the
prison sentence [petitioner] might have received
determines when he is entitled to release or civil
commitment under Title 24 of the D.C. Code."

Id., at 368.

It then held that the various differences between civil
commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees were

11.

justified under the equal-protection component of the
Fifth Amendment.

Id., at 371-376.

We granted certiorari, 454 U.S. 1141 (1982), and now
affirm.

RIDER G

~

~he:,~

· ·
·
I n argnrng ~ ~
t 1n ae f 1n1te
commitment
of

I\

A

a ~ e e s , petitioner also ~
~

·
·
1nsan1ty

that

t~ - 1 , - - -

~
tl-~~.,
t demonstrates onlv past, not'\ presen :C insaoi t,¥, and

that the commission of one criminal act does not suffice
to establish dangerousness.

RIDER C

We therefore conclude that a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity is a sufficient foundation for
commitment of an insanity acquittee for the purposes of
treatment and the protection of society. 1 (#

....

'

RIDER C.F

16 Pet i tioner
also
has
raised
an
equal-protect ion
challenge to the fact that a jury is available at a civil
commitment hearing, see §21-544, but not at the 50-day
hearing for a committed insanity acquittee. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that "this difference is justified by
the fact that the acqui ttee has had a right to a jury
determination of his sanity at the time of the offense."
432 A.2d, at 373.

RIDER D

Petitioner's principal argument is that, whatever the
validity of automatic commitment following an insanity
acquital, the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence
provides the constitutional limit for his commitment.
do not agree that the permissible duration of such a
commitment is affected by the criminal penalties the
acquittee might have received.

We

RIDER F

IV
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by
a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a
crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the
,

government, on the basis of the insanity ~~rdiet, to
confine him to a mental institution until such time as he
has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to
himself or society.

This holding accords with the widely

and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees
constitute a special class that should be treated
differently from other candidates for commitment. 1 We have
observed before that" [w]hen Congress undertakes to act in
areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties,

2.

legislative options must be especially broad and courts
should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.

"

Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974).

This

admonition has particular force in the context of
legislative efforts to deal with the special problems
raised by the insanity defense.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
So ordered.

~ - a_.

/.2-~

~~lA./2.u.v~9
~ ~

~.

~ezs,,-~,I

Ha/J~f- JI ~ ~
?~
(~...J_ ./-

men 03/04/83

~11~. /

~

\

C . . - . , ~ r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~q_.~e .-U~J__-~
4

DRAFT NO. 1 -- Jones v. United

~
~

~

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
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Court holds that petitioner, who was

r>,bbe>--.
~

committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted byf?t::f -

I~

-

~
reason of insanity of a criminal offense, must be re~

W'f6'~~

because he has been hospitalized for a period longer
(.\

tha;o/7

4 ~l,
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he might have served in prison had he been convicted.

If ·

the Government seeks to recommit petitioner, it must offer
him a jury trial and comply with the civil-commitment
standards set forth in Addington
( 19 7 9 ) •
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unique problems raised by the insanity defense.

I

therefore dissent.
I

In the District of Columbia, an individual may be
committed civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the
Government that ~e is mentally ill and likely to injure
himself or others.

D.C. Code Ann. §21-545 (1981): see In

re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233 (DC 1979).

He may be released

upon certification by the hospital chief of service.
546.

§21-

Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the

first 90 days, and subsequently at six-month intervals, to
request a judicial hearing at which he may gain his
release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
he no longer is mentally ill or dangerous.
548.

§§21-547, 21-

3.

A second type of involuntary commitment follows from
successful invocation of the insanity defense.

If a

criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity--a
verdict that requires that his insanity be "affirmatively
established by a preponderance of the evidence," §2430l(j)--he automatically is committed to a mental
hospital.

§ 24-301 ( d) ( 1) •

He may be released, with court

approval, upon certification of the hospital chief of

~,

~
911.-~

service.

~ ~L)

thereafter at six-month intervals, the committed insanity

~
~ '5D 7:

acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing at which he ·

~.,_

~~

-~"-

~
fw' ~ _

§301 (e).

Alternatively, within 50 days, and

may prove, in the same manner as a civilly committed
person, that he is entitled to release.

§§24-301 (d) (2),

(k); see 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (DC 1981)

~~~

(en bane).

?

4.

Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital
upon being acquitted by reason of insanity of attempted
petit larceny.

At two subsequent hearings the District of

Columbia Superior Court found that he remained mentally
ill and dangerous.

~-f

The correctness of those findings,

d-c-.ll~f

.A\w..bJt,Qh petitioner n ~ ~s challenged on appeal, 1 is not
"\

before us.

Nor are we asked to decide whether the

District's procedures for release from confinement are
constitutional. 2

Instead, petitioner argues that he is

1 I'b Is- ~ 4 - i - ~ of --tais ea-se- that ~ ti tioner, wh9
urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally since
1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments
raised in this case.
Petitioner has not sought judicial
review of the Superior Court's findings in 1976 and 1977
that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor does the
record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a
release hearing--a hearing to which he was entitled every
"A
2As <liscussed above, the basic standard for release
is the same under either civil commitment or commitment
following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he no
Footnote continued on next page.
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5.

being detained in violation of the Constitution, and
therefore that he need not go through release procedures
at all.
II.

It is clear that "commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection."
U.S. 418, 425 (1979).

Addington v. Texas, 441

The initial question is whether the

State has a "constitutionally adequate purpose for the

longer is dangerous or mentally ill.
There is on~
important difference, however, in the release provisions
for these two groups. A patient who was committed civilly
is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of
his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §21-546,
whereas a committed insanity acqui ttee may be released
upon
such certification only with
court
approval.
§30l(e). Neither of these provisions is before the Court,
however, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in
treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed
persons.

6.

confinement."
(1975).

O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574

A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity

establishes two facts:

(i) the defendant committed an act

that would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he
committed the act because of mental illness.

In my

judgment it was reasonable for Congress to determine that
a person as to whom those two findings were made is
mentally ill and dangerous and therefore should be
committed to a mental institution for treatment and the
protection of society.

See Addington, supra, at 426

(commitment for these purposes justified under States'
parens patriae and police powers); O'Connor, supra, at
575-576.
I am not persuaded by petitioner's suggestion that
the commission of a nonviolent criminal act such as

-,

7.

larceny is an insufficient indication of dangerousness.
We never have held that "violence," however that term
might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional
commitment. 3

Nor am~ ~e-ru,.illoed

th~Fi ~ J was J unreasonable

for Congress to determine that the insanity acquittal

?
•

suppor ;:--~

A

resen \')mental illness.

The Due

7

3 see Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861
(CADC 196 2)
(Burger, J.) (" [T] o describe the theft of
watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse
, P..
danger with violence.
Larceny 1 s usually less violent
~~
than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the
lY'
purpose of the statute is the same as to both.").
The
~~
relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of
~
.
course should be a consideration at the release hearings.
In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's
f" ~
continuing commitment apparently does not rest solely on
:
the eviden e relating to his acquittal by reason ·of
~_.)--$ insanit
the crime of attempted larceny.
In December
~·
1-~9
medical officer at St. Elizabeth's reported that
v-1" N ti titioner "has a history of attempted suicide." Record
87.
In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred
d~. ~ CJ{
to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred
U'1
~
back to the forensic division becau,~e of disruptiv ~
432
~~~~vio:fter
p:ti;f~neart w~s Fr;:;;e~e:es~~~~~~i½f~~~~~~
following the second panel decision below, he had to
recommitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later
~ ~
for conduct unrelated to the original commitment.
See
~
Brief for Respondent at 15 n.18.
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Process Clause does not require Congress to make
classifications that fit every individual with the same
degree of relevance. 4 ("Normally there will be only a
limited period of delay between the act and the insanity
and Congress has provided a hearing only 50
days after the commitment so that every acquittee has an
immediate opportunity to obtain release if he has
recovered.
The Court concedes, though with seeming reluctance,

4 .For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S.
417 {1974), we upheld a congressional dec1son to exclude

from a program of discretionary rehabilitative commitment,
in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with two or
more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the
legislative decision had a "rational basis," id., at, and
rejected the dissent's reliance on the fact that the
statutory distinction deprived every addict in that
particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered
for treatment for his disease."
Id., at 427 {MARSHALL,
J., dissenting).
We recognized that a discretionary
system would have been permissible, but concluded that
"legislative classifications need not be perfect or
ideal." Id., at 435.

2 -I
>

9.

that an insanity acquittal "is not irrelevant" to whether
an individual is mentally ill and dangerous.

~

~

Nonetheless,

I-'' 1.

.,;,/J rJ,~~ - - : :. . _'
..,,r_l-f.l.,.,

~ ~1,,~r1J..

fi!,t1;:;;_~

~-t ~
~ - _n

µ

A

suggests that the Government lacks a

automatically because the Government can introduce the
insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil

a ~:J
.9

1-t.-~

legitimate reason for committing insanity acquittees

)C~~

~-

Ante, at 14.

commitment proceeding.
misses the point.

See id., at 17.

This argument

The Government does not contend that

~ ~ automatic commitment is the only means of using the

wt!!;~

~·

finding of acquittal by reason of insanity, but rather
that "due regard for considerations of judicial economy ·
and integrity justify the assignment of the burden of

[:- h s > ~ a . . ~
proving recovery to the insanity acquittee who ~has

;: al s t a ....>(

successfully established his past insanity."

~

Respondent at 47.

~~

Brief for

Tk ~-1-~ ~ ~ ~

~

.. ~

~

the Government ie-fi reed to conduct

~~ . 9 ~ / - ~
~l-b-fa.~~ -

~t-1-~~~y
n...-.__~rMs-~.

~

10.

a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity
acquittal--[ hearing at which a jury must be availabJj', -zr";

_z

A
§21-546, and at which the Government must demonstrate the
acquittee's mental illness and dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence, see Addington, supra, at 431-433
( 19 7 9) :--4-J't;...--\ln-:l:-i:--ee--...J.€~_e.d--t..()--at'S8~e-l:f'e~s-i-c~~r±-e--o-t:H'-€1-efl-;;--\,

tkiL

~ ~evidence

placed before the criminal factfinder

m•e& tu be reintroduced.

Instead t

~/W¼,l..l..

using on the critical/

question of whether the acquittee has recovered since he
committed the criminal act by reason of insanity, the new
commitment proceeding likely will

1

d"

~~~Be

same

g r o n - n ~ r f l - a p : ! exl.<ta1:,1i..t h·ery, =t!'t the er iminal

~~ ~rtt<LLu.s1- G,,- 1.4-, ~ trial.) ~ ~~-k.d-a.----, ~~
~ N!lf.-J4AL ~ a,• ..lv
L,i.-,1
These concerns about potentially duplicative ~

~ ~a~•·4

~ ~/J-4t.,

proceedings give the Government an important interest in ~

11.

automatic commitment.
319, 348 (1976}

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

{"[T]he Government's interest, and hence

that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and
administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed.
At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to
the individual affected by the administrative action and
to society in terms of increased assurance that the action
is just, may be outweighed by the cost."}.

The remaining

question is whether, in light of this interest, the
procedural safeguards that accompany automatic commitment
satisfy the Due Process Clause.
doubt that the

Certainly there is no

criminal trial, with the availability of a

jury, counsel, and the like, provides the criminal
defendant with an acceptable forum in which to resolve the
question of whether he committed a criminal act by reason

12.

of insanity.

Nor do I believe that commitment following a

verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence is
impermissible in light of Addington's requirement for
civil commitment of proof by clear and convincing
evidence.

"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such

procedural protections as the particular situation
demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972),
and in my view the important differences between the class
of potential civil commitment candidates and the class of
insanity acquittees justify differing standards of proof.
The Court in Addington expressed particular concern·
that members of the public could be confined on the basis
of "some abnormal behavior which might be perceived by
some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but
which is in fact within a range of conduct that is

13.

generally acceptable."
O'Connor, 422

o.s.,

441

at 575.

o.s.,

at 426-427.

See also

In view of this concern, we

deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share
equally with society the risk of error."

o.s.,

at 427.

Addington, 441

But since automatic commitment under

§30l(d) follows only if the acquittee himself argues and
proves that the act was a product of his mental illness,
see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 O.S. 705 (1962), there is
good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of
error. 5

More important, the proof that he committed a

5 That petitioner raised the insanity defense also
somewhat diminishes the significance of the deprivation.
The Addington Court noted that the social stigma of civil
commitment "can have a very significant impact on the
individual."
441 o.s., at 426. A criminal defendant who
successfully
raises
the
insanity
defense,
however,
necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus
the commitment causes little additional harm in this
respect.

14.

criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the
risk that he is being commmited for mere "idiosyncratic
behavior." Addington, supra, at 427.

A criminal act by

definition is not "within a range of conduct that is
generally acceptable."

Id., at 426-427.

I therefore

would hold that the Due Process Clause is not violated
when a verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity,
supported by a preponderance of the evidence, 6 is used to
support commitment to a mental institution.
III

6 It also should be noted that a defendant could be
required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a
preponderance of the evidence.
See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 799 (1952).
Such an additional requirement
hardly would benefit a er iminal defendant who wants to
raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher
standard would be the likely result of a holding that an
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only
if the verdict were supported by clear and convincing
evidence.

15.

/ ~ ; ez_
The critical question in this case is how long an
insanity acquittee may be committed.

Although the Court

does not foreclose the possibility that the Government has

a-

;1'° legitimate interest in automatic commitment of insanity
committees, see ante, at 22 n.36, it holds today only that
"indefinite commitment" is forbidden.

Id. , at 21.

The

Court declares that automatic commitment of insanity
acquittees may be justified for a "limited period of time,
in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been
convicted of the crime with which he was charged."

Ibid.

I do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is
invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison
sentence has any relevance to the length of his
commitment.

16.

A

In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), we
held that the Due Process Clause requires that "the nature
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the individual is committed."
The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal,
like that of civil commitment, is to treat the
individual's mental illness and protect him and society
from his potential dangerousness.

See 432 A. 2d, at I\

(§30l(d) is designed for "the treatment and recovery of
the patient" and "the protection of society and the
patient").

The committed acquittee is entitled to release

when he has recovered his sanity or when he no longer is
dangerous.

See id., at

And because it is impossible

to predict how long it will take for any given individual

•

J' t

~

17.

~

to recover--or indeed whether the individual will recover
~

"'ft

&~!--Congress responsibly has chosen to leave the

length of commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic
review of the patient's suitability

~

.0-f

~

release.

The Court suggests that the insanity acquittal
constitutionally may support only a limited commitment
because "the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that
the acquittee will repeat his dangerous act.
That is equally true, however, with respect to
committed civilly pursuant to Addington.

Ante, at 16.

T one

The dangerous

acts that led to his civil commitment at some point may ho
longer justify continued confinement.

For this reason,

Congress has provided that the person must be released

hearings.

18 •

...

) ~ A ; ~ ~ ,
S"

The Court goes cm, -~ e r;
'l

-t:o

cas ~ doubt on the

constitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e
cannot ignore the adverse effect extended
institutionalization may have on an individual's ability
to prove that he is no longer mentally ill and dangerous,
both because it deprives him of the economic wherewithal
to obtain independent medical judgments and because the
treatment he receives may make it difficult for him to
show he has recovered."

Ibid.

The Court thus appears to

imply that the Constitution requires that every committed

~

patient be released at some definite point without regar"d
H

~~~~dk:./.J.1u,,.;t-~~
to his recovery.

Tl:ie uaJ ir~ity of such a drastic holding ,

riu-~
i~

, and at the very least~ should await a case

in which the issue is presented.

"'

Petitioner has

challenged neither the constitutionality of the District's

7k~~~

•

~~~~
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findings that

release procedures nor the Superior

On this record,

he remained mentally i 11 and

there is no basis
i definite commitment, subject to regular hearings
p tient's fitness for release, fails to protect

B

~~~ ~~4,4.-(
Even if the Court X" rQ corFeet that the length of a
commitment following an insanity acquittal

::::t:{ not

be

indefinite, the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence
would not provide a sound constitutional basis on which to
limit the commitment.

A particular sentence of

incarceration is chosen to reflect society's view of the
proper response to commission of a particular criminal
offense, based on a variety of considerations such as

Different considerations underlie commitment of an
insanity acquittee.
be punished. 7

As he was not convicted, he may not

His confinement rests on his continuing

illness and dangerousness.

Thus, under the District of

Columbia statute, no matter how heinous the act committed
by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his
acquittal if he has recovered.

~ ~

_ _ _7_r__f_l_t_td- -it

In contrast, someone who

t o be it@ oaJl-that the Court
actually believes, as it professes to do for purposes of
argument, that "the Government conceivably has an interest
in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their
er iminal acts."
Ante, at 12. As the Court of Appeals
held, "[s] ociety may not excuse a defendant's er iminal
behavior because of his insanity and at the same time
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d,
at
dlffletilt

.
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committed a less serious act may be confined for a longer ¼

period if he remains ill and dangerous.

There simply is~

no necessary correlation between severity of the offense ~
and length of time necessary for recovery.

~
I

The length of

the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore
is irrelevant. 8

'1

?
•
IV

8 The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may
be
treated
involuntarily
for
particular
psychiatric
problems, but that upon expiration of his prison sentence
he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment.
See McNeil v.
Director,
Patuxent
Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972): Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S . .504 (1972): Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) •.
None of those cases involved an insanity acqui ttee, and
none suggested that a person whose non-criminal commitment
was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be
confined in excess of the period for which he could have
served in prison if convicted for those acts. Similarly,
despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington had
engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for
criminal charges had the State chosen to prosecute," ante,
at 15, the Court did not intimate that his commitment
might have to be limited to the period of incarceration
that could have
resulted had he
been charged and
convicted.

22.

The Court holds that petitioner must be released
because he has been confined for longer than one vear, the
time he might have served in prison for the act he
committed.

Yet the Court expressly declines "to hold that

the interests asserted by the Government in this case do
in fact justify commitment up to the date on which a
sentence would have expired."

Ante, at 22 n.36.

This

~
suggests that after some period of time the Government may
"\
be required to release even the most violent insanity
acquittees.

In my view, the Constitution does not require

any fixed term of commitment for insanity acquittees,
whether based on a criminal sentence or selected in some
other arbitrary manner.

I Fespectfully di~sent.
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-- Jones v. United States, No. 81-5195

¥1

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to
a mental hospital upon being acquitted by reason of
insanity of a criminal offense, must be released becalISe
he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he might
have served in prison had he been convicted.

If the

Government seeks to recommit petitioner, it must
comply with the civil-commitment standards set forth in
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
that the Constitution ~

I do not think

he Government from
"\

prescribing indefinite commitment as a means of dealing
with the ~

oblems raised hy the insanity defense.

I therefore dissent.

2.

I

In the District of Columbia, an individual may be
committed civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the
Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure
himself or others.

D.C. Code Ann. §21-545 (1981) 1 see In

re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233 (DC 1979).

He may be released

upon certification by the hospital chief of service.
546.

§21-

Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the

first 90 days, and subsequently at six-month intervals, to
request a judicial hearing at which he may gain his
release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
he no longer is mentally ill or dangerous.

§§21-547, 21-

548.
A second type of involuntary commitment follows from
successful invocation of the insanity defense.

If a

3.

criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity--a
verdict that requires that his insanity be "affirmatively
established by a preponderance of the evidence," §2430l(j)--he a-u~i.:1:::a.l-ly is committed to a mental
hospital.

§24-30l(d) (1).

He may be released, with court

approval, upon certification by the hospital chief cf
service.

§30l(e).

Alternatively, within 50 days, and

thereafter at six-month intervals, the committed insanity
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing at which he
may prove, in the same manner as a civilly committed
person, that he is entitled to release.

§§24-30l(d) (2),

(k); see 432 A.2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (DC 1981)

(en bane).

Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital
upon being acquitted by reason of insanity of attempted
petit larceny.

At two subsequent hearings the District of

4.

Columbia Superior Court found that he remained mentally
ill and dangerous.

The correctness of those findings is

not before us, as petitioner did not challenge them on
appeal.

1

Nor are we asked to decide whether the

District's procedures for release from confinement are
constitutional. 2

Nor, indeed, does petitioner challenge

1 Peti tioner, who urges that he has been confined
unconstitutionally since 1977, seeks his release solely on
the legal arguments raised in this case.
Petitioner has
not sought
judicial review of the Superior Court's
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill
and dangerous, nor does the record indicate that since
1977 he ever has sought a release hearing--a hearing to
which he was entitled every six months.
On this reco.rd
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any
less ill or dangerous than he was in 1976.
See n. 5
infra.
2As discussed above, the basic standard for release
is the same under either civil commitment or commitment
following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he no
longer is dangerous or mentally ill.
There is one
important difference, however, in the release provisions
for these two groups. A patient who was committed civilly
is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of
his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §21-546,
whereas a committed insanity acqui ttee may be released
upon
such
certification
only
with
court
approval.
Footnote continued on next page.

5.

his automatic commitment following his insanity acquittal.
All petitioner contends is that he must be released
because he has been committed for a period longer than the
duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal sentence.
II.

It is clear that "commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection."
U.S. 418, 425 (1979).

Addington v. Texas, 441

Therefore, a State must have a

"constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement."
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 (1975).

A

verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes

§30l(e).

Neither of these provisions is before the Court r f

~~ as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy

of the release standards generally nor the disparity in
treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed
persons.

6•

two facts:

(i) the defendant committed an act that would

constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the
act because of mental illness.

Congress has determined

that a person as to whom those two findings were made is
mentally ill and dangerous and therefore should be
committed

~;7tieatJ Y to

a mental institution for

treatment and the protection of society.
No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970).

See H.R. Rep.

Petitioner concedes that

this was one of Congress' purposes, see Brief for
Petitioner at 9 and n. 4, and he does not challenge his
original commitment.
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the individual is committed."
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).

The purpose

7.

of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that
of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental
illness and protect him and society from his potential
dangerousness.

See 432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of

Columbia statutory scheme for commitment of insane
criminals is

a regulatory, prophylactic statute, based

on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting
society and rehabilitating mental patients.").

The

committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has
recovered his sanity or when he no longer is dangerous.
See id., at 372 and n.16; H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74
(1970).

And because it is impossible to predict how long

it will take for any given individual to recover--or
indeed whether he ever will recover--Congress has chosen,
as it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the

8.

length of commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic
review of the patient's suitability for release.
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite
commitment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional.
Ante, at 21.

In the Court's view, automatic commitment of

insanity acquittees may be justified at most for a
"limited period of time, in no event exceeding the term
for which an insanity acquittee could have been
incarcerated had he been convicted of the crime with which
he was charged."

Ibid.

I do not agree either that an

indefinite commitment is invalid or that the acquittee's
hypothetical prison sentence has any relevance to the
length of his commitment.
III.
A

9.

In finding that an indefinite commitment is not
constitutional, the Court emphasizes the difference
between an insanity verdict based on a preponderance of
the evidence and Addington's requirement for civil
commitment of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
ante, at 14-15.

See

It is not clear why this difference is

relevant to the permissible duration of the commitment.
If, as petitioner concedes in this case, an insanity
acquittal based on a preponderance of the evidence may
. - r t . A S ) ~ ~ ~ .~

justify automatic commitment, /\I do not:

1111der-st:a~

why

the

difference in level of proof for commitment has any
further significance.

The purposes of the commitment--

treatment of the patient and protection of the patient and
,

~

~Hv

~~

society--are reasonably served by an indeterminate length
of confinement.

~~~/Ud-~~

Any i;:e'fl\f:d1,ina;- question as to the proper

I"\

~

10.

level of proof for determining release . is not r ai sed ~

In any event, I ~

the Court ignores important

differences between the class of potential civil
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees
that justify differing standards of proof.

The Addington

Court expressed particular concern that members of the
public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic
of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact
within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable."
441 U.S., at 426-427.

575.

~
or:i..tW r, 422

See also ~

U.S., at

In view of this concern, the Court deemed it

inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with
society the risk of error."

Addington, 441 U.S., at 427.

11.

But since automatic commitment under §30l(d) follows only
if the acquittee himself argues and proves that the act
was a product of his mental illness, see Lynch v.
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962), there is good reason for
diminished concern as to the risk of error. 3

More

important, the proof that he committed a criminal act as a
result of mental illness eliminates the risk that he is
being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior."
Addington, supra, at 427.

A criminal act by definition is

not "within a range of conduct that is generally

3That petitioner raised the insanity defense also
somewhat d:i.mini shes the significance of the deprivation.
The Addington Court noted that the social stigma of civil
commitment "can have a very significant impact on the
individual." 441 U.S., at 426. A criminal defend~~.: .. ~~o
success fully
raises
the
insanity
defense ,--("""'h~
necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus
the commitment causes little additional harm in this
respect.

~

L

12.

acceptable."

Id., at 426-427.

"[D]ue process is flexible

and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

5~
U.S. 471, 481 (1972),.. and -1 beli-eue tbat .§30l(e) 's
/}

preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due
process for commitment of insanity acquittees. 4
B

In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity
acquittees, the Court also contends that an insanity
acquittal "is backward-looking, focusing only on one

4A defendant could be required to prove his
insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the
evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952).
Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a
criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity
defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the
likely result of a holding that an insanity acquittal
could support automatic commitment only if the verdict
were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

13.

moment in the past," ante, at 16, and that "§30l(d) fails
to reflect the commonsense truth that some crimes are more
indicative of dangerousness than others."

Ibid.

Again,

I do not think these arguments bear on the validity of an
indefinite commitment.

If the insanity acquittal provides

an insufficient foundation for a finding of mental illness
and dangerousness, then any automatic commitment following
an insanity acquittal would be precluded.

If, on the

other hand, the insanity acquittal may support automatic
commitment, as petitioner has conceded in this case, then
the duration of that commitment should be determined by
reference to its purpose: treatment and confinement of a
dangerously insane person until he has recovered.

1it.n,-aAu.,9
0~ th0 meries, c L

mm -fte-t persuaded by the Court's
'\

suggestion that commission of a nonviolent criminal act

14.

such as attempted larceny is an insufficient indication of

~~~~
dangerousness. ~

never ~

held that "violence,"

however that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for
a constitutional commitment. 5

5 see

Nor was it unreasonable for

Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861
(CADC 1962)
(Burger, J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of
watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse
danger with violence.
Larceny is usually less violent
than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the
purpose of the statute is the same as to both.").
It also
may be noted that crimes of theft frequently may result in
violence from the efforts of the criminal to escape or the
victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the
fleeing criminal.
The
relative
"dangerousness"
of
a
particular
individual of course should be a consideration at the
release hearings.
In this context, it is noteworthy t~at
petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not
rest solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by
reason of insanity of the crime of attempted larceny.
In
December 1976 a medical officer at St. Elizabeth's
reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted
suicide."
Record 87.
In addition, petitioner at one
point was transferred to the civil division of the
hospital,
but was transferred back to the forensic
di vis ion because of disruptive behavior.
4 3 2 A. 2d, at
368 n. 6.
Respondent also advises that after petitioner
was released unconditionally following the second panel
decision below, he had to recommitted on an emergency
civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the
original commitment. See Brief for Respondent at 15 n.18.

15.

Congress to determine that the insanity acquittal supports
an inference of continuing mental illness.

The Due

Process Clause does not require Congress to make
classifications that fit every individual with the same
degree of relevance.

6

By providing a hearing only 50 days

after the commitment, Congress has ensured that every
acquittee has an immediate opportunity to obtain release
if he has recovered. 7

6 .For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 o~s~
417 {1974), we upheld a congressional decison to exclude
from a program of discretionary rehabilitative commitment,
in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with two or
more prior felony convictions.
The Court noted that the
legislative decision was not "unreasonable or irrational,"
id., at 428, and rejected the dissent's reliance on the
fact that the statutory distinction deprived every addict
in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be
considered for treatment for his disease."
Id., at 427
{.MARSHALL,
J.,
dissenting).
We
recognized
that
a
discretionary system would have been permissible, but
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be
perfect or ideal." Id., at 435.
7 The Court suggests that the Government lacks a
legitimate
reason
for
committing
insanity acquittees
.Footnote continued on next page.
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The Court compl tes its analysis by suggesting that
there may be a consti utional problem with indefinite
commitment generally.

The Court states that an insanity

acquittal constitutio ally may support only a limited
commitment because "t e passage of time erodes the
likelihood" that
act.

Ante, at 16.

acquittee will repeat his dangerous

)\~ie.; equally

trueJ=. ~ with

respect to a person committed civilly pursuant to

automatically because the Government can introduce
insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civ iJ._
proceeding.
See ante, at 17.
This argument fails t~
consider the Government's strong interest in avoiding the
need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following
every insanity acqu1ttal--a hearing at which a jury trial
may be requested, §21-546, and at which the Government
bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence.
Instead of focusing on the critical question of
whether the acqui ttee has recovered, the new proceeding
likely would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These
problems give the Government an important interest in
automatic commitment.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 348 (1976).

17.

Addington.

The dangerous acts that led to his civil

commitment at some point may no longer justify continued
confinement.

For this reason, Congress has provided

periodic release hearings to ensure that the person is
released upon recovery.

The Court, however, without a

specific holding, casts doubt on the constitutional
sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ignore the
adverse effect extended institutionalization may have on
an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him
of the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make
it difficult for him to show he has recovered."

Ibid.

The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution
may require that every committed patient be released at

f .

18.

some unspecified point without regard to his recovery.

No

~-~

authority is cited that would support this dr.eti~
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Petitioner has

challenged neither the constitutionality of the District's
release procedures nor the Superior Court's findings that
he remained mentally ill and dangerous.

See supra, at

In suggesting that an indefinite commitment may be
unconstitutional because of the inadequacy of release
procedures, the Court ~

~

y has r...eached~t to addressA an

issue not before us.
IV
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration
of a commitment following an insanity acquittal must be
"definite" is highlighted by its reliance on the

19.

acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence as a
constitutional basis on which to limit the commitment.

A

particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect
society's view of the proper response to commission of a
particular criminal offense, based on a variety of
considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and
rehabilitation.

See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153, 183-186 (1976)

(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and

STEVENS, JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 248-249
(1949).

The State may punish a person convicted of a

crime even if satisfied that he is unlikely to commit
further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an
insanity acquittee.
be punished. 8

As he was not convicted, he may not

His confinement rests on his continuing

Footnote(s) 8 will appear on following pages.

20.

illness and dangerousness.

Thus, under the District of
~

Columbia statute, no matter how l+e-i-n-eus the act committed
by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his
acquittal if he has recovered.

In contrast, r

one who

committed a less serious act may be confined for a longer
period if he remains ill and dangerous.

There simply is

no necessary correlation between severity of the offense
and length of time necessary for recovery.

The length of

the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore
is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment.

9

A~~

2

8 :rl aoubt that the Court actually believes, as it
professes to do for purposes of argument, that "the
Government conceivably has an interest in confining
insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal
acts."
Ante, at 12.
As the Court of Appeals held,
"[s]ociety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior
because of his insanity and at the same time punish him
for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369.
be

9 The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may
treated
involuntarily
for
particular
psychiatric
Footnote continued on next page.
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The i.nherent ~ : ; 1 f relying on a criminal
sanction to determine the length of a therapeutic
confinement is manifested by the Court's failure to
provide guidance as to what lawfully may be done.

The

Court finds it easy to order petitioner's release because
he has been confined for longer than one year, the maximum
time he might have served in prison for the act he
committed.

At the same time, however, the Court leaves

problems, but that upon expiration of his prison sentence
he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment.
See McNeil v.
Director,
Patuxent
Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
None of those cases 1nvol ved an 1nsani ty acquit tee, and
none suggested that a person whose non-criminal commitment
was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be
confined in excess of the period for which he could have
served in prison if convicted for those acts. Similarly,
despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington had
engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for
criminal charges had the State chosen to prosecute," ante,
at 15, the Court did not intimate that his commitment
might have to be limited to the period of incarceration
that could have
resulted had he
been charged and
convicted.

22.

open the possibility that "statutory sentence reductions
or other sentencing factors" might need to be taken into
account.

Ante, at 24 n. 38.

Today's decision, therefore,

does not say whether the Due Process Clause requires
States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to
maximum sentences, minimum sentences, or likely sentences.
Nor does it suggest whether account must be taken of the
availability of release time or the possibility of parole.
And the Court ignores the fact that a criminal sentence
does not always correspond to a "limited period of time."
Id., at 22.

The States are left to speculate how they may

deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have
received life imprisonment, life imprisonment without
possibility of parole, or the death penalty.
IV

23.

The Court's decision will cause E}-l'eat uncertainty in
the many States that commit insanity acquittees
automatically or under lower standards than used for civil

~LA_,
commitment,lO for the Court simply has failed to annou;-~r1
6i:a f.4rm constitutional p ~

l~

e~

i~

e~ ~ ¼ .

I\
been ordered because his hypothetical criminal sentence
has expired.

Yet criminal sentences may prove irrelevant,

as the Court pointedly refuses "to hold that the interests
asserted by the Government in this case do in fact justify

lOA recent survey of commitment statutes reported
that 14 jurisdictions provide automatic commitment for at
least some insanity acquittees, while many other States
have a variety of unique methods of commit ing insanity
acquittees.
See Note, Commitment .Following an Insanity
Acquittal, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606 and nn. 4-6
( 1981) . ~ 19 States commit insanity acqui ttees under
the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id., at
605 n. 4.
It appears that only one State has enacted into
law the Court's new requirement that a committed insanity
acquittee be released following expiration of his maximum
criminal sentence.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §53a-47(b)
(West Supp. 1982).

24.

commitment up to the date on which a sentence would have
expired."

Ante, at 22 n. 36.

The possibility thus

remains that after some unspecified period of commitment
the Government will be required to release even the most
violent insanity acquittees.

Indeed, under its opinion

today, the Court conceivably could conclude that automatic
commitment of insanity acquittees itself is
unconstitutional.
In short, this decision casts serious doubt on
government's authority to act upon the widely and
reasonably held view that insanity acquittees constitute a
special class that should be treated differently from
other candidates for commitment.

In my view, these

problems confirm the wisdom of our observation that
"[w)hen Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with

25.

medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options
must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not
to rewrite legislation
414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974).
this admonition.

II

Marshall v. United States,

The Court should have heeded
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DRAFT NO. 1 (Court op.)Jones v. United States, No. 81-5195
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released
because he has been hospitalized for a period longer than
he might have served in prison had he been convicted.
I

In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may
not be acquitted by reason of insanity unless his insanity
is "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the
evidence." D.C. Code §24-30l(j)

(1981) • 1

If he

1section 24-30l(j) provides:
Footnote continued on next page.

2.

successfully invokes the insanity defense, he is committed
to a mental hospital.

§24-30l(d) (1) • 2

The statute

provides several ways of obtaining release.

Within 50

r;t.,ra:;e.

days of commitment the acquittee is entitled to a hearing
I\

"Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal
proceeding in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia or in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney
in such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his
plea of not guilty or within fifteen days thereafter or at
such later time as the court may for good cause permit,
files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting
attorney written notice of his intention to rely on such
defense.
No person accused of an offense shall be
acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of
its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who
raises the issue,
is affirmatively established by a
preponderance of the evidence."
2 section 24-301 (d) (1) provides:
"If any person tried upon an indictment or information
for an offense raises the defense of insanity and is
acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the
time of its commission, he shall be committed to a
hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is
eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or
subsection (e) ."
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible
only if the defendant himself raised the insanity defense.
See H.R.
Rep.
No.
91-907, p.
74
(1970); Lynch v.
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).

v

3.

to determine his eligibility for release, at which he has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous.
30l(d) (2) . 3

§24-

If he fails to meet this burden at the 50-day

hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently may be

3 section 24-30l(d) (2) provides in relevant part:
"(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall
have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his
confinement to determine whether he is entitled to release
from custody ••••
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause
notice of the hearing to be served upon the person, his
counsel,
and the prosecuting attorney and hold the
hearing.
Within ten days from the date the hearing was
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto.
The per son confined shall have the burden o'f
proof.
If the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person confined is entitled to his
release from custody, either conditional or unconditional,
the
court
shall
enter
such
order
as
may
appear
appropriate. "
The statute does not specify the standard for determining
release, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held in this case that, as in release proceedings under
§24-301 (e) and §21-545 (b), the confined person must show
that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer
dangerous to himself or others. See 432 A.2d 364, 372 and
n. 16 (1981) (en bane).

4.

released, with court approval, upon certification of his
recovery by the hospital chief of service.

§24-30l(e) • 4

Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial

4 section 24-30l(e) provides in relevant part:
"Where any per son has been confined in a hospital for
the mentally ill pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section, and the superintendent of such hospital certifies
(1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that,
in the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not
in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or
others, and (3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the
person is entitled to unconditional release from the
hospital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of
the court in which the per son was tried, and a copy
thereof served on the United States Attorney or the
Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever
office prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be
sufficient
to
authorize
the
court
to
order
the
unconditional release of the person so confined from
further hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days
from the time said certificate was filed and served as
above; but the court in its discretion may, or upon the
objection of the United States or the District of Columbia
shall, after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence
as to the mental condition of the person so confined may
be submitted, including the testimony of one or more
psychiatrists from said hospital.
The court shall weigh
the evidence and, if the court finds that such person has
recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future
be dangerous to himself or others, the court shall order
such
person
unconditionally
released
from
further
confinement in said hospital.
If the court does not so
find, the court shall order such person returned to said
hospital. • •• "

5.

hearing every six months at which he may establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to
release.

§24-30l{k). 5

Independent of its provision for the commitment of
insanity acquittees, the District of Columbia also has
adopted a civil-commitment procedure, under which an

5 section 24-30l{k) provides in relevant part:
"{l) A person in custody or conditionally released from
custody, pursuant to the prov1s1ons of this section,
claiming the right to be released from custody, the right
to any change in the conditions of his release, or other
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having
jurisdiction to order his release, to release him from
custody, to change the conditions of his release, or to
grant other relief ••••
(3) ••• On all issues raised by his motion, the person
shall have the burden of proof.
If the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person is entitled
to his release from custody,
either conditional or
unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release,
or other relief, the court shall enter such order as may
appear appropriate ••••
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or
successive motion for relief under this section more often
than once every 6 months.
A court for good cause shown
may in its discretion entertain such a motion more often
than once every 6 months."

6.

individual may be committed upon clear and convincing
proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely
to injure himself or others.

§21-545(b) • 6

The individual

may demand a jury in the civil-commitment proceeding.
§21-544.

Once committed, a patient may be released at any

time upon certification of recovery by the hospital chief
of service.

§§21-546, 21-548.

Alternatively, the patient

is entitled after the first 90 days, and subsequently at
6-month intervals, to request a judicial hearing at which

6section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part:
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally
ill and, because of that illness, likely to injure himself
or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty, the
court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate
period, or order any other alternative course of treatment
which the court believes will be in the best interests of
the person or of the public."
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into
the statute the due process requirement of "clear and
convincing" proof).

7.

he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous.

§21-546, 21-547: see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d

5 8 9 , 5 9 8 ( CADC 19 7 0 } •
II

On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for
attempting to steal a jacket from a department store.

The

next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia
Superior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one
year.

§§22-103, 22-2202.

The court ordered petitioner

committed to St. Elizabeths, a public hospital for the
mentally ill, for a determination of his competency to
stand trial. 7

On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist

Footnote(s} 7 will appear on following pages.

8.

submitted a report to the court stating that petitioner
was competent to stand trial, that petitioner suffered
from "Schizophrenia, paranoid type," and that petitioner's
alleged offense was "the product of his mental disease."
Record 51.

The court ruled that petitioner was competent

to stand trial.

Petitioner subsequently decided to plead

not guilty by reason of insanity.

The Government did not

contest the plea, and it entered into a stipulation of
facts with petitioner.

On March 12, 1976, the Superior

Court found petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity
and committed him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to §24-

7 Section 2 4-301 {a) authorizes the court to "order
the accused committed to the District of Columbia General
Hospital or other mental hospital designated by the court,
for such reasonable period as the court may determine for
examination and observation and for care and treatment if
such is necessary by the psychiatric staff of said
hospital."

..

9•

301 (d) (1).
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing
required by §24-30l(d) (2) (A).

A psychologist from St.

Elizabeths testified on behalf of the Government that, in
the opinion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer
from paranoid schizophrenia and that "because his illness
is still quite active, he is still a danger to himself and
to others."

Record 9.

Petitioner's counsel conducted a

brief cross-examination, and presented no evidence. 8

The

court then found that "the defendant-patient is mentally
ill and as a result of his mental illness, at this time,
he constitutes a danger to himself and others."

Id., at

8 Petitioner's counsel seemed concerned primarily
about obtaining a transfer for petitioner to a less
restrictive wing of the hospital. See Record 10-11.

-~
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Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeths.
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some

~

t sd:

fe l n·

procedural confusion, a release hearing purstlanl Lo
:ait-

3 ~ a s held on February 22, 1977.

Petitioner

demanded that he be released unconditionally or
recommitted pursuant to the civil-commitment standards in
§21-545(b), including a jury trial and proof by clear and
convincing evidence of his mental illness and
dangerousness.

The Superior Court denied petitioner's

request for a civil-commitment hearing, reaffirmed the
1q7~
findings made at the May 25, hearing, and continued
I\

petitioner's commitment to St. Elizabeths.
Petitioner appealed to the District of Colu bia Court
of Appeals.

A panel of the court affirmre Superior
.,.
, ../

Court, 396 A.2d 183 (1978), but the · ·granted rehearing and

:)_

,

11.

reversed, 411 A.2d 624 (1980).

Finally, the court heard

the case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court.

432 A.2d 364 (1981).

The Court of Appeals

rejected the argument "that the length of the prison
sentence [petitioner] might have received determines when
he is entitled to release or civil commitment under Title
24 of the D.C. Code."

Id., at 368.

It then held that the

various differences between civil commitment and
commitment of insanity acquittees were justified under the
equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment.

Id.,

at 371-376.
We granted certiorari, 454 U.S. 1141 (1982), and now
affirm.
III

12.

It is clear that "commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection."

u.s.

418, 425 (1979).

Addington v. Texas, 441

Therefore, a State must have "a

constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement."
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 (1975).

Congress

has determined that a person found not guilty by reason of
insanity is mentally ill and dangerous and therefore
should be committed indefinitely to a mental institution
for treatment and the protection of society.

See H.R.

Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970); Jones v. United States,
432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory
scheme for commitment of insane criminals is ••• a
regulatory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate
governmental interest in protecting society and

.

, '

~

13.

rehabilitating mental patients").

Petitioner does not

contest the Government's authority to commit a mentally
ill and dangerous person indefinitely to a mental
institution, but rather contends that "the petitioner's
trial was not a constitutionally adequate hearing to
justify an indefinite commitment."

Brief for Petitioner

14.

Petitioner's argument rests principally on Addington
v. Texas, supra, in which the Court held that the Due
Process Clause requires the Government in a civilcommitment proceeding to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill
and dangerous.

441 U.S., at 426-427.

Petitioner contends

that these due-process standards were not met in his case
because the judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity

14.

did not constitute a finding of present mental illness and
dangerousness and because it was established only by a
preponderance of the evidence. 9

Petitioner then concludes

9 rn the Court of Appeals petitioner apparently
based these arguments on equal protection rather than due
process, arguing that it was irrational for the Government
to deny him a civil-commitment hearing at which the
Government bore the burden of proof by clear and
convincing
evidence.
See
432 A.2d,
at 371.
Both
petitioner and the Government acknowledge that this equal
protection argument essentially duplicates petitioner's
due process argument. That is, if the Due Process Clause
does not require that an insanity acquittee be given the
particular procedural safeguards provided in a civilcommitment hearing under Addington, then there necessarily
is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for
distinguishing between civil commitment and commitment of
insanity acquittees.
See Reply Brief for Petitioner 2223; Brief for Government 55.
We agree, and therefore
address petitioner's arguments in terms of the Due Process
Clause.
Petitioner does raise one additional equal protection
argument that stands on its own. The District of Columbia
provides for a jury at civil-commitment hearings, see §21544,
and petitioner contends
that
equal protection
requires that insanity acquittees also be permitted to
demand a jury at the 50-day hearing. Because we determine
that an acquittee's commitment is based on the judgment of
insanity at the criminal trial, rather than solely on the
findings at the 50-day hearing, see infra, at _ _ , the
relevant
equal
protection
comparison
concerns
the
procedures available at the criminal trial and at a civilcommitment hearing.
We therefore agree with the Court of
Appeals that the absence of a jury at the 50-day hearing
"is justified by the fact that the acqui ttee has had a
Footnote continued on next page.

.
'
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15.

that the Government's only conceivably legitimate
justification for automatic commitment is to ensure that
insanity acquittees do not escape confinement entirely,
and that this interest can justify commitment at most for
a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the
acquittee could have received if convicted.

Because

petitioner has been hospitalized for longer than the one
year he might have served in prison, he asserts that he
should be released unconditionally or recommitted under
the civil-commitment procedures. 10

right to a jury determination of his sanity at the time of
the offense." 432 A.2d, at 373.
10 rt is important to note what issues are not raised
in this case. Petitioner has not sought appellate review
of the Superior Court's findings in 1976 and 1977 that he
remained mentally ill and dangerous, and, indeed, the
record does not indicate that since 1977 he ever has
sought a release hearing--a hearing to which he was
entitled every six months
or are w as e
to decide whether the District's
Footnote continued on next page.

16.

A

We turn first to the question whether the finding of
insanity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative
of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment.
A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes
two facts:

(i) the defendant committed an act that

constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the

procedures for release are constitutional.
As noted
above, see supra, at 2-4, the basic standard for release
is the same under either civil commitment or commitment
following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he no
longer
is dangerous or mentally ill.
There is an
important difference, however, in the release provisions
for these two groups. A patient who was committed civilly
is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of
his recovery by the hospital chief of service, see §21546, whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be
released upon such certification only with court approval,
see §24-30l(e). Neither of these provisions is before the
Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in
treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed
persons. See Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d, at 373, n.
19.

17.

act because of mental illness.

Congress has determined

that these findings constitute an adequate basis for
7

7

hospitalizing the acquittee as a dang~rous and mentally
ill person.

See H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 73

("Where [the] accused has pleaded insanity as a defense to
a crime, and the jury has found that the defendant was, in
fact, insane at the time the crime was committed, it is
just and reasonable in the Committee's opinion that the
insanity, once established, should be presumed to continue
and that the accused should automatically be confined for
treatment until it can be shown that he has recovered.

S.

Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955); H. Rept
No. 892, 84th Congress, 1st Sess. 13 (1955) .").

We cannot

say that it was unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional for Congress to make this determination.

18.

The fact that a person has been found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act

'

certainly indicates dangerousness, 11 and, indeed, this

\

\

concrete evidence generally may be at least as persuasive
as any predictions about dangerousness that might be made
in a civil-commitment proceeding. 12

11The

proof

beyond

a

We do not agree with

reasonable

doubt

that

the

acquittee committed a criminal act distinguishes this case
from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972}, in which the
Court held that a person found incompetent to stand trial
could not be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of
the finding of incompetency.
In Jackson there never was
any affirmative proof that the accused had committed
criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous.
12
In attacking the predictive value of the insanity
acquittal, petitioner complains that '[w]hen Congress
enacted the present statutory scheme, it did not cite any
empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons
who have committed a er iminal act are likely to commit
additional dangerous acts in the future." Reply Brief for
Petitioner 13.
He further argues that the available
research fails to support the predictive value of prior
dangerous acts. See id., at 13-14. We do not agree with
the suggestion that Congress' power to legislate in this
area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric
community. We have recognized repeatedly the "uncertainty
of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of
professional judgment.
The only thing that can be said
Footnote continued on next page.
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19.

petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness
is not established by proof that a person committed a
nonviolent crime against property constitutes a danger to
society.

This Court never has held that "violence,"

however that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for
a constitutional commitment. 13

about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding
mental disease is that science has not reached finality of
judgment •••• " Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366,
375 (1956).
See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472
(1981); Addington, 441 U.S., at 429-430; Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514, 535-537 (1968) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.).
The lesson we have drawn is not that government may not
act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that we
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative
judgments.
13 see Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861
(CADC 1961) (Burger, J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of
watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse
danger with violence.
Larceny is usually less violent
than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the
purpose of the statute is the same as to both.") (footnote
omitted).
It also may be noted that er imes of theft
frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the
er iminal to escape or the victim to protect property or
the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal.
The
relative
"dangerousness"
of
a
particular
individual, of course, should be a consideration at the
Footnote continued on next page.

20.

Nor can we say that it was unreasonable for Congress
to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an
inference of continuing mental illness.

It comports with

common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness
was sufficient to lead ~ m m i t a criminal act is
likely to remain ill and in need of treatment.

The

precise evidentiary force of the insanity acquittal, of
course, may vary from case to case, but the Due Process

release hearings.
In this context, it is noteworthy that
petitioner's continuing commitment may well rest
in
significant part on evidence independent of his acquittal
by reason of insanity of the er ime of attempted larcel'.lY'•
In December 1976 a medical officer at St. Elizabeth's
reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted
suicide."
Record 87.
In addition, petitioner at one
point was transferred to the civil division of the
hospital,
but was transferred back to the forensic
division because of disruptive behavior.
432 A. 2d, at
368 n.
6.
The Government also advises that after
petitioner was released unconditionally following the
second panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on
an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct
unrelated to the original commitment.
See Brief for
United States at 15 n. 18.
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Clause does not require Congress to make classifications
that fit every individual with the same degree of
relevance.
428

(1974).

See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417,
Because a hearing is provided within 50 days

of the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee
has prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has
recovered.
Petitioner also argues that, whatever the evidentiary
value of the insanity acquittal, the Government lacks a
legitimate reason for committing insanity acquittees
automatically because it can introduce the insanity
acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding.
This argument fails to consider the Government's strong
interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo
commitment hearing following every insanity acquittal--a

22.

hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded, §21-545,
and at which the Government bears the burden of proof by
clear and convincing evidence.

Instead of focusing on the

critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered,
the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate much of
the criminal trial.

~
~
These problems g-i,,,¥e the Government~
"1

important interest in automatic commitment.
v. Eldridge, 424

u.s.

319, 348 (1976).

See Mathews

We therefore

conclude that a finding of not guilty by reason of
insanity is a sufficient foundation for commitment of an
insanity acquittee for the purposes of treatment and the
protection of society.
B

Petitioner next contends that his indefinite
commitment is unconstitutional because the proof of his

23.

insanity was based only on a preponderance of the
evidence, as compared to Addington's civil-commitment
requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence.

~

f;)"Believe thetj/,, equating these situations, petitioner
ignores important differences between the class of
potential civil commitment candidates and the class of
insanity acquittees that justify differing standards of
proof.

The Addington Court expressed particular concern

that members of the public could be confined on the basis
of "some abnormal behavior which might be perceived by
some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but
which is in fact within a range of conduct that is
generally acceptable."

441 U.S., at 426-427.

O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S., at 575.

See also

In view of this

concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the

24.

individual "to share equally
error."

society the risk of

Addington, 441 U.S.,

But since automatic

commitment under §24-30l(d) (i)
0.JijiL4.,.._~c..11""1L.-,l aA,..

a.., ~/~c..4.--<_. I

acguittee himself a-.gug~ and proves that t-l¼,e act was a
product of his mental illness, 14 see Lynch v. Overholser,

C
-3-6~ U.&. 705 (1962), there is good reason for diminished

concern as to the risk of error. 15

More important, the

proof that he committed a criminal act as a result of
mental illness eliminates the risk that he is being

14 see n.
2,
supra.
In this case petitioner
stipulated that he had committed the offense by reason of
insanity.
15 That petitioner raised the insanity defense also
diminishes the significance of the deprivation.
The
Addington Court noted that the social stigma of civil
commitment "can have a very significant impact on the
individual." 441 U.S., at 426. A criminal defendant who
successfully raises the insanity defense necessarily is
stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus the commitment
causes little additional harm in this respect.

25.

committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," Addington,
supra, at 427.

A criminal act by definition is not

"within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable."
Id., at 426-427.
We therefore conclude that concerns critical to our
decision in Addington are diminished or absent in the case
of insanity acquittees.

Accordingly, there is no reason

for adopting the same standard of proof in both cases.
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands."
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

The

preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due
process for commitment of insanity acquittees. 16

16 A defendant could be required to prove his
insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the
Footnote continued on next page.
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C

The remaining question is whether petitioner
nonetheless is entitled to his release because he has been
hospitalized for a period longer than he could have been
incarcerated if convicted.

The Due Process Clause

requires that "the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed."
715, 738 (1972).

Jackson v. Indiana, 406

u.s.

The purpose of commitment following an

insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to
treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and

evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952).
Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a
criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity
defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the
likely legislative response to a holding that an insanity
acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the
verdict were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

27.

society from his potential dangerousness.

The committed

acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his
sanity or when he is no longer dangerous.

See O'Connor v.

Donaldson, 422 U.S., at 575-576; Jones v. United States,
432 A.2d, at 372, and n.16; H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 7374 (1970).

And because it is impossible to predict how

long it will take for any given individual to recover--or
indeed whether he ever will recover--Congress has chosen,
as it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the
length of commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic
review of the patient's suitability for release.
In light of the congressional purposes underlying
commitment of insanity acquittees, we think petitioner
clearly errs in contending that an acquittee's
hypothetical maximum sentence provides the constitutional

28.

limit for his commitment.

A particular sentence of

incarceration is chosen to reflect society's view of the
proper response to commission of a particular criminal
offense, based on a variety of considerations such as
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-186 {1976)

See, e.g.,
{opinion of

Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 {1963); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 248-249 {1949).

The State may punish a

person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he is
unlikely to commit further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an
insanity acquittee.
be punishea. 17

As he was not convicted, he may not

His confinement rests on his continuing

Footnote{s) 17 will appear on following pages.

29.

illness and dangerousness.

Thus, under the District of

Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed
by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his
acquittal if he has recovered.

In contrast, one who

committed a less serious act may be confined for a longer
period if he remains ill and dangerous.

There simply is

no necessary correlation between severity of the offense
and length of time necessary for recovery.

The length of

the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore
is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment. 18

17 As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may
not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his
insanity and at the same time punish him for invoking an
insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369.
18 The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may
be
treated
involuntarily for particular psychiatric
problems, but that upon expiration of his prison sentence
he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment.
See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972}; Humphrey v. Cady, 405
Footnote continued on next page.
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I•

V

We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by
a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a
crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the
Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to

U.S. 504 (1972): Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
None of those cases involved an insanity acqui ttee, and
none
suggested
that
a
person
under
non-criminal
confinement could not be confined in excess of the period
for which he could have served in prison if convicted for
the dangerous acts he had committed.
The inherent
fallacy of relying on a criminal
sanction
to determine
the length of a
therapeutic
confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to
suggest any clear guidelines for deciding when a patient
must be released.
For example, he does not suggest
whether the Due Process Clause would require States to
limit commitment of
insanity acquittees
to maximum
sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does he explain what
should be done in the case of indeterminate sentencing or
suggest whether account would have to be taken of the
availability of release time or the possibility of parole.
And petitioner avoids entirely the important question of
how his theory would apply to those persons who committed
especially serious er iminal acts.
Petitioner thus would
leave
the
States
to
speculate how
they may deal
constitutionally with acqui ttees who might have received
life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility
of parole, or the death penalty.

'n
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confine him to a mental institution until such time as
~~

has regained his sanity
himself or society.

9-l"

"

is no longer a danger to

This holding accords with the widely

and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees
constitute a special class that should be treated
differently from other candidates for commitment. 19 We
have observed before that "[w]hen Congress undertakes to
act in areas fraught with medical and scientific
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially

19 A recent survey of commitment statutes reported
that 14 jurisdictions provide auto~atic commitment for at
least some insanity acqui ttees, while many other States
have a variety of special methods of commiting insanity
acqui ttees.
See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity
Acquittal, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6
(1981). Nineteen States commit insanity acquittees under
the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id., at
605 n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into
law petitioner's suggested requirement that a committed
insanity acquittee be released following expiration of his
maximum criminal sentence.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a47 (b) (Supp. 1981).

32.

broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite
legislation.
417, 427 {1974).

"

Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S.
This admonition has particular force in

the context of legislative efforts to deal with the
special problems raised by the insanity defense.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals is
Affirmed.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
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Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to a
mental hospital upon being acquitted of a criminal offense by
reason of insanity , must be released because he has been
hospitalized for a period longer than he might have served in
prison had he been convicted. If the Government seeks to
recommit petitioner, it must comply with the civil-commitment standards set forth in Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S.
418 (1979). I do not think that the Constitution forbids w
vernm,ent ±o--~l"98eribe indefinite commitment as a means
of dealing with the special problems raised by the insanity defense. I therefore dissent.

I
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be committed civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. D.C. Code Ann. § 21-545 (1981); see In re Nelson, 408
A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979). He may be released upon certification
by the hospital chief of service. § 21-546. Alternatively,
the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, and subsequently at six-month intervals, to request a judicial hearing
at which he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer is mentally ill or dangerous. §§ 21-546, 21-548.

/
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A second type of involuntary commitment follows successful invocation of the insanity defense. If a criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity-a verdict that requires
that his insanity be "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence," § 24-301(j}-he is committed to a
mental hospital. § 24-301(d)(l). He may be released, with
court approval, upon certification by the hospital chief of
service. § 24-301(e). Alternatively, the committed insanity
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing within 50 days, and
thereafter at six-month intervals, at which he may prove, in
the same manner as a civilly committed person, that he is entitled to release. §§ 24-30l(d)(2), (k); see Jones v. United
States, 432 A. 2d 364, 372, and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en bane).
Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital upon
being acquitted of attempted petit larceny by reason of insanity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us,
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 1 Nor are we
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release
from confinement are constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does pePetitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hearing-a hearing to which he was entitled every six months. On this record
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any less ill or dangerous
than he was in 1976. See n. 5 infra.
2
As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he no longer is dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important difference, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, § 21-546, whereas a
committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certification only
1
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titioner challenge his automatic commitment following his insanity acquittal. All petitioner contends is that he must be
released because he has been committed for a period longer
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal
sentence.
II
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S.
563, 574 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that
a person as to whom those two findings were made is mentally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of society. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). Petitioner concedes that this was one congressional purpose, see
Brief for Petitioner at 9, and n. 4, and he does not challenge
his original commitment.
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432
A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme
for commitment of insane·criminals is . . . ·a regulatory, prowith court approval. § 24--301(e). Neither of these provisions is before
the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy of the release
standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity acquittees
and other committed persons.
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phylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating mental patients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576;
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp.
73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or indeed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the
patient's suitability for release.
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite commitment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional. Ante, at 21.
In the Court's view, automatic commitment of insanity
acquittees may be justified at most "for a limited period of
time, in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been convicted
of the crime with which he was charged." Id., at 22 (footnote omitted). I do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment.

III
A
In finding that an indefinite commitment is not constitutional, the Court emphasizes the difference between an insanity verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence and
Addington's requirement for civil commitment of proof by
clear and convincing evidence. See ante, at 14-16. It is not
clear why this difference is relevant to the permissible duration of the commitment. If, as petitioner concedes in this
case, an insanity acquittal based on a preponderance of the
evidence may justify automatic commitment, no reason has
been suggested why the difference in level of proof for com-
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mitment has any further significance. The purposes of the
commitment-treatment of the patient and protection of the
patient and society-are reasonably served in both situations
by an indeterminate length of confinement. This case does
not present the question as to the proper level of proof for
determining release.
In any event, the Court ignores important differences between the class of potential civil commitment candidates and
the class of insanity acquittees that justify differing standards of proof. The Addington Court expressed particular
concern that members of the public could be confined on the
basis of "some abnormal behavior which might be perceived
by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder,
but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally
acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426-427. See also O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575. In view of this concern, the
Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share
equally with society the risk of error." Addington, 441
U. S., at 427. But since automatic commitment under
§ 24-301(d)(i) follows only if the acquittee himself argues and
proves that the act was a product of his mental illness, see
Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962), there is good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of error. 3 More important, the proof that he committed a criminal act as a result
of mental illness eliminates the risk that he is being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," Addington, supra, at
427. A criminal act by definition is not "within a range of
conduct that is generally acceptable." Id., at 426-427.
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protec3
That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the significance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.
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tions as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of
the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity acquittees. 4

B
In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity acquittees,
the Court also contends that an insanity acquittal "is backward-looking, focusing only on one moment in the past,"
ante, at 16, and that "§ 301 fails to reflect the commonsense
truth that some crimes are more indicative of dangerousness
than others." Ibid. Again, I do not think these arguments
bear on the validity of an indefinite commitment. If the insanity acquittal provides an insufficient foundation for a finding of mental illness and dangerousness, then any automatic
commitment following an insanity acquittal would be precluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity acquittal may
support automatic commitment, as petitioner has conceded in
this case, then the duration of that commitment should be determined by reference to its purpose: treatment and confinement of a dangerously insane person until he has recovered.
Nor am I persuaded by the Court's suggestion that commission of a nonviolent criminal act such as attempted larceny is an insufficient indication of dangerousness. This
Court never has held that "violence," however that term
might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. 5 Nor was it unreasonable for Congress to deter• A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an ,additional requirement hardly would benefit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the verdict
were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
• See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger,
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder
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mine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of continuing mental illness. The Due Process Clause does not
require Congress to make classifications that fit every individual with the same degree of relevance. 6 By providing a
hearing only 50 days after the commitment, Congress has ensured that every acquittee has an immediate opportunity to
obtain release if he has recovered. 7
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal.
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St.
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide."
Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred to the civil
division of the hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic division
because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368 n. 6. The Government
also advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the
second panel decision below, he had to recommitted on an emergency civil
basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the original commitment.
See Brief for United States at 15 n. 18.
•For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974), we
upheld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We
recognized that a discretionary' system would have been permissible, but
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be perfect or ideal."
Id., at 428.
1
The Court suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding. See ante, at 17. This argument fails to consider the Government's
strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hear-
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C
The Court completes its analysis by suggesting that there
may be a constitutional problem with indefinite commitment
generally. The Court states that an insanity acquittal constitutionally may support only a limited commitment because
"the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that the acquittee
will repeat his dangerous act. Ante, at 15-16. To the extent this is likely, it would be equally true with respect to a
person committed civilly pursuant to Addington. The dangerous acts that led to his civil commitment at some point
may no longer justify continued confinement. For this reason, Congress has provided periodic release hearings to ensure that the person is released upon recovery. The Court,
however, without a specific holding, casts doubt on the constitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ignore the adverse effect extended institutionalization may
have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him of
the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make
it difficult for him to show he has recovered." Id., at 16
(footnote omitted).
The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution may
require that every committed patient be released at some unspecified point without regard to his recovery. No authority
is cited that would support this far-reaching suggestion, and
until the issue is presented the Court should intimate no
view. Petitioner has challenged neither the constitutionality
ing following every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may
be demanded, § 21-545, and at which the Government bears the burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on the critical
question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new proceeding likely
would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems give the Government an important interest in automatic commitment. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976) .

.,.
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of the District's release procedures nor the Superior Court's
findings that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. See
supra, at - - , and n. 1. In suggesting that an indefinite
commitment may be unconstitutional because of the inadequacy of release procedures, the Court has addressed an
issue not before us.
IV
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration of a
commitment following an insanity acquittal must be "definite" is highlighted by its reliance on the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence as a constitutional basis on which
to limit the commitment. A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response
to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and
rehabilitation. See, e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153,
183-186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949).
The State may punish a person convicted of a crime even if
satisfied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. 8 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the
acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal
if he has recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less
serious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains
8

One may doubt that the Court actually believes, as it professes to do
for purposes of argument, that f'the Government conceivably has an interest in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts."
Ante, at 12 (footnote omitted). As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432
A. 2d, at 369.
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ill and dangerous.

There simply is no necessary correlation
between severity of the offense and length of time necessary
for recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical
criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of
his commitment. 9
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested
by the Court's failure to provide ~idance as to what lawfully
may be do~. The Court finds it easy to order petitioner's
release
because he has been confined for longer than one
(
year, the maximum time he might have served in prison for
the act he committed. At the same time, however, the
Court leaves open the possibility that "statutory sentence reductions or other sentencing factors" might need to be taken

I
I

- --

1-t,;;..i..c~-v..--,

'
--------

r::.~:;:t42~:u~;::~~:::i/:~ii~;s /

!mum sentences. minimum sentences.,.~ r

likely sentences]
Nor does it suggest whether account must be taken of the
availability of release time or the possibility of parole. And
the Court ignores the fact that a criminal sentence does not
always correspond to a "limited period of time ' 1d., at 22.
The States e left to speculate how they may deal constitu• The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose non-criminal commitment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in excess of the period for which he could have served in prison if convicted for
those acts. Similarly, despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington
had engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges
had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, at 15, the Court did not intimate
that his commitment might have to be limited to the period of incarceration
that could have resulted had he been charged and convicted.

~
~

,

81-5195---DISSENT
JONES v. UNITED STATES

11

tionally with acquittees who might have received life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or
the death penalty.
IV
The Court's decision will cause uncertainty in the many
States that commit insanity acquittees automatically or
under lower standards than used for civil commitment, 10 for
the Court simply has failed to identify a constitutional principle that can be applied consistently. --Petitione~s--reiease has
been ordered because his hypothetical criminal sentence has
expired. Yet criminal sentences may prove irrelevant, as
the ourt pointedly refuses "to hold that the interests aserted by the Government in this case do in fact justify commitment up to the date on which a sentence would have ex- - - pired." Ante, at 22 n. 36. The possibility thus remains that
after some unspecified period of commitment the Government will be required to release even the most violent insanity acquittees. Indeed, under its opinion today, the Court
conceivably could conclude that automatic commitment of insanity acquittees itself is unconstitutional.
n short, this decision casts serious doubt on government's
authority to act upon the widely and reasonably held view
that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should
be treated differently from other candidates for commitment.
In my view, these problems confirm the wisdom of our observation that "[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas
10
A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while
many other States have a variety of unique methods of commiting insanity
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605--606, and nn. 4--6 (1981). Nineteen States commit
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id. , at 605 n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law the
Court's new requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released
following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981) .

.l: •
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fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative
options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.... " Marshall v. United
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). The Court should have
heeded this admonition.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to a
mental hospital upon being acquitted of a criminal offense
by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been
hospitalized for a period longer than he might have
served in prison had he been convicted. If the Government
seeks to recommit petitioner, it must comply with the civilommitment standards set forth in Addington v. Texas, 441
U. S. 418 (1979). I do not think that the Constitution
forbids indefinite commitment as a means of dealing with the
special problems raised by the insanity defense. I therefore dissent.
I
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be committed civilly upon clear and, convincing proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. D.C. Code § 21-545 (1981); see In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d
1233 (DC 1979). He may be released upon certification of recovery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548.
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days,
and subsequently at six-month intervals, to request a judicial
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous. §§ 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.
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2d 589, 598 (CADC 1970).
A second type of involuntary commitment follows successful invocation of the insanity defense. If a criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity-a verdict that requires
that his insanity be "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence," §24-301(j)-he is committed to a
mental hospital. § 24-301(d)(l). He may be released, with
court approval, upon certification by the hospital chief of
service. § 24-301(e). Alternatively, the committed insanity
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing within 50 days, and
thereafter at six-month intervals, at which he may prove, in
the same manner as a civilly committed person, that he is entitled to release. §§ 24-301(d)(2), (k); see Jones v. United
States, 432 A. 2d 364, 372, and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en bane).
Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital upon
being acquitted of attempted petit larceny by reason of insanity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us,
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 1 Nor are we
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release
from confinement are constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does pe1
Petitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hearing-a hearing to which he is entitled every six months. On this record
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any Jess ill or dangerous
than he was in 1976. See n. 5, infra.
2
As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important difference, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §§ 21-546, 21-548
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titioner challenge his automatic commitment following his insanity acquittal. All petitioner contends is that he must be
released because he has been committed for a period longer
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal
sentence.
II
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S.
563, 574 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that
a person as to whom those two findings were made is mentally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of society. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). Petitioner concedes that this was a congressional purpose, see
Brief for Petitioner at 9, and n. 4, and he does not challenge
his original commitment.
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432
A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme
whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certification only with court approval. § 24-301(e). Neither of these provisions is before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity
acquittees and other committed persons.
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for commitment of insane criminals is ... a regulatory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating mental patients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576;
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp.
7~74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or indeed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the
patient's suitability for release.
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite commitment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional. Ante, at 21.
In the Court's view, automatic commitment of insanity
acquittees may be justified at most "for a limited period of
time, in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been convicted
of the crime with which he was charged." Id., at 22 (footnote omitted). I do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment.

III
A

In finding that an indefinite commitment is not constitutional, the Court emphasizes the difference between an insanity verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence and
Addington's requirement for civil commitment of proof by
clear and convincing evidence. See ante, at 1~17. It is not
clear why this difference is relevant to the permissible duration of the commitment. If, as petitioner concedes in this
case, an insanity acquittal based on a preponderance of the
evidence may justify automatic commitment, no reason has

I I
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been suggested why the difference in level of proof for commitment has any further significance. The purposes of the
commitment-treatment of the patient and protection of the
patient and society-are reasonably served in both situations
by an indeterminate length of confinement. This case does
not present the question as to the proper level of proof for
determining release.
To the extent the Court suggests that the commitment itself is invalid if based on a showing of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, I disagree. In my view, there are
important differences between the class of potential civil
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees
that justify differing standards of proof. The Addington
Court expressed particular concern that members of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range
of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at
426-427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since
automatic commitment under § 24---301(d)(l) follows only if
the acquittee himself argues and proves that the act was a
product of his mental illness, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U. S. 705 (1962), there is good reason for diminished concern
as to the risk of error. 3 More important, the proof that he
committed a criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk that he is being committed for mere "idiosyn• That petitioner raised the ini,anity defense also diminishes the significance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.

.• ,
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cratic behavior," Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act
by definition is not "within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426--427. "[D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity
acquittees. 4
B
In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity acquittees,
the Court also contends that an insanity acquittal "is backward-looking, focusing only on one moment in the past,"
ante, at 16, and that "§ 301 fails to reflect the commonsense
truth that some crimes are more indicative of dangerousness
than others." Ibid. Again, I do not think these arguments
bear on the validity of an indefinite commitment. If the insanity acquittal provides an insufficient foundation for a finding of mental illness and dangerousness, then any automatic
commitment following an insanity acquittal would be precluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity acquittal may
support automatic commitment, as petitioner has conceded in
this case, then the duration of that commitment should be determined by reference to its purpose: treatment and confinement of a dangerously insane person until he has recovered.
In any event, I am not persuaded by the Court's suggestion that commission of a nonviolent criminal act such as attempted larceny is an insufficient indication of dangerous• A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the verdict
were supported by clear and convincing evidence .

.
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ness. This Court never has held that "violence," however
that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. 5 Nor was it unreasonable for Congress
to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference
of continuing mental illness. The Due Process Clause does
not require Congress to make classifications that fit every individual with the same degree of relevance. 6 By providing a
See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger,
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal.
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St.
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide by
cutting his wrists." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was
transferred to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred back to
the forensic division because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368, n.
6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to
the original commitment. See Brief for United States, at 15, n. 18.
6
For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417 (1974), we
upheld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We
recognized that a discretionary system would have been permissible, but
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be perfect or ideal."
6
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hearing only 50 days after the commitment, Congress has ensured that every acquittee has an immediate opportunity to
obtain release if he has recovered. 7
C
The Court completes its analysis by suggesting that there
may be a constitutional problem with indefinite commitment
generally. The Court states that an insanity acquittal constitutionally may support only a limited commitment because
"the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that the acquittee
will repeat his dangerous act. Ante, at 15-16. To the extent this is likely, it would be equally true with respect to a
person committed civilly pursuant to Addington. The dangerous acts that led to his civil commitment may at some
point no longer justify continued confinement. For this reason, Congress has provided periodic release hearings to ensure that the person is released upon recovery. The Court,
however, without a specific holding, casts doubt on the constitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ignore the adverse effect extended institutionalization may
have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him of
the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make
Id., at 428.
7
The Court suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding. See ante, at 17. This argument fails to consider the Government's
strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may
be demanded, §§ 21-545, 21-545, and at which the Government bears the
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on
the critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems
give the Government an important interest in automatic commitment.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976).

,.
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it difficult for him to show he has recovered." Id., at 16
(footnote omitted).
The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution may
require that every committed patient be released at some unspecified point without regard to his recovery. No authority
is cited that would support this far-reaching suggestion, and
until the issue is presented the Court should intimate no
view. Petitioner has challenged neither the constitutionality
of the District's release procedures nor the Superior Court's
findings that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. See
supra, at 2, and n. 1. In suggesting that an indefinite commitment may be unconstitutional because of the inadequacy
of release procedures, the Court has addressed an issue not
before us.
IV
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration of a
commitment following an insanity acquittal must be "definite" is highlighted by its reliance on the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence as a constitutional basis on which
to limit the commitment. A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response
to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153,
183--186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949).
The State may punish a person convicted of a crime even if
satisfied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. 8 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and
One may doubt that the Court actually believes, as it professes to do
for purposes of argument, that "the Government conceivably has an interest in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts."
Ante, at 12 (footnote omitted). As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]o8
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dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the
acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal
if he has recovered. In contrast, one who commits a less serious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his
commitment. 9
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested
by the Court's failure to provide a guiding principle as to
what lawfully may be done in the variety of sentencing and
post-sentencing situations. The Court finds it easy to order
petitioner's release because he has been confined for longer
than one year, the maximum time he might have served in
prison for the act he committed. At the same time, however, the Court leaves open the possibility that "statutory
sentence reductions or other sentencing factors" might need
ciety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432
A. 2d, at 369.
9
The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose noncriminal commitment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in excess of the period for which he could have served in prison if convicted for
those acts. Similarly, despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington
had engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges
had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, at 15, the Court did not intimate
that his commitment might have to be limited to the period of incarceration
that could have resulted had he been charged and convicted.
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to be taken into account. Ante, at 24, n. 38. Today's decision does not say whether the Due Process Clause requires
States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does it state
what should be done in the case of indeterminate sentencing
or suggest whether account must be taken of the availability
of release time or the possibility of parole. And the Court
ignores the fact that a criminal sentence does not always correspond to a "limited period of time." Id., at 22. The
States are left to speculate how they may deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have received life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the
death penalty.
V
The Court's decision will cause uncertainty in the many
States that commit insanity acquittees automatically or
under lower standards than used for civil commitment, 10 for
the Court has failed to identify a constitutional principle that
can be applied consistently. Moreover, the reasoning in the
Court's opinion casts serious doubt on government's authority to act upon the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be
treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 11
A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law the
Court's new requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released
following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981).
11
Indeed, although expiration of petitioner's hypothetical maximum sentence is decisive in this case, the Court refuses "to hold that the interests
asserted by the Government in this case do in fact justify commitment up
10
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In my view, these problems confirm the wisdom of our observation that "[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative
options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.... " Marshall v. United
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). The Court should have
heeded this admonition.

to the date on which a sentence would have expired." Ante at 22, n. 36.
Thus, the Court does not even admit that the Government has legitimate
interests in automatic commitment of insanity acquittees.
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to a
mental hospital upon being acquitted of a criminal offense
by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been
hospitalized for a period longer than he ·might have
served in prison had he been convicted. If the Government
seeks to recommit petitioner, it must comply with the civilommitment standards set forth in Addington v. Texas, 441
U. S. 418 (1979). I do not think that the Constitution
forbids indefinite commitment as a means of dealing with the
special problems raised by the insanity defense. I therefore dissent.
I
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be commit. ted civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. D.C. Code § 21-545 (1981); see In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d
1233 (DC 1979). He may be released upon certification of recovery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548.
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days,
and subsequently at six-month intervals, to request a judicial
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or

I
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dangerous. §§ 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.
2d 589, 598 (CADC 1970).
A second type of involuntary commitment follows successful invocation of the insanity defense. If a criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity-a verdict that requires
that his insanity be "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence," § 24-301(j)-he is committed to a
mental hospital. § 24-301(d)(l). He may be released, with
court approval, upon certification by the hospital chief of
service. § 24-301(e). Alternatively, the committed insanity
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing within 50 days, and
thereafter at six-month intervals, at which he may prove, in
the same manner as a civilly committed person, that he is entitled to release. §§ 24-301(d)(2), (k); see Jones v. United
States, 432 A. 2d 364, 372, and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en bane).
Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital upon
being acquitted of attempted petit larceny by reason of insanity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us,
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 1 Nor are we
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release
from confinement are constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does pe1
Petitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hearing-a hearing to which he is entitled every six months. On this record
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any less ill or dangerous
than he was in 1976. See n. 5, infra.
2
As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important difference, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certi-
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titioner challenge his automatic commitment following his insanity acquittal. All petitioner contends is that he must be
released because he has been committed for a period longer
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal
sentence.
II
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S.
563, 574 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that
a person as to whom those two findings were made is mentally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of society. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). Petitioner concedes that this was a congressional purpose, see
Brief for Petitioner at 9, and n. 4, and he does not challenge
his original commitment.
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432
fication of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §§ 21-546, 21-548
whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certification only with court approval. § 24-301(e). Neither of these provisions is before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity
acquittees and other committed persons.
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A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme
for commitment of insane criminals is . . . a regulatory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating mental patients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576;
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp.
73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or indeed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the
patient's suitability for release.
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite commitment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional. Ante, at 21.
In the Court's view, automatic commitment of insanity
acquittees may be justified at most "for a limited period of
time, in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been convicted
of the crime with which he was charged." Id., at 22 (footnote omitted). I do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment.

III
A
In finding that an indefinite commitment is not constitutional, the Court emphasizes the difference between an insanity verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence and
Addington's requirement for civil commitment of proof by
clear and convincing evidence. See ante, at 13-17. It is not
clear why this difference is relevant to the permissible duration of the commitment. If, as petitioner concedes in this
case, an insanity acquittal based on a preponderance of the
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evidence may justify automatic commitment, no reason has
been suggested why the difference in level of proof for commitment has any further significance. The purposes of the
commitment-treatment of the patient and protection of the
patient and society-are reasonably served in both situations
by an indeterminate length of confinement. This case does
not present the question as to the proper level of proof for
determining release.
To the extent the Court suggests that the commitment itself is invalid if based on a showing of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, I disagree. In my view, there are
important differences between the class of potential civil
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees
that justify differing standards of proof. The Addington
Court expressed particular concern that members of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range
of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at
426-427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if
the acquittee himself argues and proves that the act was a
product of his mental illness, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U. S. 705 (1962), there is good reason for diminished concern
as to the risk of error. 3 More important, the proof that he
committed a criminal act as a result of mental illness elimiThat petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the significance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.
8
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nates the risk that he is being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act
by definition is not "within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426-427. "[D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity
acquittees. 4
B
In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity acquittees,
the Court also contends that an insanity acquittal "is backward-looking, focusing only on one moment in the past,"
ante, at 16, and that "§ 301 fails to reflect the commonsense
truth that some crimes are more indicative of dangerousness
than others." Ibid. Again, I do not think these arguments
bear on the validity of an indefinite commitment. If the insanity acquittal provides an insufficient foundation for a finding of mental illness and dangerousness, then any automatic
commitment following an insanity acquittal would be precluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity acquittal may
support automatic commitment, as petitioner has conceded in
this case, then the duration of that commitment should be determined by reference to its purpose: treatment and confinement of a dangerously insane person until he has recovered.
In any event, I am not persuaded by the Court's suggestion that commission of a nonviolent criminal act such as attempted larceny is an insufficient indication of dangerous• A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the verdict
were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

,.
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ness. This Court never has held that "violence," however
that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. 5 Nor was it unreasonable for Congress
to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference
of continuing mental illness. The Due Process Clause does
not require Congress to make classifications that fit every individual with the same degree of relevance. 6 By providing a
See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger,
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal.
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St.
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide by
cutting his wrists." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was
transferred to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred back to
the forensic division because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368, n.
6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to
the original commitment. See Brief for United States, at 15, n. 18.
6
For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417 (1974), we
upheld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We
recognized that a discretionary system would have been permissible, but
concluded that "legislative classifi~ations need not be perfect or ideal."
Id., at 428.
5

81-5195-DISSENT
JONES v. UNITED STATES

8

hearing only 50 days after the commitment, Congress has ensured that every acquittee has an immediate opportunity to
obtain release if he has recovered. 7
C
The Court completes its analysis by suggesting that there
may be a constitutional problem with indefinite commitment
generally. The Court states that an insanity acquittal constitutionally may support only a limited commitment because
"the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that the acquittee
will repeat his dangerous act. Ante, at 11>-16. To the extent this is likely, it would be equally true with respect to a
person committed civilly pursuant to Addington. The dangerous acts that led to his civil commitment may at some
point no longer justify continued confinement. For this reason, Congress has provided periodic release hearings to ensure that the person is released upon recovery. The Court,
however, without a specific holding, casts doubt on the constitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ignore the adverse effect extended institutionalization may
have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him of
the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make
The Court suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding. See ante, at 17. This argument fails to consider the Government's
strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may
be demanded, §§ 21-544, 21-545, and at which the Government bears the
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on
the critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems
give the Government an important interest in automatic commitment.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976).
7
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it difficult for him to show he has recovered." Id., at 16
(footnote omitted).
The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution may
require that every committed patient be released at some unspecified point without regard to his recovery. No authority
is cited that would support this far-reaching suggestion, and
until the issue is presented the Court should intimate no
view. Petitioner has challenged neither the constitutionality
of the District's release procedures nor the Superior Court's
findings that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. See
supra, at 2, and n. 1. In suggesting that an indefinite commitment may be unconstitutional because of the inadequacy
of release procedures, the Court has addressed an issue not
before us.
IV
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration of a
commitment following an insanity acquittal must be "definite" is highlighted by its reliance on the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence as a constitutional basis on which
to limit the commitment. A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response
to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153,
183-186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 24&-249 (1949).
The State may punish a person convicted of a crime even if
satisfied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. 8 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and
8
One may doubt that the Court actually believes, as it professes to do
for purposes of argument, that "the Government conceivably has an interest in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts."
Ante, at 12 (footnote omitted). As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]o-
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dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the
acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal
if he has recovered. In contrast, one who commits a less serious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his
commitment. 9
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested
by the Court's failure to provide a guiding principle as to
what lawfully may be done in the variety of sentencing and
post-sentencing situations. The Court finds it easy to order
petitioner's release because he has been confined for longer
than one year, the maximum time he might have served in
prison for the act he committed. At the same time, however, the Court leaves open the possibility that "statutory
sentence reductions or other sentencing factors" might need
ciety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432
A. 2d, at 369.
9
The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose noncriminal commitment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in excess of the period for which he could have served in prison if convicted for
those acts. Similarly, despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington
had engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges
had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, at 15, the Court did not intimate
that his commitment might have to be limited to the period of incarceration
that could have resulted had he been charged and convicted.
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to be taken into account. Ante, at 24, n. 38. Today's decision does not say whether the Due Process Clause requires
States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does it state
what should be done in the case of indeterminate sentencing
or suggest whether account must be taken of the availability
of release time or the possibility of parole. And the Court
ignores the fact that a criminal sentence does not always correspond to a "limited period of time." Id., at 22. The
States are left to speculate how they may deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have received life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the
death penalty.
V
The Court's decision will cause uncertainty in the many
States that commit insanity acquittees automatically or
under lower standards than used for civil commitment, 10 for
the Court has failed to identify a constitutional principle that
can be applied consistently. Moreover, the reasoning in the
Court's opinion casts serious doubt on government's authority to act upon the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be
treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 11
10
A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law the
Court's new requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released
following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981).
11
Indeed, although expiration of petitioner's hypothetical maximum sentence is decisive in this case, the Court refuses ''to hold that the interests
asserted by the Government in this case do in fact justify commitment up
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In my view, these problems confirm the wisdom of our observation that "[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative
options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.... " Marshall v. United
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). The Court should have
heeded this admonition.

to the date on which a sentence would have expired." Ante at 22, n. 36.
Thus, the Court does not even admit that the Government has legitimate
interests in automatic commitment of insanity acquittees.
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MICHAEL JONES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF APPEALS

[March -

, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to a
mental hospital upon being acquitted of a criminal offense
by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been
hospitalized for a period longer than he might have
served in prison had he been convicted. If the Government
seeks to recommit petitioner, it must comply with the civilommitment standards set forth in Addington v. Texas, 441
U. S. 418 (1979). I do not think that the Constitution
forbids indefinite commitment as a means of dealing with the
special problems raised by the insanity defense. I therefore dissent.

I
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be committed civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. D.C. Code §21-545 (1981); see In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d
1233 (DC 1979). He may be released upon certification of recovery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548.
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days,
and subsequently at six-month intervals, to request a judicial
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or
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dangerous. §§21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.
2d 589, 598 (CADC 1970).
A second type of involuntary commitment follows successful invocation of the insanity defense. If a criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity-a verdict that requires
that his insanity be "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence," § 24-301(j)-he is committed to a
mental hospital. § 24-301(d)(l). He may be released, with
court approval, upon certification by the hospital chief of
service. § 24-301(e). Alternatively, the committed insanity
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing within 50 days, and
thereafter at six-month intervals, at which he may prove, in
the same manner as a civilly committed person, that he is entitled to release. §§ 24-301(d)(2), (k); see Jones v. United
States, 432 A. 2d 364, 372, and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en bane).
Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital upon
being acquitted of attempted petit larceny by reason of insanity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us,
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 1 Nor are we
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release
from confinement are constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does pe'Petitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hearing-a hearing to which he is entitled every six months. On this record
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any less ill or dangerous
than he was in 1976. See n. 5, infra.
2
As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important difference, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certi-
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titioner challenge his automatic commitment following his insanity acquittal. All petitioner contends is that he must be
released because he has been committed for a period longer
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal
sentence.

II
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S.
563, 574 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that
a person as to whom those two findings were made is mentally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of society. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). Petitioner concedes that this was a congressional purpose, see
Brief for Petitioner at 9, and n. 4, and he does not challenge
his original commitment.
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432
fication of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §§ 21-546, 21-548
whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certification only with court approval. § 24-301(e). Neither of these provisions is before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity
acquittees and other committed persons.
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A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme
for commitment of insane criminals is ... a regulatory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating mental patients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576;
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp.
73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or indeed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the
patient's suitability for release.
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite commitment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional. Ante, at 21.
In the Court's view, automatic commitment of insanity
acquittees may be justified at most "for a limited period of
time, in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been convicted
of the crime with which he was charged." Id., at 22 (footnote omitted). I do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment.

III
A

In finding that an indefinite commitment is not constitutional, the Court emphasizes the difference between an insanity verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence and
Addington's requirement for civil commitment of proof by
clear and convincing evidence. See ante, at 13-17. It is not
clear why this difference is relevant to the permissible duration of the commitment. If, as petitioner concedes in this
case, an insanity acquittal based on a preponderance of the
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evidence may justify automatic commitment, no reason has
been suggested why the difference in level of proof for commitment has any further significance. The purposes of the
commitment-treatment of the patient and protection of the
patient and society-are reasonably served in both situations
by an indeterminate length of confinement. This case does
not present the question as to the proper level of proof for
determining release.
To the extent the Court suggests that the commitment itself is invalid if based on a showing of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, I disagree. In my view, there are
important differences between the class of potential civil
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees
that justify differing standards of proof. The Addington
Court expressed particular concern that members of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range
of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at
426--427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if
the acquittee himself argues and proves that the act was a
product of his mental illness, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U. S. 705 (1962), there is good reason for diminished concern
as to the risk of error. 3 More important, the proof that he
committed a criminal act as a result of mental illness elimi3
That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the significance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.
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nates the risk that he is being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act
by definition is not "within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426-427. "[D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity
acquittees. 4
B
In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity acquittees,
the Court also contends that an insanity acquittal "is backward-looking, focusing only on one moment in the past,"
ante, at 16, and that "§ 301 fails to reflect the commonsense
truth that some crimes are more indicative of dangerousness
than others." Ibid. Again, I do not think these arguments
bear on the validity of an indefinite commitment. If the insanity acquittal provides an insufficient foundation for a finding of mental illness and dangerousness, then any automatic
commitment following an insanity acquittal would be precluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity acquittal may
support automatic commitment, as petitioner has conceded in
this case, then the duration of that commitment should be determined by reference to its purpose: treatment and confinement of a dangerously insane person until he has recovered.
In any event, I am not persuaded by the Court's suggestion that commission of a nonviolent criminal act such as attempted larceny is an insufficient indication of dangerous'A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the verdict
were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

81-5195---DISSENT
JONES v. UNITED STATES

7

ness. This Court never has held that "violence," however
that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. 5 Nor was it unreasonable for Congress
to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference
of continuing mental illness. The Due Process Clause does
not require Congress to make classifications that fit every individual with the same degree of relevance. 6 By providing a
See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger,
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal.
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St.
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide by
cutting his wrists." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was
transferred to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred back to
the forensic division because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368, n.
6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to
the original commitment. See Brief for United States, at 15, n. 18.
"For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417 (1974), we
upheld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We
recognized that a discretionary system would have been permissible, but
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be perfect or ideal."
Id., at 428.
In rejecting the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, the Court re5
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hearing only 50 days after the commitment, Congress has ensured that every acquittee has an immediate opportunity to
obtain release if he has recovered. 7
C
The Court completes its analysis by suggesting that there
may be a constitutional problem with indefinite commitment
generally. The Court states that an insanity acquittal constitutionally may support only a limited commitment because
lies on the fact that "research on the relationship of non-violent criminal
behavior . . . to future dangerousness is scarce. We do not even know
whether it is statistically valid as a predictor of similar non-violent behavior, much less of behavior posing more serious risks to self or others."
Ante, at 14 (emphasis in original). The Court also undertakes its own
analysis of the meaning of the available psychiatric evidence. See id., at
14-17, nn. 26-29. I cannot agree with the notion that Congress' power to
legislate in this area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric
community. We have recognized co~irmaHy the "uncertainty of diagnosis
in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment. The only
thing that can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy
regarding mental disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment . . . ." Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366, 375 (1956). See
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981); Addington, 441 U. S., at
429-430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 535-537 (1968) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.). The lesson we have drawn is not that government may not act
in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that we should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.
7
The Court suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding. See ante, at 17. This argument fails to consider the Government's
strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may
be demanded, §§ 21-544, 21-545, and at which the Government bears the
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on
the critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems
give the Government an important interest in automatic commitment.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976).
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"the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that the acquittee
will repeat his dangerous act. Ante, at 15--16. To the extent this is likely, it would be equally true with respect to a
person committed civilly pursuant to Addington. The dangerous acts that led to his civil commitment may at some
point no longer justify continued confinement. For this reason, Congress has provided periodic release hearings to ensure that the person is released upon recovery. The Court,
however, without a specific holding, casts doubt on the constitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ignore the adverse effect extended institutionalization may
have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him of
the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make
it difficult for him to show he has recovered." Id., at 16
(footnote omitted).
The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution may
require that every committed patient be released at some unspecified point without regard to his recovery. No authority
is cited that would support this far-reaching suggestion, and
until the issue is presented the Court should intimate no
view. Petitioner has challenged neither the constitutionality
of the District's release procedures nor the Superior Court's
findings that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. See
supra, at 2, and n. 1. In suggesting that an indefinite commitment may be unconstitutional because of the inadequacy
of release procedures, the Court has addressed an issue not
before us.
IV
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration of a
commitment following an insanity acquittal must be "definite" is highlighted by its reliance on the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence as a constitutional basis on which
to limit the commitment. A particular sentence of incarcera-

81-519~DISSENT
10

JONES v. UNITED STATES

tion is chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response
to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153,
183--186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949).
The State may punish a person convicted of a crime even if
satisfied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. 8 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the
acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal
if he has recovered. In contrast, one who commits a less serious act may be confined for longer period if he remains ill
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his
commitment. 9

a

8
One may doubt that the Court actually believes, as it professes to do
for purposes of argument, that "the Government conceivably has an interest in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts."
Ante, at 12 (footnote omitted). As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432
A. 2d, at 369.
9
The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose noncriminal commitment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in excess of the period for which he could have served in prison if convicted for
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The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested
by the Court's failure to provide a guiding principle as to
what lawfully may be done in the variety of sentencing and
post-sentencing situations. The Court finds it easy to order
petitioner's release because he has been confined for longer
than one year, the maximum time he might have served in
prison for the act he committed. At the same time, however, the Court leaves open the possibility that "statutory
sentence reductions or other sentencing factors" might need
to be taken into account. Ante, at 24, n. 38. Today's decision does not say whether the Due Process Clause requires
States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does it state
what should be done in the case of indeterminate sentencing
or suggest whether account must be taken of the availability
of release time or the possibility of parole. And the Court
ignores the fact that a criminal sentence does not always correspond to a "limited period of time." Id., at 22. The
States are left to speculate how they may deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have received life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the
death penalty.
V
The Court's decision will cause uncertainty in the many
States that commit insanity acquittees automatically or
under lower standards than used for civil commitment, 10 for
those acts. Similarly, despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington
had engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges
had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, at 15, the Court did not intimate
that his commitment might have to be limited to the period of incarceration
that could have resulted had he been charged and convicted.
10
A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94

81-5195-DISSENT

12

JONES v. UNITED STATES

the Court has failed to identify a constitutional principle that
can be applied consistently. Moreover, the reasoning in the
Court's opinion casts serious doubt on government's authority to act upon the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be
treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 11
In my view, these problems confirm the wisdom of our observation that "[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative
options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.... " Marshall v. United
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). The Court should have
heeded this admonition.

Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4--6 (1981). Nineteen States commit
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law the
Court's new requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released
following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen.
A~ _ /. . .
Stat. §53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981).
- - - - - - - - -~ ~
11
Indeed, although expiration of petitioner's h othetical maximum sen'
,an
:t i
tence is ecisive in this case, the Court r ~ o hold that the interests
asserte by the Government in this case do "in fact justify commitment
without clear and convincing evidence up to the date on which his sentence
would have expired." Ante at 22, n. 36. Thus, the Court does not even
~ that the Government has legitimate interests in automatic commit'
,y,< ~
ment of insanity acquittees.

titioner challenge dire y his automatic commitment following his insanity acqui tal. Rather, his argument is that an
insanity acquittal pr vides an inadequate basis for an indefinite commitment.
pecifically, he contends that he must be
released because he has been committed for a period longer
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum sentence.
We do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical maximum prison
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment.

III
A

In arguing that an indefinite commitment is unconstitutional, petitioner emphasizes the difference between an inc,s a ~ based on a preponderance of the evidence and
Addington's requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence for civil commitment. It is not self-evident why this
difference is relevant to the permissible duration of the commitment. If, as petitioner concedes, an insanity acquittal
based on a preponderance of the evidence may justify automatic commitment, no reason has been suggested why the
difference in level of proof for commitment has any further
significance. The purposes of the commitment-treatment
of the patient and protection of the patient and society-are
reasonably served in both situations by an indeterminate
length of confinement.
To the extent petitioner suggests that the commitment itself is invalid if based on a showing of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, we disagree. There are important
differences between the class of potential civil commitment
candidates and the class of insanity acquittees that justify differing standards of proof. The Addington Court expressed
before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy of the
release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed persons.
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particular concern that members of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior which might be
perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional
disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is
generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426-427. See also
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575. In view of this
concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the risk of error."
Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since automatic commit~
ment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if the acquittee himsez v
-~~,,/~
. ~ proves that the act was a product of his mental
~~r - : .
Y-- ill~ess, 11 see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962), there
u-j ~
is good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of error. 12
~ ~~
More important, the proof that he committed a criminal act
as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk that he is
~
being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act by definition is not "within
a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 ,U. S.,
at 426-427. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,"
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity acquittees. 13

c~;

In this case petitioner stipulated that he had committed the offense by
reason of insanity.
12
That the aquittee raised the insanity defense also diminishes the significance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.
13
A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the verdict
11

J
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B
In asserting the invalidity of indefinite commitment of insanity acquittees, petitioner also argues that the judgment of
insanity ¥et'dtet- demonstrates only a past, not a present, condition, and that the commission of one criminal act does not
suffice to establish dangerousness. Again, we do not think
these arguments bear on the validity of an indefinite commitment. If the insanity acquittal provides an insufficient foundation for a finding of mental illness and dangerousness, then
any automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal
would be precluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity acquittal may support~ utomatic commitment, as petitioner has
conceded iR thii' ca"~ then the duration of that commitment
should be determined by reference to its purpose: treatment
and confinement of a dangerously insane person until he has
recovered.
We also reject petitioner's implicit challenge to any commitment on the basis of the finding of insanity at the criminal
trial. We are not persuaded by petitioner's contention that
commission of a single, nonviolent criminal act is an insufficient indication of dangerousness. This Court never has
held that "violence," however that term might be defined, is
a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. 14 Nor was it
were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
1
• See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger,
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal.
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the
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unreasonable for Congress to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of continuing mental illness.
The Due Process Clause does not require Congress to make
classifications that fit every individual with the same degree
of relevance. 15 Because a hearing is provided within 50 days
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St.
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide by
cutting his wrists." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was
transferred to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred back to
the forensic division because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368,
n. 6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the original commitment. See Brief for United States, at 15,
n. 18.
~
15
For example, Jll. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974), we
eld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We
recognized that a discretionary system would have been permissible, but
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be perfect or ideal."
d., at 428.
In rejecting the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, petitioner complains that "[w]hen Congress enacted the present statutory scheme, it did
not cite any empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons who
have committed a criminal act are likely to commit additional dangerous
acts in the future." Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. Petitioner further argues that the available research fails to support the predictive value of
prior dangerous acts. See id., at 13-14. _We do rn,t &g:F-ee ~
__
____.tlM.t-Congr~ powed,Q lee:isl.ttotQ iJl- this-,a.rQa eepel'l~B-tha reseaPeh een- ..,,.--~ - - -~eiffl~a-bTttttri:rs:vrtrr.·mrc·:-eeffM'~~-~- We have recognized repeatedly the
"uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional
judgment. The only thing that can be said about the present state of
knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not
reached finality of judgment .... " Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S.
366, 375 (1956). See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981); Adding-

81-5195-DISSENT
12

JONES v. UNITED STATES

of the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee
has prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has recovered. 16 We therefore conclude that a ~ t of not guilty by
reason of insanity is a sufficient foundation for commitment of
an insanity acquittee for the purposes of treatment and the
protection of society. 17
C
Petitioner's principal argument is that, whatever the validity of automatic commitment following an insanity acquital,
the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence provides the
constitutional limit for his commitment. We do not agree
that the permissible duration of such a commitment is affected by the criminal penalties the acquittee might have received. A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to
reflect society's view of the proper response to commission of
a particular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerton, 441 U. S., at 429--430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 535-537 (1968)
(opinion of MARSHALL, J.). The lesson we have drawn is not that government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that we should
pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.
1
• Petitioner suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding. This argument fails to consider the Government's strong interest in
avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following
every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded,
§§ 21-544, 21-545, and at which the Government bears the burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on the critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new proceeding likely
would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems give the Government an important interest in automatic commitment. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976).
17
Petitioner also has raised an equal-protection challenge to the fact that
a jury is available at a civil commitment hearing, see § 21-544, but not at
the 50-day hearing for a committed insanity acquittee. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that "this difference is justified by the fact that the
acquittee has had a right to a jury determination of his sanity at the time of
the offense." 432 A. 2d, at 373.
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ations such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
See, e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183-186 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Williams
v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949). The State may
punish a person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he
is unlikely to commit further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. 18 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he
has recovered. In contrast, one who commits a less serious
act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill and
dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his
commitment. 19
IV
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime
by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the govern18
As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369.
19
The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose noncriminal commitment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in excess of the period for which he could have served in prison if convicted for
those acts.
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ment, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to
a mental institution until such time as he has regained his
sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. This
holding accords with the widely and reasonably held view
that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should
be treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 20 We have observed before that "[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad
and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation. . . ."
Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). This
admonition has particular force in the context of legislative
efforts to deal with the special problems raised by the insanity defense.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
is affirmed.
So ordered.

20
A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law a
requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53a~7(b) (Supp. 1981).
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MICHAEL JONES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURT OF APPEALS

[April - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he
might have served in prison had he been convicted.
I

In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may not
be acquitted by reason of insanity unless his insanity is "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence."
D.C. Code§ 24-301(j) (1981). 1 If he successfully invokes the
insanity defense, he is committ~d to a mental hospital.
Section 24-301(j) provides:
"(j) Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in
such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his plea of not guilty or
within fifteen days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for
good cause permit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting attorney written notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person
accused of an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at
the time of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the
issue, is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence."
1
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§ 24-301(d)(l). 2

The statute provides several ways of obtaining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee
is entitled to a hearing to determine his eligibility for release,
at which he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous.
§ 24-301(d)(2). 3 If he fails to meet this burden at the 50-day
hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently may be released, with court approval, upon certification of his recovery
by the hospital chief of service. § 24-301(e). 4 AlternaSection 24-301(d)(l) provides:
"(d)(l) If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground
that he was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a
hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or subsection (e)."
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible only if the defendant himself raised the insanity defense. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369
u. s. 705 (1962).
3
Section 24-301(d)(2) provides in relevant part:
"(2)(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine whether
he is entitled to release from custody ....
"(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the hearing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney
and hold the hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall have the
burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear
appropriate."
The statute does not specify the standard for determining release, but the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals heid in this case that, as in release
proceedings under § 24-301(e) and § 21-545(b), the confined person must
show that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous to himself or others. See 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (1981) (en bane).
'Section 24-301(e) provides in relevant part:
"(e) Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally ill
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the superintendent of such
hospital certifies (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in
2

~~~
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tively, the acquittee is entit d to a judicial hearing every six
months at which he may stablish by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is ent" ed to release. § 24-301(k). 5
Independent of its commitment of insanity acquittees, the
District of Columbia also has adopted a civil-commitment procedure, under which an individual may be committed upon
the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable
future be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the person is entitled to unconditional release from the hospital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of the court in which the
person was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney
or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever office
prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the
court to order the unconditional release of the person so confined from further hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days from the time said certificate was filed and served as above; but the court in its discretion may,
or upon the objection of the United States or the District of Columbia shall,
after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence as to the mental condition of the person so confined may be submitted, including the testimony of
one or more psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh the
evidence and, if the court finds that such person has recovered his sanity
and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, the
court shall order such person unconditionally released from further confinement in said hospital. If the court does not so find, the court shall order
such person returned to said hospital. ... "
• Section 24-30l(k) provides in relevant part:
"(k)(l) A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pursuant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released
from custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release, or
other relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction
to order his release, to release him from custody, to change the conditions
of his release, or to grant other relief....
"(3) ... On all issues raised by his motion, the person shall have the
burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the person is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or
unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release, or other relief, the
court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate. . . .
"(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or successive motion
for relief under this section more often than once every 6 months. A court
for good cause shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more
often than once every 6 months."
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clear and convincing proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. § 21-545(b). 6
The individual may demand a jury in the civil-commitment
proceeding. § 21-544. Once committed, a person may be
released at any time upon certification of recovery by the
hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548. Alternatively,
the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, and subsequently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial hearing at
which he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous.
§ 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F. 2d 589, 598
(CADC 1970).
II
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for attempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia Superior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one
year. D.C. Code §§ 22-103, 22-2202 (1981). The court ordered petitioner committed to St. Elizabeth's, a public hospital for the mentally ill, for a determination of his competency
to stand trial. 7 On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist
submitted a report to the court stating that petitioner was
competent to stand trial, that petitioner suffered from
6

Section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part:

"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of

that illness, likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at
liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public."
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into the statute the
due process requirement of "clear and convincing" proof).
7
Section 24-301(a) authorizes the court to "order the accused committed
to the District of Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital designated by the court, for such reasonable period as the court may determine
for examination and observation and for care and treatment if such is necessary by the psychiatric staff of said hospital. "

•r
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"Schizophrenia, paranoid type," and that petitioner's alleged
offense was "the product of his mental disease." Record 51.
The court ruled that petitioner was competent to stand trial.
Petitioner subsequently decided to plead not guilty by reason
of insanity. The Government did not contest the plea, and it
entered into a stipulation of facts with petitioner. On March
12, 1976, the Superior Court found petitioner not guilty by
reason of insanity and committed him to St. Elizabeth's pursuant to § 24-301(d)(l).
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing required by § 24-301(d)(2)(A). A psychologist from St. Elizabeth's testified on behalf of the Government that, in the opinion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer from paranoid
schizophrenia and that "because his illness is still quite active, he is still a d~nger to himself and to others." Record 9.
Petitioner's counsel conducted a brief cross-examination, and
presented no evidence. 8 The court then found that "the defendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of his mental illness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to himself and others." Id., at 13. Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeth's.
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some procedural confusion, a release hearing pursuant to § 24-301(k)(2)
was held on February 22, 1977. Petitioner demanded that
he be unconditionally released or recommitted pursuant to
the civil commitment standards in § 21-545(b), including a
jury trial and proof by clear and convincing evidence of his
illness and dangerousness. The Superior Court denied petitioner's request for a civil commitment hearing, reaffirmed
its findings at the May 25 hearing, and continued petitioner's
commitmiih to St. Elizabeth's.
.
Petitioner appealed to the District of Qolumbia Court of
Appeals. A panel of the court ·affirmed the Superior Court,
396 A. 2d 183 (1978), but then granted rehearing and re8
Petitioner's counsel seemed concerned primarily about obtaining a
transfer for petitioner to a less restrictive wing of the hospital. See
Record 10-11.
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versed, 411 A. 2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard the
case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court. 432 A. 2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals rejected the argument "that the length of the prison sentence
[petitioner] might have received determines when he is entitled to release or civil commitment under Title 24 of the D.C.
Code." Id., at 368. It then held that _the various differences between civil commitment and commitment of insanity
acquittees were justified under the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment. I d. 1 at 371-376.
We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and now
affirm.
III
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S.
563, 574 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that
a person as to whom those two findings were made is mentally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of society. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970).
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432
A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme
for commitment of insane criminals is ... a regulatory, pro-
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phylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating mental patients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576;
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp.
73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or indeed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the
patient's suitability for release.
In this case petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's
upon being acquitted of attempted larceny by reason of insanity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us,
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 9 Nor are we
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release
from confinement are constitutional. 10 Nor, indeed, does pePetitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hearing-a hearing to which he is entitled every six months. On this record
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any less ill or dangerous
than he was in 1976. See n. 14, infra.
·
0
' As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important difference, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §§ 21-546, 21-548
whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certification only with court approval. § 24-301(e). These provisions are not
9
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he
might have served in prison had he been convicted.
JUSTICE POWELL
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In the District of ColumbiaI a _ 1.·,..m""i~ns::;
alllfd~e'.:f.-e ndant may
~ acquitted by reason of insanity •m.i= his insanity is "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence."
D. C. Code § 24-301(j) (1981). 1 If he successfully invokes
the insanity defense, he is committed to a mental hospital.

Section 24-301(j) provides:
"Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his plea of not guilty or within fifteen days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for good cause
permit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting attorney written notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person accused of
an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time
of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is
affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence."
1
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§ 24-301(d)(l). 2

The statute provides several ways of obtaining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee
is entitled to a judicial hearing to determine his eligibility for
release, at which he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous. § 24-301(d)(2). 3 If he fails to meet this burden
at the 50-day hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently
may be released, with court approval, upon certification of
his recovery by the hospital chief of service. § 24-301(e). 4
Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial hear2

Section 24--301(d)(l) provides:

"If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense

raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he
was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant
to this subsection or subsection (e)."
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible only if the defendant himself raised the insanity defense. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907,
p. 74 (1970); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962).
3
Section 24--301(d)(2) provides in relevant part:
"(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall have a hearing,
unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine whether he
is entitled to release from custody ....
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the hearing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney
and hold the hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall have
the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear
appropriate."
The statute does not specify the standard for determining release, but the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in this case that, as in release
proceedings under § 24--301(e) and § 21-545(b), the confined person must
show that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous to himself or others. See 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (1981) (en bane).
'Section 24--301(e) provides in relevant part:
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ing every six months at which he may establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to release.
§ 24-301(k). 5 •
"Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally ill
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the superintendent of such
hospital certifies (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in
the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable
future be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the person is entitled to unconditional release from the hospital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of the court in which the
person was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney
or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever office
prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the
court to order the unconditional release of the person so confined from further hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days from the time said certificate was filed and served as above; but the court in its discretion may,
or upon the objection of the United States or the District of Columbia shall,
after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence as to the mental condition of the person so confined may be submitted, including the testimony of
one or more psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh the
evidence and, if the court finds that such person has recovered his sanity
and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, the
court shall order such person unconditionally released from further confinement in said hospital. If the court does not so find, the court shall order
such person returned to said hospital. ... "
5
Section 24--301(k) provides in relevant part:
"(1) A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pursuant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released from
custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release, or other
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction to
order his release, to release him from custody, to change the conditions of
his release, or to grant other relief....
(3) ... On all issues raised by his motion, the person shall have the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the person is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release, or other relief, the
court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate ....
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or successive motion
for relief under this section more often than once every 6 months. A court
for good cause shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more
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Independent of its provision for the commitment of insanity acquittees, the District of Columbia also has adopted a
civil-commitment procedure, under which an individual may
be committed upon clear and convincing proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. § 21-545(b). 6 The individual may demand a jury in the
civil-commitment proceeding. § 21-544. Once committed, a
patient may be released at any time upon certification of recovery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548.
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days,
and subsequently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous. § 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F. 2d
589, 598 (CADC 1970).

II
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for attempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia Superior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one
year. §§ 22-103, 22-2202. The court ordered petitioner
committed to St. Elizabeths, a public hospital for the mentally ill, for a determination of his competency to stand trial. 7
often than once every 6 months."
6
Section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part:
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of
that illness, likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at
liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public."
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into the statute the
due process requirement of "clear and convincing" proof).
7
Section 24-301(a) authorizes the court to "order the accused committed
to the District of Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital designated by the court, for such reasonable period as the court may determine
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On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist submitted a report
to the court stating that petitioner was competent to stand
trial, that petitioner suffered from "Schizophrenia, paranoid
type," and that petitioner's alleged offense was "the product
of his mental disease." Record 51. The court ruled that petitioner was competent to stand trial. Petitioner subsequently decided to plead not guilty by reason of insanity.
The Government did not contest the plea, and it entered into
a stipulation of facts with petitioner. On March 12, 1976, the
Superior Court found petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to
§ 24-301(d)(l).
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing required by § 24-301(d)(2)(A). A psychologist from St. Elizabeths testified on behalf of the Government that, in the opinion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer from paranoid
schizophrenia and that "because his illness is still quite active, he is still a danger to himself and to others." Record 9.
Petitioner's counsel conducted a brief cross-examination, and
presented no evidence. 8 The court then found that "the defendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of his mental illness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to himself and others." Id., at 13. Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeths.
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some procedural confusion, a second release hearing was held on February 22, 1977. Petitioner demanded that he be released unconditionally or recommitted pursuant to the civil-commitment standards in § 21-545(b), including a jury trial and proof
by clear and convincing evidence of his mental illness and
dangerousness. The Superior Court denied petitioner's refor examination and observation and for care and treatment if such is necessary by the psychiatric staff of said hospital."
8
Petitioner's counsel seemed concerned primarily about obtaining a
transfer for petitioner to a less restrictive wing of the hospital. See
Record 10-11.

81-5195-OPINION
6

JONES v. UNITED STATES

quest for a civil-commitment hearing, reaffirmed the findings
made at the May 25, 1976, hearing, and continued petitioner's
commitment to St. Elizabeths. 9
Petitioner appealed to the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Superior Court,
396 A. 2d 183 (1978), but then granted rehearing and reversed, 411 A. 2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard the
case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court. 432 A. 2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals rejected the argument "that the length of the prison sentence
[petitioner] might have received determines when he is entitled to release or civil commitment under Title 24 of the D. C.
Code." Id., at 368. It then held that the various differences between civil commitment and commitment of insanity
acquittees were justified under the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 371-376.
We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and now
affirm.
III
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979).
Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate
purpose for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U. S. 563, 574 (1975). Congress has determined that a person found not guilty by reason of insanity should be committed indefinitely to a mental institution for treatment and the
protection of society. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73--74
9
"A subsequent motion for unconditional release under § 301(k) was denied in March of 1977. Three months later, however, [petitioner] was
granted conditional release on terms recommended by St. Elizabeths' staff,
allowing daytime and overnight visits into the community. He was also
admitted into the civil division of the hospital, though as a result of disruptive behavior, he was retransferred to the forensic division." Jones v.
United States, 432 A. 2d 364, 368, n. 6 (1981) (en bane).
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(1970); Jones v. United States, 432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme for commitment of insane
criminals is ... a regulatory, prophylactic statute, based on
a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and
rehabilitating mental patients"). Petitioner does not contest
the Government's authority to commit a mentally ill and dangerous person indefinitely to a mental institution, but rather
contends that "the petitioner's trial was not a constitutionally adequate hearing to justify an indefinite commitment."
Brief for Petitioner 14.
Petitioner's argument rests principally on Addington v.
Texas, supra, in which the Court held that the Due Process
Clause requires the Government in a civil-commitment proceeding to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. 441 U. S., at
426-427. Petitioner contends that these due-process standards were not met in his case because the judgment of not
guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute a finding of
present mental illness and dangerousness and because it was
established only by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 Peti10
In the Court of Appeals petitioner apparently based these arguments
on equal protection rather than due process, arguing that it was irrational
for the Government to deny him a civil-commitment hearing at which the
Government bore the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
See 432 A. 2d, at 371. Both petitioner and the Government acknowledge
that this equal protection argument essentially duplicates petitioner's due
process argument. That is, if the Due Process Clause does not require
that an insanity acquittee be given the particular procedural safeguards
provided in a civil-commitment hearing under Addington, then there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for distinguishing
between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees. See
Reply Brief for Petitioner 22-23; Brief for Government 55. We agree, and
therefore address petitioner's arguments in terms of the Due Process
Clause.
Petitioner does raise one additional equal protection argument that
stands on its own. The District of Columbia provides for a jury at civilcommitment hearings, see § 21-544, and petitioner contends that equal
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tioner then concludes that the Government's only conceivably
legitimate justification for automatic commitment is to ensure that insanity acquittees do not escape confinement entirely, and that this interest can justify commitment at most
for a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the acquittee could have received if convicted. Because petitioner
has been hospitalized for longer than the one year he might
have served in prison, he asserts that he should be released
unconditionally or recommitted under the civil-commitment
procedures. 11
A

We turn first to the question whether the finding of insanprotection requires that insanity acquittees also be permitted to demand a
jury at the 50-day hearing. Because we determine that an acquittee's
commitment is based on the judgment of insanity at the criminal trial,
rather than solely on the findings at the 50-day hearing, see infra, at--,
the relevant equal protection comparison concerns the procedures available
at the criminal trial and at a civil-commitment hearing. We therefore
agree with the Court of Appeals that the absence of a jury at the 50-day
hearing "is justified by the fact that the acquittee has had a right to a jury
determination of his sanity at the time of the offense." 432 A. 2d, at 373.
11
It is important to note what issues are not raised in this case. Petitioner has not sought appellate review of the Superior Court's findings in
1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, and, indeed,
the record does not indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release
hearing-a hearing to which he was entitled every six months.
Nor are we asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release
are constitutional. As noted above, see supra, at 2-4, the basic standard
for release is the same under either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer is dangerous or mentally ill.
There is an important difference, however, in the release provisions for
these two groups. A patient who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of
service, see § 21-546, whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certification only with court approval, see § 24-301(e).
Neither of these provisions is before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy of the release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed persons.
See Jones v. United States, 432 A. 2d, at 373, n. 19.
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ity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment. A verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the
defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness.
Congress has determined that these findings constitute an
adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous
and mentally ill person. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra,
at 74 (expressing fear that "dangerous criminals, particularly
psychopaths, [may] win acquittals of serious criminal charges
on grounds of insanity" and yet "escape hospital commitment"); S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955)
("Where [the] accused has pleaded insanity as a defense to a
crime, and the jury has found that the defendant was, in fact,
insane at the time the crime was committed, it is just and
reasonable in the Committee's opinion that the insanity, once
established, should be presumed to continue and that the accused should automatically be confined for treatment until it
can be shown that he has recovered"). We cannot say that it
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional for Congress to make this determination.
The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates
dangerousness~2 [§ee Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705,
714 (1962) (The fact that the accused was found to have committed a criminal act is "strong evidence that his continued
liberty could imperil 'the preservation of the peace"f} Indeed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least as perThe proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee committed a
criminal act distinguishes this case from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715
(1972), in which the Court held that a person found incompetent to stand
trial could not be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of the finding of
incompetency. In Jackson there never was any affirmative proof that the
accused had committed criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous.
12
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suasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be
made in a civil-commitment proceeding. 13 We do not agree
with petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness
is not established by proof that a person committed a nonviolent crime against property constitutes a danger to society. This Court never has held that "violence," however
that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. 14
13
In attacking the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, petitioner
complains that "[w]hen Congress enacted the present statutory scheme, it
did not cite any empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons who
have committed a criminal act are likely to commit additional dangerous
acts in the future." Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. He further argues that
the available research fails to support the predictive value of prior dangerous acts. See id., at 13-14. We do not agree with the suggestion that
Congress' power to legislate in this area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric community. We have recognized repeatedly the
"uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional
judgment. The only thing that can be said about the present state of
knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not
reached finality of judgment.... " Greenwood v. United States, 350
U. S. 366, 375 (1956). See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981);
Addington, 441 U. S., at 429-430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 53fr.537
(1968) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.). The lesson we have drawn is not that
government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that we
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.
14
See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger,
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the
a crimes o
same as to both.") (footnote omitted).
also may e no e
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal.
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual, of course, should
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's continuing commitment may well rest in significant part on evidence independent of his acquittal by reason of insanity of
the crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St.
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Nor can we say that it was unreasonable for Congress to
determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of
continuing mental illness. It comports with common sense
to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient
to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and
in need of treatment. The precise evidentiary force of the
insanity acquittal, of course, may vary from case to case, but
the Due Process Clause does not require Congress to make
classifications that fit every individual with the same degree
of relevance. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417,
428 (1974). Because a hearing is provided within 50 days of
the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee has
prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has recovered.
Petitioner also argues that, whatever the evidentiary value
of the insanity acquittal, the Government lacks a legitimate
reason for committing insanity acquittees automatically because it can introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a
subsequent civil proceeding. This argument fails to consider
the Government's strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity
acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded,
§ 21-545, and at which the Government bears the burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing
on the critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate
much of the criminal trial. These problems accent the Government's important interest in automatic commitment. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). We thereElizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide."
Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred to the civil
division of the hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic division
because of disruptive behavior. Jones v. United States, 432 A. 2d, at 368,
n. 6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the original commitment. See Brief for United States at 15 n. 18.
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fore conclude that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity
is a sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquittee for the purposes of treatment and the protection of
society.
B
Petitioner next contends that his indefinite commitment is
unconstitutional because the proof of his insanity was based
only on a preponderance of the evidence, as compared to
Addington's civil-commitment requirement of proof by clear
and convincing evidence. In equating these situations, petitioner ignores important differences between the class of potential civil commitment candidates and the class of insanity
acquittees that justify differing standards of proof. The
Addington Court expressed particular concern that members
of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic
of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within
a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S.,
at 426-427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(i) follows only if the
acquittee himself advances insanity as a defense and proves
that his criminal act was a product of his mental illness, 15
there is good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of
error. 16 More important, the proof that he committed a
15
See n. 2, supra. In this case petitioner stipulated that he had committed the offense by reason of insanity.
16
That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the significance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.
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criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk
that he is being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior,"
Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act by definition is not
"within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable."
Id. , at 426-427.
We therefore conclude that concerns critical to our decision in
Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity
acquittees. Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the
same standard of proof in both cases. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity
acquittees. 17
C
The remaining question is whether petitioner nonetheless
is entitled to his release because he has been hospitalized for
a period longer than he could have been incarcerated if convicted. The Due Process Clause requires that "the nature
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to
the purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The
committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dangerous. See
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576; Jones v.
17

A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the likely legislative response to a
holding that an insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment
only if the verdict were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
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United States, 432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No.
91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to
predict how long it will take for any given individual to recover-or indeed whether he ever will recover-Congress
has chosen, as it has with respect to civil commitment, to
leave the length of commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the patient's suitability for release.
In light of the congressional purposes underlying commitment of insanity acquittees, we think petitioner clearly errs
in contending that an acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence provides the constitutional limit for his commitment.
A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect
society's view of the proper response to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations
such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. See,
e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183-186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168 (1963); Williams v.
New York, 337 U. S. 241, 24~249 (1949). The State may
punish a person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he
is unlikely to commit further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. 18 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he
has recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less serious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical crimi18
As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369.
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nal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his
commitment. 19
V
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by
reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Government,
on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to a
mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. This holding accords with the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be
treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 20
1
• The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity
acquittee, and none suggested that a person under non-criminal confinement could not be confined in excess of the period for which he could have
served in prison if convicted for the dangerous acts he had committed.
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the
length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to
suggest any clear guidelines for deciding when a patient must be released.
For example, he does not suggest whether the Due Process Clause would
require States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does he explain what should be done in
the case of indeterminate sentencing or suggest whether account would
have to be taken of the availability of release time or the possibility of parole. And petitioner avoids entirely the important question of how his
theory would apply to those persons who committed especially serious
criminal acts. Petitioner thus would leave the States to speculate how
they may deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have received life
imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the death
penalty.
20
A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while
many other States have a variety of special methods of commiting insanity
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We have observed before that "[w ]hen Congress undertakes
to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts
should be cautious not to rewrite legislation. . . . " Marshall
v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). This admonition
has particular force in the context of legislative efforts to deal
with the special problems raised by the insanity defense.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id., at 605 n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law petitioner's suggested requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981).
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he
might have served in prison had he been convicted.

I
In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may not
be acquitted by reason of insanity unless his insanity is "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence."
D. C. Code § 24-301(j) (1981). 1 If he successfully invokes
the insanity defense, he is committed to a mental hospital.
Section 24-30l(j) provides:
"Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his plea of not guilty or within fifteen days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for good cause
permit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting attorney written notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person accused of
an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time
of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is
affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence."
1
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§ 24-301(d)(l). 2

The statute provides several ways of obtaining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee
is entitled to a judicial hearing to determine his eligibility for
release, at which he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous. § 24-301(d)(2). 3 If he fails to meet this burden
at the 50-day hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently
may be released, with court approval, upon certification of
his recovery by the hospital chief of service. § 24-301(e). 4
Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial hear2

Section 24--301(d)(l) provides:

"If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense

raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he
was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant
to this subsection or subsection (e)."
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible only if the defendant himself raised the insanity defense. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907,
p. 74 (1970); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962).
3
Section 24--301(d)(2) provides in relevant part:
"(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall have a hearing,
unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine whether he
is entitled to release from custody ....
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the hearing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney
and hold the hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall have
the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear
appropriate."
The statute does not specify the standard for determining release, but the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in this case that, as in release
proceedings under § 24--301(e) and § 21-545(b), the confined person must
show that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous to himself or others. See 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (1981) (en bane).
' Section 24--301(e) provides in relevant part:
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ing every six months at which he may establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to release.
§24-301(k). 5
"Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally ill
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the superintendent of such
hospital certifies (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in
the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable
future be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the person is entitled to unconditional release from the hospital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of the court in which the
person was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney
or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever office
prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the
court to order the unconditional release of the person so confined from further hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days from the time said certificate was filed and served as above; but the court in its discretion may,
or upon the objection of the United States or the District of Columbia shall,
after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence as to the mental condition of the person so confined may be submitted, including the testimony of
one or more psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh the
evidence and, if the court finds that such person has recovered his sanity
and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, the
court shall order such person unconditionally released from further confinement in said hospital. If the court does not so find, the court shall order
such person returned to said hospital. ... "
5
Section 24-301(k) provides in relevant part:
"(1) A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pursuant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released from
custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release, or other
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction to
order his release, to release him from custody, to change the conditions of
his release, or to grant other relief....
(3) ... On all issues raised by his motion, the person shall have the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the person is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release, or other relief, the
court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate ....
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or successive motion
for relief under this section more often than once every 6 months. A court
for good cause shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more
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Independent of its provision for the commitment of insanity acquittees, the District of Columbia also has adopted a
civil-commitment procedure, under which an individual may
be committed upon clear and convincing proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. §21-545(b). 6 The individual may demand a jury in the
civil-commitment proceeding. § 21-544. Once committed, a
patient may be released at any time upon certification of recovery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548.
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days,
and subsequently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous. § 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, - U. S. App. D. C. - , - , 427 F. 2d 589, 598 (1970).

II
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for attempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia Superior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one
year. §§ 22-103, 22-2202. The court ordered petitioner
committed to St. Elizabeths, a public hospital for the mentally ill, for a determination of his competency to stand trial. 7
often than once every 6 months."
6
Section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part:
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of
that illness, likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at
liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public."
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into the statute the
due process requirement of "clear and convincing" proof).
7
Section 24-301(a) authorizes the court to "order the accused committed
to the District of Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital desig-
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On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist submitted a report
to the court stating that petitioner was competent to stand
trial, that petitioner suffered from "Schizophrenia, paranoid
type," and that petitioner's alleged offense was "the product
of his mental disease." Record 51. The court ruled that petitioner was competent to stand trial. Petitioner subsequently decided to plead not guilty by reason of insanity.
The Government did not contest the plea, and it entered into
a stipulation of facts with petitioner. On March 12, 1976, the
Superior Court found petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to
§ 24-301(d)(l).
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing required by § 24-301(d)(2)(A). A psychologist from St. Elizabeths testified on behalf of the Government that, in the opinion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer from paranoid
schizophrenia and that "because his illness is still quite active, he is still a danger to himself and to others." Transcript 9. Petitioner's counsel conducted a brief cross-examination, and presented no evidence. 8 The court then found
that "the defendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of
his mental illness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to
himself or others." Id., at 13. Petitioner was returned to
St. Elizabeths. IPetitioner obtained new counsel and, following some procect'ural confusion, a second release hearing was
held on February 22, 1977. By that date petitioner had been
hospitalized for more than one year, the maximum period he
could have spent if prison if he had been convicted. On
basis he demanded that he be released unconditionally or re-

-Mt

nated by the court, for such reasonable period as the court may determine
for examination and observation and for care and treatment if such is necessary by the psychiatric staff of said hospital."
8
Petitioner's counsel seemed concerned primarily about obtaining a
transfer for petitioner to a less restrictive wing of the hospital. See Transcript 11-12.
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committed pursuant to the civil-commitment standards in
§ 21-545(b), including a jury trial and proof by clear and convincing evidence of his mental illness and dangerousness.
The Superior Court denied petitioner's request for a civilcommitment hearing, reaffirmed the findings made at the
May 25, 1976, hearing, and continued petitioner's commitment to St. Elizabeths. 9
Petitioner appealed to the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Superior Court,
396 A. 2d 183 (1978), but then granted rehearing and reversed, 411 A. 2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard the
case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court. 432 A. 2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals rejected the argument "that the length of the prison sentence
[petitioner] might have received determines when he is entitled to release or civil commitment under Title 24 of the D. C.
Code." Id., at 368. It then held that the various statutory
differences between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees were justified under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 371-376.
We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and now
affirm.
III
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979).
Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate
purpose for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
"A subsequent motion for unconditional release under § 301(k) was denied in March of 1977. Three months later, however, [petitioner] was
granted conditional release on terms recommended by St. Elizabeths' staff,
allowing daytime and overnight visits into the community. He was also
admitted into the civil division of the hospital, though as a result of disruptive behavior, he was retransferred to the forensic division." 432 A. 2d, at
368, n. 6.
9
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U. S. 563, 574 (1975). Congress has determined that a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in the
District of Columbia should be committed indefinitely to a
mental institution for treatment and the protection of society.
See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970); Jones v. United
States, 432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme for commitment of insane criminals is . . . a regulatory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating
mental patients"). Petitioner does not contest the Government's authority to commit a mentally ill and dangerous person indefinitely to a mental institution, but rather contends
that "the petitioner's trial was not a constitutionally adequate hearing to justify an indefinite commitment."
Brief for Petitioner 14.
Petitioner's argument rests principally on Addington v.
Texas, supra, in which the Court held that the Due Process
Clause requires the Government in a civil-commitment proceeding to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. 441 U. S., at
426-427. Petitioner contends that these due process standards were not met in his case because the judgment of not
guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute a finding of
present mental illness and dangerousness and because it was
established only by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 Peti10
In the Court of Appeals petitioner apparently based these arguments
on equal protection rather than due process, arguing that it was irrational
for the Government to deny him a civil-commitment hearing at which the
Government bore the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
See 432 A. 2d, at 371. Both petitioner and the Government acknowledge
that this equal protection argument essentially duplicates petitioner's due
process argument. That is, if the Due Process Clause does not require
that an insanity acquittee be given the particular procedural safeguards
provided in a civil-commitment hearing under Addington, then there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for distinguishing
between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees. See
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tioner then concludes that the Government's only conceivably
legitimate justification for automatic commitment is to ensure that insanity acquittees do not escape confinement entirely, and that this interest can justify commitment at most
for a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the acquittee could have received if convicted. Because petitioner
has been hospitalized for longer than the one year he might
have served in prison, he asserts that he should be released
unconditionally or recommitted under the District's civilcommitment procedures. 11
Reply Brief for Petitioner 22-23; Brief for Government 55. We agree, and
therefore address petitioner's arguments in terms of the Due Process
Clause.
Petitioner does raise one additional equal protection argument that
stands on its own. The District of Columbia provides for a jury at civilcommitment hearings, see § 21-544, and petitioner contends that equal
protection requires that insanity acquittees also be permitted to demand a
jury at the 50-day hearing. Because we determine that an acquittee's
commitment is based on the judgment of insanity at the criminal trial,
rather than solely on the findings at the 50-day hearing, see infra, at 9-12,
the relevant equal protection comparison concerns the procedures available
at the criminal trial and at a civil-commitment hearing. We therefore
agree with the Court of Appeals that the absence of a jury at the 50-day
hearing "is justified by the fact that the acquittee has had a right to a jury
determination of his sanity at the time of the offense." 432 A. 2d, at 373.
11
It is important to note what issues are not raised in this case. Petitioner has not sought appellate review of the Superior Court's findings in
1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, and, indeed,
the record does not indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release
hearing-a hearing to which he was entitled every six months.
Nor are we asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release
are constitutional. As noted above, see supra, at 2-4, the basic standard
for release is the same under either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill.
There is an important difference, however, in the release provisions for
these two groups. A patient who is committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of
service, see § 21-546, whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be re-
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A
We turn first to the question whether the finding of insanity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment. A verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the
defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness.
Congress has determined that these findings constitute an
adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous
and mentally ill person. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra,
at 74 (expressing fear that "dangerous criminals, particularly
psychopaths, [may] win acquittals of serious criminal charges
on grounds of insanity" and yet "escape hospital commitment"); S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955)
("Where [the] accused has pleaded insanity as a defense to a
crime, and the jury has found that the defendant was, in fact,
insane at the time the crime was committed, it is just and
reasonable in the Committee's opinion that the insanity, once
established, should be presumed to continue and that the accused should automatically be confined for treatment until it
can be shown that he has recovered"). We cannot say that it
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional for Congress to make this determination.
The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates
dangerousness. 12 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705,
leased upon such certification only with court approval, see § 24-301(e).
Neither of these provisions is before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy of the release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed persons.
See 432 A. 2d, at 373, n. 19.
12
The proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee committed a
criminal act distinguishes this case from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715
(1972), in which the Court held that a person found incompetent to stand
trial could not be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of the finding of
incompetency. In Jackson there never was any affirmative proof that the
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714 (1962) (The fact that the accused was found to have committed a criminal act is "strong evidence that his continued
liberty could imperil 'the preservation of the peace'"). Indeed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least as persuasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be
made in a civil-commitment proceeding. 13 We do not agree
with petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness
is not established by proof that a person committed a nonviolent crime against property. This Court never has held
that "violence," however that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. 14
accused had committed criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous.
13
In attacking the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, petitioner
complains that "[w]hen Congress enacted the present statutory scheme, it
did not cite any empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons who
have committed a criminal act are likely to commit additional dangerous
acts in the future." Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. He further argues that
the available research fails to support the predictive value of prior dangerous acts. See id., at 13-14. We do not agree with the suggestion that
Congress' power to legislate in this area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric community. We have recognized repeatedly the
"uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional
judgment. The only certain thing that can be said about the present state
of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not
reached finality of judgment .... " Greenwood v. United States, 350
U. S. 366, 375 (1956). See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981);
Addington, 441 U. S., at 429--430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 53&--537
(1968) (plurality opinion). The lesson we have drawn is not that government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that courts
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.
14
See Overholser v. O'Beirne, - - App. D. C. - - , 302 F. 2d 852, 861
(1961) (Burger, J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'nondangerous' is to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the
statute is the same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted
that crimes of theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the
criminal to escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal.
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual, of course, should
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Nor can we say that it was unreasonable for Congress to
determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of
continuing mental illness. It comports with common sense
to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient
to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and
in need of treatment. The precise evidentiary force of the
insanity acquittal, of course, may vary from case to case, but
the Due Process Clause does not require Congress to make
classifications that fit every individual with the same degree
of relevance. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417,
428 (1974). Because a hearing is provided within 50 days of
the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee has
prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has recovered.
Petitioner also argues that, whatever the evidentiary value
of the insanity acquittal, the Government lacks a legitimate
reason for committing insanity acquittees automatically because it can introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a
subsequent civil proceeding. This argument fails to consider
the Government's strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity
acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded,
§ 21-544, and at which the Government bears the burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing
on the critical question whether the acquittee has recovered,
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's continuing commitment may well rest in significant part on evidence independent of his acquittal by reason of insanity of
the crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St.
Elizabeths reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide."
Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred to the civil
division of the hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic division
because of disruptive behavior. See n. 9, supra. The Government also
advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on an emergency civil
basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the original commitment.
See Brief for United States at 15 n. 18.
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the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate much of
the criminal trial. These problems accent the Government's
important interest in automatic commitment. See Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). We therefore conclude that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is a sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquittee for
the purposes of treatment and the protection of society.
B

Petitioner next contends that his indefinite commitment is
unconstitutional because the proof of his insanity was based
only on a preponderance of the evidence, as compared to
Addington's civil-commitment requirement of proof by clear
and convincing evidence. In equating these situations, petitioner ignores important differences between the class of potential civil-commitment candidates and the class of insanity
acquittees that justify differing standards of proof. The
Addington Court expressed particular concern that members
of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic
of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within .
a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S.,
at 426--427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if
the acquittee himself advances insanity as a defense and
proves that his criminal act was a product of his mental illness, 15 there is good reason for diminished concern as to the
risk of error. 16 More important, the proof that he committed
1
In this case petitioner stipulated that he had commit• See n. 2, supra.
ted the offense by reason of insanity.
16
That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the significance of the deprivation. The Addi ngton Court noted that the social
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a criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk
that he is being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior,"
Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. A criminal act by definition is
not "within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable."
Id., at 426--427.
We therefore conclude that concerns critical to our decision
in Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity
acquittees. Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the
same standard of proof in both cases. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity
acquittees. 11
C
The remaining question is whether petitioner nonetheless
is entitled to his release because he has been hospitalized for
a period longer than he could have been incarcerated if convicted. The Due Process Clause "requires that the nature
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to
the purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of com:rpitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.
11
A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be a likely legislative response to a holding that an insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if
the verdict were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
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committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576; Jones v. United States,
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp.
73--74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or indeed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the
patient's suitability for release.
In light of the congressional purposes underlying commitment of insanity acquittees, we think petitioner clearly errs
in contending that an acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence provides the constitutional limit for his commitment.
A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect
society's view of the proper response to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations
such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. See,
e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183--186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168 (1963); Williams v.
New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949). The State may
punish a person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he
is unlikely to commit further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. 18 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he
has recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less serious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill
18

As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a 'defendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369.
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and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his
commitment. 19
IV
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime
by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to
a mental institution until such time as he has regained his
sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. This
holding accords with the widely and reasonably held view
that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should
be treated differently from other candidates for commit19
The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity
acquittee, and none suggested that a person under noncriminal confinement could not be hospitalized in excess of the period for which he could
have served in prison if convicted for the dangerous acts he had committed.
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the
length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to
suggest any clear guidelines for deciding when a patient must be released.
For example, he does not suggest whether the Due Process Clause would
require States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does he explain what should be done in
the case of indeterminate sentencing or suggest whether account would
have to be taken of the availability of release time or the possibility of parole. And petitioner avoids entirely the important question how his theory would apply to those persons who committed especially serious criminal acts. Petitioner thus would leave the States to speculate how they
may deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have received life
imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the death
penalty.
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ment. 20 We have observed before that "[w ]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad
and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation. . .. "
Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). This
admonition has particular force in the context of legislative
efforts to deal with the special problems raised by the insanity defense.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
is
Affirmed.

A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while
many other States have a variety of special methods of commiting insanity
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605--606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law petitioner's suggested requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released' following expiration of his hypothetical maximum criminal sentence.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981).
20
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he
might have served in prison had he been convicted.

I
In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may _.,
be acquitted by reason of insanity if his insanity is "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence." D. C.
Code § 24-301(j) (1981). 1
If he successfully invokes
the insanity defense, he is committed to a mental hospital.
§ 24-301(d)(l). 2 The statute provides several ways of obSection 24--301(j ) provides:
"Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his plea of not guilty or within 15
days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for good cause permit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting attorney written
notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person accused of an
offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of
its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence."
2
Section 24--301(d)(l) provides:

I

1

I
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taining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee
is entitled to a judicial hearing to determine his eligibility for
release, at which he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous. § 24-301(d)(2). 3 If he fails to meet this burden
at the 50-day hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently
may be released, with court approval, upon certification of
his recovery by the hospital chief of service. § 24-301(e). 4
Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial hear"If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense
raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he
was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant
to this subsection or subsection (e) of this section."
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible only if the defendant himself raised the insanity defense. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907,
p. 74 (1970); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962).
3
Section 24-301(d)(2) provides in relevant part:
"(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) of this section shall \
have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine whether he is entitled to release from custody....
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the hearing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney
and hold the hearing. Within 10 days from the date the hearing was
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall have
the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear
appropriate."
The statute does not specify the standard for determining release, but the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in this case that, as in release
proceedings under § 24-301(e) and § 21--545(b), the confined person must
show that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous to himself or others. See 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (1981) (en bane).
'Section 24-301(e) provides in relevant part:
''Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally ill
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the superintendent of such
hospital certifies: (1) That such person has recovered his sanity; (2) that, in

I

I
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ing every six months at which he may establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to release.
§ 24-301(k). 5

Independent of its provision for the commitment of insanity acquittees, the District of Columbia also has adopted a
civil-commitment procedure, under which an individual may
the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable
future be dangerous to himself or others; and (3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the person is entitled to his unconditional release from the
hospital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of the court in which the
person was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney
or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever office
prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the
court to order the unconditional release of the person so confined from further hospitalization at the expiration of 15 days from the time said certificate was filed and served as above; but the court in its discretion may, or
upon objection of the United States or the District of Columbia shall, after
due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence as to the mental condition of
the person so confined may be submitted, including the testimony of 1 or
more psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh the evidence
and, if the court finds that such person has recovered his sanity and will not
in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, the court shall
order such person unconditionally released from further confinement in
said hospital. If the court does not so find, the court shall order such person returned to said hospital. ... "
• Section 2W01(k) provides in relevant part:
"(1) A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pursuant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released from
custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release, or other
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction to
order his release, to release him from custody, to change the conditions of
his release, or to grant other relief....
(3) . .. On all issues raised by his motion, the person shall have the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the person is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release, or other relief, the
court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate ....
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or successive motion
for relief under this section more often than once every 6 months. A court
for good cause shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more
often than once every 6 months."

f

f
I
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be committed upon clear and convincing proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. §21-545(b). 6 The individual may demand a jury in the
civil-commitment proceeding. § 21-544. Once committed, a
patient may be released at any time upon certification of recovery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548.
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days,
and subsequently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or
dangerous. § 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 138 U. S. ,
App. D. C. 319, 328, 427 F. 2d 589, 598 (1970).

II
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for attempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia Superior Court.on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one
year. §§ 22-103, 22-2202. The court ordered petitioner
committed to St. Elizabeths, a public hospital for the mentally ill, for a determination of his competency to stand trial. 7
On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist submitted a report
6

Section 21-545(b) provides in relevant part:
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of
that illness, is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain
at liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public."
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into the statute the
due process requirement of "clear and convincing" proof).
7
Section 24-301(a) authorizes the court to "order the accused committed
to the District of Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital designated by the court, for such reasonable period as the court may determine
for examination and observation and for care and treatment if such is necessary by the psychiatric staff of said hospital."

I
I
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to the court stating that petitioner was competent to stand
trial, that petitioner suffered from "Schizophrenia, paranoid
type," and that petitioner's alleged offense was "the product
of his mental disease." Record 51. The court ruled that petitioner was competent to stand trial. Petitioner subsequently decided to plead not guilty by reason of insanity.
The Government did not contest the plea, and it entered into
a stipulation of facts with petitioner. On March 12, 1976, the
Superior Court found petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to
§ 24--301(d)(l).
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing required by § 24--301(d)(2)(A). A psychologist from St. Elizabeths testified on behalf of the Government that, in the opinion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer from paranoid
schizophrenia and that "because his illness is still quite active, he is still a danger to himself and to others." Transcript 9. Petitioner's counsel conducted a brief cross-examination, and presented no evidence. 8 The court then found
that "the defendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of
his mental illness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to
himself or others." Id., at 13. Petitioner was returned to
St. Elizabeths.
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some procedural confusion, a second release hearing was held on February 22, 1977. By that date petitioner had been hospitalized
for more than one year, the maximum period he could have
spent if prison if he had been convicted. On that basis he
demanded that he be released unconditionally or recommitted pursuant to the civil-commitment standards in
§ 21-545(b), including a jury trial and proof by clear and convincing evidence of his mental illness and dangerousness.
Petitioner's counsel seemed concerned primarily about obtaining a
transfer for petitioner to a less restrictive wing of the hospital. See Transcript 11-12.
8

I
f
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The Superior Court denied petitioner's request for a civilcommitment hearing, reaffirmed the findings made at the
May 25, 1976, hearing, and continued petitioner's commitment to St. Elizabeths. 9
Petitioner appealed to the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Superior Court,
396 A. 2d 183 (1978), but then granted rehearing and reversed, 411 A. 2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard the
case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court. 432 A. 2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals rejected the argument "that the length of the prison sentence
[petitioner] might have received determines when he is entitled to release or civil commitment under Title 24 of the D. C.
Code." Id., at 368. It then held that the various statutory
differences between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees were justified under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 371-376.
We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and now
affirm.

III
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979).
Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate
purpose for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U. S. 563, 574 (1975). Congress has determined that a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in the
District of Columbia should be committed indefinitely to a
9

"A subsequent motion for unconditional release under § 301(k) was denied in March of 1977. Three months later, however, [petitioner] was
granted conditional release on terms recommended by St. Elizabeths' staff,
allowing daytime and overnight visits into the community. He was also
admitted into the civil division of the hospital, though as a result of disruptive behavior, he was retransferred to the forensic division. " 432 A. 2d, at
368, n. 6.
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mental institution for treatment and the protection of society.
See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970); Jones v. United
States, 432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme for commitment of insane criminals is ... a regulatory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating
mental patients"). Petitioner does not contest the Government's authority to commit a mentally ill and dangerous person indefinitely to a mental institution, but rather contends
that "the petitioner's trial was not a constitutionally adequate hearing to justify an indefinite commitment."
Brief for Petitioner 14.
Petitioner's argument rests principally on Addington v.
Texas, supra, in which the Court held that the Due Process
Clause requires the State in a civil-commitment proceeding
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. 441 U. S., at
426-427. Petitioner contends that these due process standards were not met in his case because the judgment of not
guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute a finding of
present mental illness and dangerousness and because it was
established only by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 PetiIn the Court of Appeals petitioner apparently based these arguments
on equal protection rather than due process, arguing that it was irrational
for the Government to deny him a civil-commitment hearing at which the
Government bore the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
See 432 A. 2d, at 371. Both petitioner and the Government aclmowledge
that this equal protection argument essentially duplicates petitioner's due
process argument. That is, if the Due Process Clause does not require
that an insanity acquittee be given the particular procedural safeguards
provided in a civil-commitment hearing under Addington, then there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for distinguishing
between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees. See
Reply Brief for Petitioner 22-23; Brief for Government 55. We agree, and
therefore address petitioner's arguments in terms of the Due Process
Clause.
Petitioner does raise one additional equal protection argument that
10

f
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tioner then concludes that the Government's only conceivably
legitimate justification for automatic commitment is to ensure that insanity acquittees do not escape confinement entirely, and that this interest can justify commitment at most
for a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the acquittee could have received if convicted. Because petitioner
has been hospitalized for longer than the one year he might
have served in prison, he asserts that he should be released
unconditionally or recommitted under the District's civilcommitment procedures. 11
stands on its own. The District of Columbia provides for a jury at civilcommitment hearings, see § 21-544, and petitioner contends that equal
protection requires that insanity acquittees also be permitted to demand a
jury at the 50-day hearing. Because we determine that an acquittee's
commitment is based on the judgment of insanity at the criminal trial,
rather than solely on the findings at the 50-day hearing, see infra, at 9--12,
the relevant equal protection comparison concerns the procedures available
at the criminal trial and at a civil-commitment hearing. We therefore
agree with the Court of Appeals that the absence of a jury at the 50-day
hearing "is justified by the fact that the acquittee has had a right to a jury
determination of his sanity at the time of the offense." 432 A. 2d, at 373.
11
It is important to note what issues are not raised in this case. Petitioner has not sought appellate review of the Superior Court's findings in
1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, and, indeed,
the record does not indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release
hearing-a hearing to which he was entitled every six months.
Nor are we asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release
are constitutional. As noted above, see supra, at 2--4, the basic standard
for release is the same under either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill.
There is an important difference, however, in the release provisions for
these two groups. A patient who is committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of
service, see § 21-546, whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certification only with court approval, see § 24--301(e).
Neither of these provisions is before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy of the release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed persons.
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A

We turn first to the question whether the finding of insanity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment. A verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the
defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness.
Congress has determined that these findings constitute an
adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous
and mentally ill person. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra,
at 74 (expressing fear that "dangerous criminals, particularly
psychopaths, [may] win acquittals of serious criminal charges
on grounds of insanity" and yet "escape hospital commitment"); S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 '(1955)
("Where [the] accused has pleaded insanity as a defense to a
crime, and the jury has found that the defendant was, in fact,
insane at the time the crime was committed, it is just and
reasonable in the Committee's opinion that the insanity, once
established, should be presumed to continue and that the accused should automatically be confined for treatment until it
can be shown that he has recovered"). We cannot say that it
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional for Congress to make this determination.
The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates
dangerousness. 12 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705,
714 (1962) (The fact that the accused was found to have committed a criminal act is "strong evidence that his continued
See 432 A. 2d, at 373, n. 19.
12
The proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee committed a
criminal act distinguishes this case from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715
(1972), in which the Court held that a person found incompetent to stand
trial could not be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of the finding of
incompetency. In Jackson there never was any affirmative proof that the
accused had committed criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous.
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liberty could imperil 'the preservation of the peace'"). Indeed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least as persuasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be
made in a civil-commitment proceeding.13 We do not agree
with petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness
is not established by proof that a person committed a nonviolent crime against property. This Court never has held
that "violence," however that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. 14
18
In attacking the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, petitioner
complains that "[w]hen Congress enacted the present statutory scheme, it
did not cite any empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons who
have committed a criminal act are likely to commit additional dangerous
acts in the future." Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. He further argues that
the available research fails to support the predictive value of prior dangerous acts. See id., at 13-14. We do not agree with the suggestion that
Congress' power to legislate in this area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric community. We have recognized repeatedly the
"uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional
judgment. The only certain thing that can be said about the present state
of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not
reached finality of judgment .... " Greenwood v. United States, 350
U. S. 366, 375 (1956). See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981);
Addington, 441 U. S., at 429--430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 535-537
(1968) (plurality opinion). The lesson we have drawn is not that government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that courts
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.
14
See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 112 U. S. App. D. C. 267, 276, 302 F. 2d
852,861 (1961) (Burger, J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry
as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually
less violent than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the same as to both.") (footnote omitted). Thus, the \
"danger" may be to property rights as well as to persons. It also may be
noted that crimes of theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts
of the criminal to escape or the victim to protect property or the police to
apprehend the fleeing criminal.
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual, of course, should
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's continuing_ commitment may well rest in signifi-

I
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Nor can we say that it was unreasonable for Congress to
determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of
continuing mental illness. It comports with common sense
to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient
to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and
in need of treatment. The precise evidentiary force of the
insanity acquittal, of course, may vary from case to case, but
the Due Process Clause does not require Congress to make
classifications that fit every individual with the same degree
of relevance. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417,
428 (1974). Because a hearing is provided within 50 days of
the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee has
prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has recovered.
Petitioner also argues that, whatever the evidentiary value
of the insanity acquittal, the Government lacks a legitimate
reason for committing insanity acquittees automatically because it can introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a
subsequent civil proceeding. This argument fails to consider
the Government's strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity
acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded,
§ 21-544, and at which the Government bears the burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing
on the critical question whether the acquittee has recovered,
the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate much of
the criminal trial. These problems accent the Government's
cant part on evidence independent of his acquittal by reason of insanity of
the crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St.
Elizabeths reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide."
Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred to the civil
division of the hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic division
because of disruptive behavior. See n. 9, supra. The Government also
advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on an emergency civil
basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the original commitment.
See Brief for United States at 15, n. 18.
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important interest in automatic commitment. See Mathews
v. ·Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). We therefore conclude that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is a sufficient found~tion for commitment of an insanity acquittee for
the purposes of treatment and the protection of society.

B
Petitioner next contends that his indefinite commitment is
unconstitutional because the proof of his insanity was based
only on a preponderance of the evidence, as compared to
Addington's civil-commitment requirement of proof by clear
and convincing evidence. In equating these situations, petitioner ignores important differences between the class of potential civil-commitment candidates and the class of insanity
acquittees that justify differing standards of proof. The
Addington Court expressed particular concern that members
of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic
of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within
a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S.,
at 426--427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if
the acquittee himself advances insanity as a defense and
proves that his criminal act was a product of his mental illness, 16 there is good reason for diminished concern as to the
risk of error. 16 More important, the proof that he committed
16

See n. 2, supra. In this case petitioner stipulated that he had committed the offense by reason of insanity.
16
That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the significance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U. S. , at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and
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a criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk
that he is being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior,"
Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. A criminal act by definition is
not "within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable."
Id., at 426-427.
We therefore conclude that concerns critical to our decision
in Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity
acquittees. Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the
same standard of proof in both cases. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S.
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment of insanity
acquittees. 17
C

The remaining question is whether petitioner nonetheless
is entitled to his release because he has been hospitalized for
a period longer than he could have been incarcerated if convicted. The Due Process Clause "requires that the nature
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to
the purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The
committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v.
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect.
11
A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be a likely legislative response to a holding that an insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if
the verdict were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
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Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575--576; Jones v. United States,
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp.
73--74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or indeed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the
patient's suitability for release.
In light of the congressional purposes underlying commitment of insanity acquittees, we think petitioner clearly errs
in contending that an acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence provides the constitutional limit for his commitment.
A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect
society's view of the proper response to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations
such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. See,
e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183--186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168 (1963); Williams v.
New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248--249 (1949). The State may
punish a person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he
is unlikely to commit further crimes.
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. 18 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he
has recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less serious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for
18
As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369.
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recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his
commitment. 19
IV
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime
by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to
a mental institution until such time as he has regained his
sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. This
holding accords with the widely and reasonably held view
that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should
be treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 20 We have observed before that "[w]hen Congress un19
The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity
acquittee, and none suggested that a person under noncriminal confinement could not be hospitalized in excess of the period for which he could
have served in prison if convicted for the dangerous acts he had committed.
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the
length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to
suggest any clear guidelines for deciding when a patient must be released.
For example, he does not suggest whether the Due Process Clause would
require States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does he explain what should be done in
the case of indeterminate sentencing or suggest whether account would
have to be taken of the availability of release time or the possibility of parole. And petitioner avoids entirely the important question how his theory would apply to those persons who committed especially serious criminal acts. Petitioner thus would leave the States to speculate how they
may deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have received life
imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the death
penalty.
20
A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions
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dertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad
and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation .... "
Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). This
admonition has particular force in the context of legislative
efforts to deal with the special problems raised by the insanity defense.
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
IS

Affirmed.

provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment.
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law petitioner's suggested requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released following expiration of his hypothetical maximum criminal sentence.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981).

